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ABSTRACT
Gissberg, Kristin Sue. PhD. The University of Memphis. December, 2012.
Temporal Subjectivities: Time and Difference in Hegel’s Thought. Dr. Thomas Nenon.
The primary purpose of the dissertation is to fill what I saw to be a gap in
Hegelian scholarship, and in particular, in feminist critiques of Hegel. What I have found
to be lacking in much of the literature on Hegel, and those that centerpiece his
understanding of subjective differences, is that by isolating parts of his thought, they do
not follow his work through to its conclusion, and in doing such, they critique him for a
position he does not commit to. In reply, the dissertation assumes a double gesture: I take
up the feminist concern with difference generally speaking, but also surpass feminist
critiques, which take issue to centerpiece what is wanting in Hegel, by positively fleshing
out the productive resources and platforms for thinking and living difference, as are
immanent in his philosophy. The project is feminist, insofar as it concerns itself with
rethinking sexual differences, sexualities, and genders, but it also extends beyond the
limitations of these specific themes. Following Hegel, our main preoccupation concerns
the cultivation of self-understanding – or as Hegel states, responding to the Greek
dictum— to know thyself—which necessarily involves subject matters pertinent to
feminist thought overall.
The dissertation tracks the development of recurring themes that take place on
increasing levels of specificity. Doing such, the project highlights different instantiations
of difference, and argues that, when closely examined, each bears a significant relation to
time. By accentuating the most controversial elements in Hegel’s philosophy, those that
have served as reasons for dismissing Hegel’s thought for countless critics, elements
which are commonly relegated to the category of “other” — madness, sexual difference,
iii

racial and gender difference, religion—I have argued that through recourse to the
temporal aspects latent in each of these, one can find perspectives in Hegel’s thought
itself that not only challenge the fortitude of the critiques heretofore waged against him,
but also and moreover, provide productive ways for advancing new perspectives on these
standpoints.
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Introduction:
At least since Frantz Fanon famously stated that, “every human problem cries out to be
considered on the basis of time,”1 the question of the temporal in feminist projects,
political philosophies, deconstructive readings, and queer movements has moved from
the margin to the center.
Thinkers of difference, such as Fanon, Julia Kristeva, and Judith Halberstam –
each argue for different models of temporality, based on race, gender, and sexual identity,
respectively.2 Yet, since these alternative examples of the experience of time and
temporality are bound to subjective identities – race, gender, and sexuality, the allegiance
of these categories of identification and the experiences of time seem to risk further
perpetuating the problem of exclusion – that is, creating more modes of temporality, but
ones which are specific to and reserved for certain identities. If we take seriously the
multiplicities of temporality, then effectively there could be temporalities for even the
most unlikely suspects: nationalities, smokers, rocks in a riverbed, bears in hibernation,
birds in migration, and the list could go on.
Yet, while each may have their own experience of temporality, they are never
simply isolated, never purely personal, but emerge in a historical context. Each person is
formed and comes to understand themselves in light of their belonging to a multiplicity of
different, and at times, overlapping identities; the categories by which one comes to
understand herself develop, and gain purchase within a historical and social backdrop that
1

Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks. Trans. Richard Philcox, New York: Grove Press,
2008, p. xvi.
2

Halbestam, J. M.. In A Queer Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives.
New York, NY: New York University Press, 2005; Kristeva, Julia. “Women’s Time.” New
Maladies of the Soul. Trans. Ross Guberman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995
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is never solely of one’s choosing. Within this matrix, the question of how to think
subjectivity that is requisite for recognition— particularly in underrepresented,
historically undervalued, or positions of subordination—without binding one to
limitation, becomes particularly pressing.
Indeed, time and subjective standpoints contribute to the ways in which we see
the world and its inhabitants; both constitute our vision, our judgment, our acceptance,
and in turn, our existential goals and social/political investments. Nonetheless, to remain
steadfastly wedded to identity—as do politics motivated by claims to identity—risks
erasing the particularity of individuals in the name of a group identity, and thereby reinvoking the classical philosophical problem of the one and the many. This means that
while analyses of difference are imperative, the efficacy of establishing an identity politic
on the basis of such difference no longer suffices to meet the particular needs of our time.
On the other hand, personal and collective approaches to difference that have called for
blindness to difference have proven to be equally ineffective insofar as they erase
difference in the service of hegemonic power.
The problem of how to understand multiplicity outside lines of exclusion, has
deeply occupied feminist projects, many of which, knowingly or not, have found
solutions originating in the thought of G.W.F. Hegel.3 As the pre-eminent thinker of

3

See for example: “Despite the fact that feminists have rarely found much in his work to
commend him, one of the main problems with which feminist theorists have been concerned—
how to conceptualize identity and difference or, in the case of feminism, how to reconcile
political action in the name of “women” as an identity category with the multiplicity of
differences between individual women—was one he could have shed light on, as Patricia Mills
has pointed out. Hegel’s understanding of identity as always involving difference and
differentiation, and of difference as containing identity, is one historical but oftenunacknowledged root of contemporary feminist endeavors to understand political and personal
identities as relational and non-essential. He suggests in Phenomenology of Spirit that
“womankind” [Weiblichkeit] as the inner enemy of the state is created by its attempt to subjugate
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difference in the 19th century, the question of unity and differentiation, of the one and the
many, is central to Hegel’s thought. To be clear however, Hegel’s notion of identity
(Identität)—which connotes unity—must be understood within the philosophical context
from which it sprung, and thereby distinguished from the contemporary idea of “identity”
as a group allegiance or perseverance. Hegel aimed his polemic against the philosophies
of his time – in particular the Romanticism of Schelling and Hölderlin among others—
who, on his reading, sought to erase difference in the name of perfect unity or wholeness,
despite the fact that in The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate and in his Jena theological
writings more broadly, he himself was greatly influenced by Hölderlin’s “Identity
Theory.”4 Hegel fiercely criticized the idea of reason that he saw operating in the
philosophy of his time as one that characterized thinking most fundamentally as an act of
disengaged reflection. Such lines of thought, he argues construct planes of differentiation
and form antinomies, dividing irrevocably what Hegel, in response, thinks of in dialectic
unison, cultivating an absolute thought that argued above all, for unity in difference.
Hegel’s problematic with the philosophies of his time recurs today for us in the
it. This argument was later echoed by feminist theorists who pointed out that only a group
excluded from universality could have an identity as “women,” “black,” or “gay,” whereas the
corresponding categories conceived of as universal or “the majority”—“man,” “white,” or
“heterosexual”—were not seen to constitute an identity at all. Thus group identity is not the result
of an inherent unity but is only a consequence of repression or exclusion.” Werner, Laura. “The
Gender of Spirit” in Hegel’s Philosophy and Feminist Thought: Beyond Antigone?. Eds.
Kimberly Hutchings and Tuija Pulkkinen, New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, 196.
4

Describing Hegel’s engagement with Hölderlin, H.S. Harris writes: “Hölderlin was
already working with an “Identity” theory in which actuality was necessarily prior to possibility.
The actual experience of “being” - the original unity of Subject and Object - is an intuition of the
divine life that is enjoyed by the poet. The critical philosophy of a moral harmony that ought to
exist (and hence must, at least, be "possible") can never be more than a reflective imitation of this
actual intuition. Hegel began, at once, to conceptualize both the "history of mankind" and the
founding of his new "religion of “freedom” in terms of this “philosophy of identity.” Harris, H.S..
“Hegel’s Intellectual Development to 1807.” The Cambridge Companion to Hegel. Ed. Frederick
C. Beiser, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.32.
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multifarious ways in which we approach differences, and in turn, respond to the
inequalities and injustices that arise in light of such differences. Ironically, Hegel has
been vehemently criticized by feminists for erasing difference in the name of similarity,
and for thereby presenting a “totalizing, colonizing power of hegemonic philosophical
narratives.”5 That Hegel has not been a straightforward champion of what we now know
as feminist aims has been well noted, and consequently, feminist critiques have not been
left wanting for material in this regard. Many feminists interpretations of Hegel, most
famously advanced by Luce Irigaray, read him as perpetuating the idea that woman is
unified with nature by virtue of her reproductive capacities. Or, as Elaine Miller states,
“Purportedly providing a neutral description of nature and its processes, the philosophy
of nature lectures ultimately provide implicit justification for spiritual hierarchies ranking
the place of men and women, Europeans and non-Europeans, Christians and nonChristians, within both history and contemporary politics. Hegel's lectures on nature thus
provide important insights into his understanding of subjectivity.”6 In a similar vein,
other readers of Hegel, such as Patricia Jantowicz Mills and Tulija Pulkinen, have
charged him with advancing a masculine notion of Spirit.7 Furthermore, the fact that
hierarchies and levels of differentiation organized by ascension structure the organization
5

Elaine Miller, describing Irigaray’s critique of Hegel and Hegelian philosophy Miller, Elaine
P.. The Vegetative Soul, From Philosophy of Nature to Subjectivity in the Feminine. Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2002, 199. Hereafter The Vegetative Soul.
6

Miller, The Vegetative Soul, 121.

7

“Only man “dirempts” himself; only he struggles for recognition in the universal sense.
Fortunately, he can come home after a hard day of self-diremption to the wife who offers him “a
tranquil intuition ... of unity.” ... With the limitation of woman there is a limitation of the
Hegelian system. Hegel's universal is necessarily male and male is not universal.” Patricia
Jantowicz Mills. “Hegel's Antigone.” The Owl of Minerva 17, 2 (Spring 1986): 131-152, 151152; also see Hegel’s Philosophy and Feminist Thought Beyond Antigone, p. 30.
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of Hegel’s system invite the mistrust of scholars critical of vertically arranged
classifications of difference, insofar as such ordering is thought to be partial to traditional
sources of power and hegemony. A central aim of feminist critiques of Hegel then, has
involved exposing the bias characteristic of western culture, including the philosophical
tradition, which edifies men and masculinity, while systematically devaluing and thereby
repressing women and femininity.8 A practical, motivating objective in such projects
consists of terminating the uncritical reproduction and thereby proliferation such bias. As
an exemplary of such prejudice, feminists have pointed to the conceptual linkage uniting
women and femininity with matter/materiality, nature, feeling, other, non-white, illness,
and mentally incapable or unstable, where as men enjoy the superior position of the
dichotomous relation in the categories of masculinity, form, culture, reason, subject,
white, health, and mentally sound respectively.9
Indeed, if we fully import wholeheartedly our own views from today, reading
isolated sentences in his work to express the truth of his thought, then Hegel could be
dismissed in several sentences. This means that, while such critiques have been and
continue to be important interventions in questioning the silent assumptions that pervade
the history of philosophy, many do not, and particularly in the case of Hegel, follow his
thought through to the end, and in doing such, critique him for a position he does not
commit to, or merely offer an exposition of as a vanishing moment in the restless
movement of Hegel’s texts, that is surpassed at a later time. To this extent, critiques that

8

For early arguments in support of this thesis, see: Lloyd, Genevieve. The Man of
Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy. London: Routledge, 1993; and Elshtain,
Jean Bethke. Public Man, Private Women in Social and Political Thought. Princeton University
Press, 1981.
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fall guilty of this remain locked within what Hegel would call the parameters of the
philosophy of Reflection—and as is characteristic of this thought, do not succeed in
contributing to a positive advancement of philosophical argumentation.
While taking seriously the foreground that such interventions have made
possible—and recognizing that many aspects of Hegel’s thought are susceptible to this
type of critique—this dissertation endeavors to at once engage with such feminist
critiques, whist taking Hegel past the point of critique, following him through to the most
advanced moment of thought in his system—that of the speculative. Doing such, the
dissertation assumes a double gesture: taking up the feminist concern with difference writ
large, but also surpassing feminist critiques, which take issue to centerpiece what is
wanting in Hegel, by positively fleshing out the productive resources and platforms for
thinking and living difference, as are immanent in his thought. The project is feminist,
insofar as it concerns itself with rethinking sexual differences, sexualities, and genders,
but, it also extends beyond the limitations of these specific themes. Following Hegel, our
main preoccupation concerns the cultivation of self-understanding, which necessarily
involves subject matters pertinent to feminist thought overall.
For Hegel, subjects are never given in advance, but rather are constantly in
formation, emerging in the motion that is for him, requisite of all articulations of
subjectivity. The movement away from immediacy and towards mediation, departing
from givenness and advancing towards more sophisticated ways of knowing, underscores
the basic motivation of all of Hegel’s thought. This is the task of education (Bildung), a
self-elevation to the standpoint of universality. In this movement, however, a tendency
towards fixity arises, and in these moments, subjectivity set itself in opposition, clinging

6

to a subjective thought, that secures its separation in the name of identity. The task of
philosophy, and indeed of the philosopher, is to see that the subject is not in fact defined
by what it opposes itself to and instead, to take fixed, determinate thoughts and render
them mobile. Looking to the time structures that underscore various historical
articulations of subjectivity, and what we might now today call subjective standpoints,
the dissertation aims to show how that which Hegel took to be quintessential to his
philosophy overall—the universal individual—is embedded in material existence and
social interaction, which in turn discloses a particular experiences of time. Putting
pressure on the link between the temporal and subjective standpoints, the project
demonstrates the efficacy a return to Hegel on the basis of time for subjective differences.
Nevertheless, one mustn’t forget that time is not a neutral category, but one that
throughout the tradition of Western philosophy has been heavily marked by gender, by
associations with men and women, sexuality, and race, all of which carry assumptions
about power and ability. This back and forth movement— between vigilance towards
Western bias, and extracting a pointed reading of Hegel that remains faithful to his own
thought—will further guide the unfolding of this project.
***
The question of time in Hegel, brought into the limelight in different and at times
controversial ways in the past by Heidegger and Kojève, has re-emerged in recent work,
most notably in the French tradition by Catherine Malabou and Bernard Bourgeois
among others. While these works serve to return integrity to the combination of Hegel
and time— and in particular, that of the future of Hegel, as argued by Malabou—they
nevertheless leave underdeveloped the productive possibilities of co-articulating time and
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subjectivity, in particular the standpoints emphasized by feminist scholarship, and thus
call for further engagement.
As the operative concept in this project is that of the temporal, one might inquire
into the efficacy of reading Hegel through the kaleidoscope of time and subjective
difference.10 Traditionally thought, time has been rendered in terms of articulating its
division roughly into the categories of the past, which is no longer; the present, which is
now; and the future that is not-yet, a formulation that, since Heidegger’s Being and Time,
has undergone significant reform. Additionally, at least since Simone de Beauvoir, two
models of time—cyclical and linear— have served to envision temporal movement.
Centering the formation of different subjectivities in the midst of these notions of time,
we maintain that time and temporality are not merely structures in Hegel’s thought, but
are at the core of his articulation of human life and its struggles. Illustrating this, the
project reconstructs Hegel’s argumentation, whilst bringing into sharper focus—one that
has often been obfuscated— the essentiality of the temporal, latent in each aspect of his
thought.
Insofar as the project focuses on temporality and historicity, and the importance of
the human subject, the position adopted is partially Kojèvean, but unlike Kojève and his
immediate inheritors, it does such with a purposeful aim of focusing on human
standpoints, while recognizing that Hegel’s philosophical intentions extended beyond

10

In his recent book, The Time of Our Lives: A Critical History of Temporality, David
Couzens Hoy examines temporality as distinct from time, and convincingly argues for
distinguishing the two. He writes, “To avoid ambiguous references to “time,” where whether one
is talking about universal time or human time is unclear, let me stipulate provisionally a
conceptual distinction between the terms “time” and “temporality.” The term “time” can be used
to refer to universal time, clock time, or objective time. In contrast, “temporality” is time insofar
as it manifests itself in human existence.” p. xiii. Roughly I follow, this distinction, but will also
employ the term ‘temporal’ as a general term, without technical import.
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finite subjectivity. For this reason, we will concentrate as much as possible on the third
volume of the Encyclopaedia, Philosophy of Spirit, particularly the section on
“Subjective Spirit,” and on his lecture series from 1827-8 on the same subject entitled
Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, whilst turning to other texts in his corpus, tracing
the network of his cross-references, to substantiate or further elucidate the human,
subjective stance.
***
Deeply engaging with the argumentation advanced in this work firstly requires an
explanation, albeit all too truncated, of Hegel’s own philosophical system, its aims, and
terminology. What guides Hegel’s work overall is the sense that, after years upon years,
philosophy seems to go nowhere, but rather, culminates merely in a sequence of varied
positions. Embracing this worry, Hegel demands for a system that can account for the
interconnectivity of the history of philosophy: whereas for Kant all previous philosophies
are false, for Hegel all are all true when seen from the standpoint of the system. In
concordance with this, the project advances an immanent reading, which presupposes the
standpoint of the system overall, whilst understanding that Hegel himself is posing a
series of immanent critiques.11
In its most basic formulation, the aim of Hegel’s speculative system takes as its
goal exposing the underlying unity in duality, whereby the method in which unity unfolds
is a recurring dialectical movement, characterized by a threefold act of negation.12 The

11

This point becomes particularly important when considering Hegel’s account of natural
differences, and especially in his reading of Antigone, as will be discussed in chapter 3.
12

For a systematic definition of dialectic, see Inwood, Michael. A Hegel Dictionary.
Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. Sebastian Gardner in his “Hegel: Glossary” defines dialectic in the
following way: “DIALECTIC (Dialektik). The form of movement of concepts, in which
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first stance, that of simplicity, contains an indistinguishable unity of opposites; the second
stance, that of differentiation, ‘negates’ the original unity of opposites, and posits a
conceptual difference dividing the two terms; the third stance, that of reconciliation,
negates the negation of the second movement, resulting in type of re-unification of
opposition. Following Charles Taylor, we shall call the moments of the dialectical phases
“immediacy” (intermingled with “givenness”), “Understanding,” and “Reason.” Yet, this
dialectical movement, culminating in aufheben,13 only works insofar as it maintains the
tension between two previous terms, but raises our understanding of such tension to a
higher level: the resolutionary moment of the dialectic then is not a leveling-off or
subsumption of the other two, but rather, holds them together in a higher order of
thought. It is only in this way that true difference is maintained within the underlying
unity that is Reason. A classical misreading of Hegel is one that delimits his thought to
three stages: one, followed by two, followed by three. Hegel’s contribution and
commitment to thinking in the strong sense rejects the factionalizing thought, and instead
insists on thinking in movement—thus, thinking with Hegel means thinking in motion. In

development takes place through opposed or contradictory stages. The development in question
pertains to the subject-matter of the Phenomenology, i.e. to forms of consciousness, and it is
internal to them: it is self-development through self-criticism. Per Inwood, dialectic involves
three steps: (1) one or more concepts are taken as fixed, sharply defined and distinct from one
another = stage of understanding; (2) through reflection on them, a contradiction or contradictions
emerge = stage of dialectical reason; (3) the result is a higher concept which embraces the earlier
ones and resolves their contradiction = stage of speculative reason. Hegel thus inverts Kant's
sense of dialectic as a logic of illusion. Geraets et al distinguish a broad use of dialectic, to refer
to the entire movement of the self-articulation of thought, from a narrower use, which refers to
the self-negations of the understanding.” See unpublished glossary:
(http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/ewatkins/Hegel-Glossary.pdf)
13

Commonly translated “sublated.”
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the rhythm of thinking, moments of rest invariable emerge, moments that give voice to
the speculative, that are, categorically, not identity statements.
To this end, when one raises thought to the level of speculative thinking, everything
appears differently. Adopting a phenomenological stance—that is, one that articulates our
basic form of experience, and gives philosophical worth to the multifarious ways in
which things appear, depending on the stance of the viewer—our project will follow this
methodological guiding thread, insofar as it offers the richest account of the contours of
the experiences constituting the living life of spirit. Emphasizing this method, we do not
wish to obfuscate Hegel’s various methods, which are sometimes, but not always
phenomenological. When he does employ it, we maintain the essentiality of taking with
utmost seriousness Hegel's own phenomenological method, which is always historically
and therefore temporally grounded.
The project’s commitment to both phenomenological and hermeneutical stances
fortifies the position implicit in its exposition, namely that one’s understanding of a
situation always depends on the angle from which it is viewed. Hegel’s overall
philosophy could be characterized as an illustration of a mounting process of cultivating
interiority, and then giving that interiority external form, whereby each standpoint in this
development is constituted by different degrees of concreteness. Reading this ascension
in terms of developing a heightened level of “seeing”— as opposed to simply a
hierarchically rising—we regard the incline as providing different angles from which the
world and its inhabitants can be viewed. As Hyppolite summarizes the climb to selfknowledge, “To know oneself, to come to consciousness of self, is to raise oneself above
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one’s being.”14
The project adopts Hegel’s own terminology, depicting the stage from which
subjectivity is viewing its world: the term consciousness expresses a way of being
(Sein)— in this moment, as awareness or knowing (bewußt); self-consciousness is the
logical predecessor of consciousness, and expresses a stance of the self knowing itself via
another. In the original German, Selbstbewußtsein has a connotation of being overconfident, even arrogant – the opposite of what one hears in English. In both languages –
and this undoubtedly was Hegel’s main intent—self-consciousness can literally mean,
becoming conscious of one’s own self; Spirit (Geist) the word in German can be
translated as ghost, spirit, or mind. Hegel uses it in a variety of ways, but most generally,
it is his main subject, as it were, denoting the human mind, and social and political
structures;15 the Concept (Das Begriff)— translated by Miller as the Notion, and
elsewhere as the Idea—etymologically in the original German expresses that which
grasps together (greifen); the Absolute (Das Absolut) is nothing other than that which
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constituted its self-development. In all citations of Hegel, we will retain the translation
given in the cited text for purposes of consistency, but will accompany it with the original
German pagination.
The dissertation will regularly refer to the controversial “additions” (Zusätze) to
Hegel’s texts, particularly those throughout his dense and otherwise often
incomprehensible Encyclopaedia. These additions were compiled and added to the
original body of the works by Hegel’s editors, and consist primarily of students’ and
Hegel’s own notes on his lectures. Since the sources and times from which the notes were
taken have been omitted, their usage remains under debate for Hegel scholars. Despite
this ongoing discussion, they will be included in the present work.
***
Taking Hegel’s dictum as stated in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit as a guiding
thread, we envisage to traverse the path unfolded by “a call issued by the Greeks...[:]
spirit has only to know what it is.”16 The labor involved in self-knowledge is, if we
follow Hegel’s own logical organization, whereby “subjective spirit” transitions into
“objective spirit” is required in order to be able to best understand oneself and others, and
thus act with ethical and political efficacy. The curves, contours, dips, and rivets of this
path of self-knowledge – a road upon which each person is always already on, without
choice or deliberation – will serve as the point of focus for this dissertation. With its aim
as absolute self-knowledge, the path invariably winds through stances towards one’s own
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self and others—manifestations of self-identity in which one can easily becomes
entangled—ones that, for Hegel, must be experienced and subsequently understood in
thought as partial articulations of the whole that each individual implicitly is.
Following roughly the textual movements of, as Hegel himself situates them in
the divisions of the Philosophy of Spirit— spirit as soul, divided spirit, practical spirit,
theoretical spirit, and objective spirit— the project isolates instantiations of concrete
subjective differences within these divisions, particularly those that have received
sustained attention by feminists. These are, in our view, the positions that substantially
contribute to the formation of personal and collective identity, which serve as foundations
for the most intimate and substantial of subjective standpoints, including their underlying
temporal currents: mental derangement, sexual differences and love, categories of gender,
race, and nationality in world history, and religion. We have isolated these facets of
subjective life with the thought that, first, each provides an inroad to the most salient,
personal, and contentious aspects of being human, and second, they are of the most
prevalent concerns in feminist critique.
The project takes as an overall aim the task of showing that Hegel's most robust
concept of subjectivity presupposes, and can be most fruitfully understood within the
backdrop of a broadly Heideggerian notion of temporality—that is, a self who knows
itself as something that is grounded by its past, projecting its future, and making present.
A fluid experience of the self as a threefold ecstasy of time, we argue, is the precondition
for fulfilling of the Greek dictum to which Hegel often refers: know thyself.
In its opening pages, the project considers the general landscape of Hegel’s notion
of the human as in the bourgeoning moments. However, in at this stage of fragility, spirit
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can become entangled in its past, unable to envision the future or the present, as is the
case in madness. Showcasing this, our first proper step into the life of subjective spirit
begins with perhaps the most entrapping of subjective scenes—that of the inverted time
of madness.
Glancing next retrospectively, both to Spirit’s logical unfolding in the Philosophy
of Nature, and historically to Hegel’s inheritance of the philosophy of his time, this
chapter centerpieces the most apparent and insidious differences in Life – sexual
difference and sexual love. Drawing out the temporal tag latent in each, we track the
transition from the purpose-laden animal—that of giving life—to the self-conscious
human—that of living a sexual life in all of its variations.
Time, writ large—history—offers the focal point for our subsequent thematic,
historical genders. Looking to the life of Spirit in its pre-history (Africa), childhood (the
“Oriental” world), adolescence (the Greek world), manhood (the Roman world) and
nostalgic old age (the Romantic German retrieval of Greece via Antigone), we argue that
Hegel’s gendered overtones characterizing these worlds can be read as a dialectic of
gendered expressions. Antigone. She, the one who Hegel loved above all, who has
remained—almost timeless in her import— opens the door to usher in a new time, that of
destabilizing naturalized gender norms, of individuation, and of the vanishing of static
lines of identification, making possible a life in which cultivated differences flourish
within unity, while placing Fanon and Hegel in dialogue disrupts the seeming neutrality
of history.
If Antigone sets the stage structurally for the advent of a new time, it is up to God,
or rather, subjectivity’s response to the death of God, to bring this temporal mode into
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fruition. Tracking Hegel’s different uses of this phrase “God is dead” we read Hegel’s
articulation of the relation between humans and the divine first in terms of their temporal
dissidence, and secondly in temporal resolution—what Hegel calls “absolute presence”—
in the experience of absolute love.
Interpreters of Hegel have quite often adopted the idea that the a priori or ideality,
as expressed in Hegel’s Logic as the Concept or Idea, is the absence of time. Evidence for
this has been additionally found in the end of the Phenomenology, when Hegel states that
‘time is annulled (tilgt).’ Offering a different interpretation, we argue, by engaging with
Heidegger and his critique of Hegel, that the time of “Absolute Knowledge” is
speculative time—what Hegel now defines in philosophical terms, as absolute presence.
This time, as we endeavor to show, is spirit’s achievement of a robust engagement with,
and understanding of, the interplay of its own temporal axes—past, present, and future.
Precisely the accomplishment of this time allows for the emergence of a different manner
of seeing, one that fully recognizes difference, and finds in them an underlying unity.
The course of five chapters serves as the terrain, unfolding in a field whose soil
our time has made rich for germination, a time which calls for the seeds for a revolution
above all in thinking, in loving, are ready to be planted. Because we learn through our
engagements with others, not only about them but also about ourselves, thinking
speculatively through difference, and the temporal modes that they entail, as Hegel
continues to teach us, provides a springboard for change in people, what our
accumulative project aspires to show as the inroad making possible “seeing difference
differently.” The collective aim of this dissertation, then, is to bring to light via Hegel’s
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thought, the wealth of possibility, or in Hegel’s own language, the “infinite value”17 in
cultivating a robust, yet fluid understanding of oneself as a temporal being; this, we argue
is the key to cultivating a new vision of subjective difference.

17

Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vol. III. Ed. Peter C. Hodgson, Trans. R.F.
Brown, P. C. Hodgson, J.M. Stewart, H.S. Harris. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007, 109. Hereafter
cited in the body of text, LPR.

17

Chapter 1. The Temporality of Madness
One of the most interesting and least examined themes in Hegel's life and work is that of
madness. Indeed, his private life was marred by intimate and personal encounters with
mentally deranged individuals, most notably his sister Christiane Hegel, and his dear
friend and once colleague, Hölderlin. Throughout his philosophical work too, Hegel
engages the problem of madness, offering his own distinct approach to the subject. Yet,
even in his most explicit discussion, Hegel's descriptions of madness (Verrücktheit) are at
best eccentric, at worst unintelligible; his examination of witches, somnambulism,
birthmarks, dementia, hypochondria, menstruation, clairvoyance, hailstorms, gout,
bloodletting, animal magnetism, and the cutting of hair as a therapeutic act, come without
warning, and are scarcely explained or situated.
While thematized most extensively in the Encyclopaedia vol. 3 (Philosophy of
Subjective Spirit or Philosophy of Mind) its Zusätze and in his 1827-8 Lectures on the
Philosophy of Spirit, one finds references to madness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, The
Aesthetics, Philosophy of Right. He sets forth his most substantial treatment of madness
in the first subsection, “Anthropology, the Soul,” and in the pages of the subsection's
subdivision: the natural soul, the feeling soul/dreaming soul, and the actual soul.1 It is in
these pages that Hegel defines spirit's starting line, a line that it must transgress in order
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to gain an understanding of what it is all along. Beginning by turning to spirit's first
movements, in Naturgeist, Hegel posits a version of Aristotle's passive intellect (νοῦς),
what he transforms into the 'sleep of spirit' (Schlaf des Geistes). It is to this early stage,
characterized by immediacy, simplicity, and feeling, that spirit digresses to or “sinks
back” from a more developed, rational conscience. On this basis, Hegel defines madness
(Verrücktheit) not as rationality's opposite, but as its regression into its earliest phase of
development, a definition anticipating Freud's vision of mental illness as a presupposition
of healthy consciousness.
Hegel's stated intention is to offer a philosophical account of the underlying
meaning of mental disorder, and endeavor that must necessarily offer more than a mere
cataloging of symptoms: “The particular kinds of derangement are usually distinguished
in accordance with the manifestations of this illness rather than an inner determinateness,
but this is inadequate to philosophical consideration” (PSS §408 Z). Organizing the
expression of states of withdrawal and separation of madness, from which he will draw
his ontology of the inner determinations of mad spirit, Hegel delineates the following
three main possibilities, each of which is further articulated in subdivisions and
subcategories:
1. Imbecility (der Blödsinn) – 1 (a) This is natural and incurable, such as in case of
retardation or as developed later in live through epilepsy; 1(b) absent-mindedness
(die Zerstreutheit) involves not knowing what is in the immediate vicinity. It is an
unawareness, and mere abstract self-awareness; 1(c) desipience (die Faselei)
takes interest in everything, often emerges in loud and disruptive behavior, and
can be an indication of delirium (PSS §408 Z).
2. Folly proper, or foolishness (die Narrheit) – 2 (a) It is the self-absorption of
natural spirit, a fixation on the self, absorbed in the content of the self. Here it
sinks into imbecility; 2 (b) world-weariness (der Lebensüberdruß) It is a
“concentration upon the fixed presentation of the repulsiveness of life and at the
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same time a drive to overcome it” (PSS §408 Z). It can evoke the desire to commit
suicide, (PSS §408 Z) and can also appear as a fanatic passion (PSS §408 Z).
3. Frenzy (die Tollheit/ der Wahnsinn) – 3 It is closest to modern classification of
schizophrenia; it is characterized by a dwelling on the past, and can be occasioned
by a great loss. Those suffering from it are aware of the internal contradiction
within themselves. They are often caring individuals, who are moved to fits of
rage and sometimes violence (PSS §408 Z).
Hegel understands the distinctions he makes within madness to be based on philosophical
theory, as a method that not only incorporates the best aspects of the seminal principles of
empirical and Romantic psychology, but moreover, adds to them by offering a
phenomenology of madness. This serves as the foundation of Hegel's third way, an
approach that mediates between the oppositional theories of madness of his time, but
adds to them by securing the speculative content of madness, and its therapy.
While recognizing the historical and philosophical significance of Hegel's theory
of madness, this analysis also takes with utmost seriousness, on the one hand, the
concrete lived experiences of mental illness, including the challenges and the struggles
that mental illness can give rise to for the afflicted individual, and more broadly of the
lives of those affected; and on the other hand, the contemporary developments of the
psychological sciences, (including psychiatry, psychology, psychoanalysis and
pharmacology), their diagnoses and treatments for mental illness. With this in mind, the
analysis by no means intends to offers more than an investigation of the philosophical
relevance of mental derangement, particularly in the 19th century, and strives to
illuminate this as an important philosophical concept in Hegel's work its own right. In
doing such, it does not wish to be involved in any way in the recently revived
philosophical trend of romanticizing mental illness, particularly that of schizophrenia.
Pursuing this type of reading first contributes to the growing body of literature tracking
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the influence of German Idealism more broadly—Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel— on the
development of the discipline of psychology and of psychoanalysis as initiated by Freud,
and secondly offers a fresh interpretation of Hegel by drawing out the importance of the
temporal elements which provide a common denominator for each of his accounts of
madness. Thus, through an engaged consideration of the aforementioned expressions of
madness, the objective of this work is to extract the underling temporal structure in
Hegel's account of madness, in an effort to understand its temporality. Accordingly, the
analysis makes two major claims about the relation between time and mental
derangement, which are expounded over the course of five sections: first, by locating the
red thread of time that weaves through every expression of derangement, the work seeks
to show that at its foundation, madness and Hegel's proposed therapy for it emerge in
relation to temporal experiences—time is cut short, time is too slow, time is out of joint.
Secondly, the question of madness and temporality implicates categories of otherness,
including social difference (race and sex), and the particular voices of madness. Building
upon these two interrelated claims, section one begins with a broad historical overview,
contextualizing the most prominent debates on health and diseases in Hegel's time. This
includes a discussion of empirical and Romantic medicine, 'somatic' and 'psychic'
theories of madness, and gestures towards Hegel's overcoming of these oppositional
approaches in his own 'speculative' theory of mental illness. To illustrate, the section
looks closely at Hegel’s invocation of Marie-François Xavier Bichat, and the
'physiological psychology' that Hegel articulates through the systems of organic life and
animal life, and the subsystem of sensibility and irritability. The section displays Hegel's
appropriation of Bichat, which, it argues, lays the foundation for what will become his
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speculative theory of madness and its therapy. The second section examines the
experience of mental illness according to Hegel, and argues that mental illness rests on
temporal experiences. Relating the time of madness in Hegel's works to Freud's famous
claim that the unconscious is timeless (Zeitlos), we argue that mental derangement is
hyperbolically temporal, but lacks a definitive regulatory time, particularly objective,
linear time. This exposition of deranged time segues to the question of the history of
madness, and seeks to explain Hegel's claim that madness cannot be historical, by
contrasting mad spirit with healthy spirit, who must actualize its possibilities by
transforming itself out of the historicity from which it emerges. The third section
examines two social groups that Hegel addresses in various places in his work that are
particularly vulnerable to being classified mad, or are commonly defined in similar terms:
women and black Africa(ns). Our aim is not to go as far as Foucault or Szasz, who argue
in their own respective ways for the social/political invention of madness, but rather to
show in a similar vein the ways in which the conceptual and existential account of time in
madness are in close proximity to those of women and Africa. This retrospective glance
to Hegel allows us to more clearly and rigorously think through the structural lineage of
madness and social difference, from Hegel to the present, and demands that we
meticulously and constantly scrutinize especially the seeming neutrality of philosophical
concepts such as time and madness. The section tracks and unpacks Hegel's threepronged idea of 'therapy' for mental illness, namely, work, trust, and humor. We argue
that the 'work' conceived in the therapeutic context involves re-establishing spirit's
engagement in and with the world, or to externalize the temporal interiority that underlies
mental derangement. Examining these three therapies for madness with an emphasis on
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time, imprisonment, and freedom, we suggest an alternative understanding of Hegel, one
that both underlines and complicates the contemporary scholarship on this contentious
and irreducible philosophical figure. Lastly, we conclude by offering an interpretation of
Hegel's speculative method, which as the section argues, implicitly establishes the
philosophical justification, and indeed imperative for listening to the voices of madness.
In doing such, we seek to elucidate the originality of Hegel's interpretation of pathology,
as a something situated within a continuum of rationality.

Hegel, 19th Century Medicine, and Psychology
Hegel's philosophical engagement with madness occurs in the midst of a bourgeoning
moment in history of mental illness, its causes, and cures, a moment that began,
according to historians, in the late eighteenth century. Specifically, the shift from the
criminalization of madness, which Foucault examines at length, to its medicalization
marks a major transition in history of madness, one that gave rise to an influx of theories
and approaches to mental derangement.2 This involved, as Foucault recounts, a change in
attitude and approach, one that transformed criminal prisons into medical institutions, and
accordingly, treated the inhabitants not as prisoners, but as patients, who were to be
tended to medically.3 The most prevalent schools of thought on madness at this time
were: empirical and romantic medicine, somatic and psychic theories of mental illness,
and physical and psychological methods of therapy. While the 'somaticists' conceived of
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mental illness as a disease of the body, the 'psychists' understood madness as a disease of
the soul. The somatic school offers a physiology independent from psychology, and saw,
as Franz Joseph Gall made famous, the root of mental illness as anatomical.4 The
'psychists,' by contrast, only recognized madness as a malady of the mind or soul.
Empirical medicine took as its method the clinical study of symptoms, postmortem
examinations, and physical methods of therapy, including the use of opium, arsenic, and
electricity, bloodletting, purging, and castration. Romantic medicine found resources
exclusively within metaphysical systems, and appealed to cosmology, theology, and often
idolized mental illness as a key to poetic or mystical insight providing that provides
access to higher truths. Hegel was highly critical of Romantic medicine and the historical
import of madness that it mandated. For example, Schelling among other Romantic
psychologists, celebrated the gap madness could provide, opening one regressively to
distant past, mythical realm of truth, or sublime understanding, as many attributed to
Hölderlin. Hegel rejected this, and indeed any thought that idolized madness as a
productive pathway to truth, not an illness, for as is well known, Hegelian truth is the
whole, and its gradual progressive uncovering is the human project.
A prolific reader, Hegel was well informed about each of these competing schools
of thought and the debates that ensued between them. Yet, as a thinker of mediation,
Hegel found each approach, taken in isolation, to be wanting and one-sided, and
alternatively, sought to think their opposition in harmony. Indeed, straight away in the
“Introduction,” to the Philosophy of Mind, Hegel asserts that his analysis of the mind will
not work within the bounds of contemporary methods of empirical and rational
4
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psychology, but rather, will be guided by a return to Aristotle's De Anima, and will
“reinterpret the lessons of... those books” (PM §378). While Hegel makes good on his
claim to work within an Aristotelean sphere, he also appeals to a revolutionary thinker of
the time, Marie-François Xavier Bichat, and particularly the system of sensibility and
irritability that he offers in his Physiological Researches on Life and Death. Bichat's
system of irritability and sensibility is not in isolation in the sciences and philosophies of
nature, nor is the breadth of these various systems foreign to Hegel. The terminology is
originally attributed to Albrecht von Haller, a Swiss atomist, physiologist, and naturalist
in 1753; it was appropriated and amended by John Brown, a Scottish physician in 1780;
by F.W.J. Schelling, a German philosopher and Hegel’s contemporary in 1799; and by
Bichat, a French atomist and physiologist in 1800. The Brownian system amounts to a
dialectic of inverse reciprocation between excitability and stimuli. He advances the idea
that life is possible through affects, and can be affected by stimuli.5 Stimuli work upon a
property inherent in the organism called ‘excitability,’ which is simply the organism’s
ability to receive external excitation. Together, stimuli and excitability form an inverse
reciprocation, insofar as when the stimuli are increased in intensity, excitability diminish,
and vice versa. When either the stimuli or the excitability is too high or too depleted, the
organism falls into a pathological range. To demonstrate his point, Brown gives the
example of nutrition; if an organism fails to consume enough food, or, consumes excess,
it will lack an appropriate level of energy. The task of the physician is to adjust the levels
of excitement in an organism in an effort to repair and maintain its appropriate level of
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excitation; this was commonly executed by methods including: bloodletting,
refrigeration, alcohol, and opium.
Even though Hegel praises Brown for “direct[ing] attention beyond what was
merely specific and particular in diseases and healing agents, to a recognition of their
essential universality,” (PSS §373Z) he exhibits a spirited distaste for Brown’s 1780
treatise, Elements of Medicine, in another paragraph:
For a long time now, certain formal and material relationships in the theory of
stimulation have been regarded as philosophical, although their introduction is as
unphilosophical as any other scientific hotch-potch of reflectiondeterminations...A theory of medicine based on these arid determinations is
completed in half a dozen propositions, so it is not surprising that it should have
spread rapidly and found plenty of adherents...6
And again in the “Preface” to the Phenomenology of Spirit:
What a dullard a man must be who could not be taught in a quarter of an hour the
theory that there are asthenic, sthenic, and indirectly asthenic diseases, and as
many modes of treatment; and still till quite recently such instructions sufficed,
who could not hope to be transformed in this short space of time from an
empirical to a theoretical physician?7
Incidentally, transforming the Brownian theory from the empirical to the theoretical was
one of Schelling’s central aspirations in his appropriation of Brown in the First Outline of
a System of the Philosophy of Nature. In the Third Division of the text, Schelling adopts
Brown’s central ideas, but seeks to develop the theory with greater rigor, indeed, to raise
it to the level of a true Wissenschaft in the Kantian sense. Amending the Brownian
system, Schelling claims that an organism must be double—that is, it must be active and
receptive to stimuli. To account for this, he introduces the two terms ‘sensibility’ and
6
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‘irritability,’ and maintains Brown’s ‘excitability’ as an umbrella term expressing their
unity. An organism’s receptivity to the stimuli is ‘organic sensibility,’ and the resulting
activity from the received sensations is ‘organic irritability.’ On Schelling’s model, as the
stimulus increases in intensity, sensibility will diminish proportionally. But, sensibility
also stands in an inverse reciprocal relationship to irritability, so when the intensity of a
stimulus is raised, sensibility falls, and irritability rises. In short, ‘affect’ as a whole
follows a threefold structure: a stronger stimulant results in a higher degree of irritability,
but a lowered degree of sensibility.
One finds evidence of Hegel’s attention to Schelling’s Naturphilosophie,
including his appropriation of the Brownian system of excitability, in the chapter
“Reason” in the Phenomenology, where Hegel dedicates over thirty pages to critically
reading Schelling. At the heart of his criticism is a dissatisfaction with Schelling’s system
of life; in his attempt to formulate a law that conforms to its proper subject matter,
Schelling fails to grasp sensibility and irritability as one—that is, he does not see them as
a mere play of forces, a moment of play that was surpassed two chapters back in “Force
and the Understanding.”
Hegel discusses the systems of irritability and sensibility throughout his larger
corpus, but especially in The Philosophy of Nature, §354 and its Zusatz.8 Thus, the turn to
Bichat in the Philosophy of Mind, and the Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, 1827-8 is
rather a return, for he plays a major role in Hegel's description of the “Animal Organism”
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in second volume of the Encyclopaedia.9 Hegel bases his theory of madness on the
account of disease developed here where he claims that disease exhibits itself through the
system of sensibility, irritability, and reproduction. He states, “The organism is in a
diseased state when one of its systems or organs is stimulated into conflict with the
inorganic potency of the organism. Through this conflict, the system or organ establishes
itself in isolation, and by persisting in its particular activity in opposition to the activity of
the whole, obstructs the fluidity of this activity, as well as the process by which it
pervades all the moments of the whole” (PN §371). These principle characteristics –
when the organism is in conflict, is isolated, involves itself in activity that is particular,
compromising the activity of the whole, and as a consequence, its fluidity (Flüßigkeit)
becomes hindered-- also constitute Hegel's primary definition of madness. To be sure, of
the three main classifications of disease offered here, the first two are Noxiousness
(epidemics and plagues), acute and chronic diseases, and “[a] third form of disease is that
which is rooted in the universal subject, and especially in man. It consists of diseases of
the soul, which are caused by terror and grief etc., and can also give rise to death” (PN
§371 Z). While Hegel does not immediately elaborate, he is clearly alluding to madness,
the malady of spirit as soul, immersed in nature.
Underscoring the importance of life, of temporal existence, Hegel reiterates a
banality that has been covered over: an entity's capacity to become sick, to have a
disease, is first and foremost conditioned by the fact that it is living – that it is an entity
limited by the very own temporal conditions that constitute it. Drawing out the deficit in
the theorists previously discussed, Hegel claims, “To appear is to have life; what the
9
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philosophers of nature have in mind however, is merely an external reflection. They are
unable to comprehend life because they fail to reach it, and stop short at inanimate
gravity” (PN §371 Z). Hegel's dissatisfaction with the prevalent approaches to disease
and its causes lies in the fragmented and thus limited way in which they treat an entity, a
manner that in is objectifying gestures, precludes the richest and truest understanding.
When Hegel endorses Bichat, this problem is not far from his mind. While
thoroughly indebted to the science of the time, Bichat along with Hegel, unlike Brown
and Schelling among others, finds modern science to be lacking, as Hegel describes at
length in his critique advanced in 'Observing Reason' in the Phenomenology. Bichat's
now widely recognized novelty is that of a new model of life—one that does not oppose
life and death, but rather sees them as commensurate: “Life consists in the sum of the
functions, by which death is resisted.”10 As Deleuze summarizes, “... Bichat broke with
the classical conception of death, as a decisive moment or indivisible event, and broke it
in two ways, simultaneously presenting death as being coextensive with life and as
something made up of partial and particular deaths.”11 Thus, through the work of Bichat
and the formation of the modern conception of life, knowledge of disease made life and
death no longer necessarily antithetical. Similarly, disease for Hegel was the “negative
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mirror” of health,12 a relation he traces through to his understanding of reason and
madness:
The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that insanity is not
an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence nor of will and its
responsibility), but only derangement, only a contradiction in a still subsisting
reason; – just as physical disease is not an abstract, i.e. mere and total loss of
health (if it were that, it would be death), but a contradiction in it (PM §408).
As a consequence of thinking life and death in unison, Bichat features the fundamentally
temporal structure not only of the entity susceptible to disease, but of disease itself; to
this end, there is a life to diseases, one which is modeled on an individual being: Just as,
in the words of Len Lawlor, “there is a life of cancer,” so too is there a 'life' to mental
derangement.13
In Cinzia Ferrini's essay “Reason Observing Nature,” we are reminded that “an
echo of this discussion returns at the anthropological level of the corporeality of spirit,
where Hegel opposes contemporaneous physiognomy by providing his own system of the
somatization of the inward content of the human soul”14 to advance what he calls a
“psychic physiology” that comprehends the emotional and bodily affectations, including
their excesses and deficits, of the human organism. Here, Hegel grafts onto Bichat's a
version of the system of irritability and sensibility in an effort to give a more substantial
treatment of the unity of spirit, of sentience [Empfindung] and feeling [Gefühl], one that
12
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can make sense of bodily affectations and feelings in unison. Through Bichat, Hegel in
part illustrates the division he calls attention to within individuality through his own
“psychic physiology” in his account of the individual in various states of affectivity, but
he also offers a description of the most simple experience of spirit's affectation that
highlights the essentiality of time. In his appropriation of Bichat, as we argue in what
follows, Hegel's model of a “psychic physiology” draws special attention to what has
been lost on the science of the time—the essentiality of temporal constitution, of life, of
spirit. Articulating first the temporality of sentience and feeling in a “psychic
physiology,” Hegel furnishes the groundwork for understanding the subsequent sections
of the 'Anthropology,' dedicated to the diseased mind – that is, the mad swirling of time
and emotion that is derangement.

Hegel, Bichat, and the Time of Bodily Affectation
In the opening pages of the Philosophy of Mind, Hegel states that his consideration of the
movements or alterations of natural spirit in three parts will be in the following order: a.)
natural individuality, exemplified in the periods of life: birth, childhood, adolescence,
adulthood, and old age; b.) individuality in otherness, specifically in the differences of the
sexes, and in the sex drive, which puts one in a state of opposition with oneself. When the
drive finds satisfaction, the state of being divided is suspended (aufheben); c.) natural
individuality as identical with itself in its difference. The task of the rest of the chapter
entitled 'Anthropology' is to articulate the play of difference within natural individuality.
Hegel introduces Bichat's systems of organic and animal life, and his subsystem of
sensibility and irritability in animal life. Organic life involves the circulation of the blood,
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and it is ruled by the heart. Hegel claims that Bichat's “organic life” and “animal life”
(LPS 104) are two sides within a divided self. The former “is the life of simple relation of
the individual to himself,” reproduction and the reproductive process, and circulation of
the blood (LPS 105). Through respiration, the organic life connects with the external
world. This system also includes organic organs, such as the stomach, the spleen, and the
liver. It is a single system; if it stops, the organism dies.15Animal life is ruled by the
brain, and involves the senses, the voluntary muscles and the larynx.16 He calls the organs
of the animal life “symmetrical” and harmoniously disposed, and accordingly, the organs
of sense are doubled: eyes, nostrils, ears, hands, and tongue.17 By contrast “those of the
organic life are irregular in their confirmation,”18 and, “…we shall find that harmony has
nothing to do with them.”19 Within Bichat’s system of animality is a subsystem with
various degrees of activity and passivity, which consists of sensibility and irritability.
Hegel states that for Bichat, sensibility “resides in the organs of sense,” whereas
irritability, a source of muscle movement, is oriented towards the world (LPS 105). This
leads him to claim that organs are constituted by similar patters of organization: Organs
of organic life are singular, and organs of animal life are accordingly double. Sensibility
inhabits the sense organs, and therefore, sense organs like eyes and ears, come in pairs.
Applying Bichat's system to his rendering of natural spirit, Hegel states that in the system
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of animal life, when one sleeps, the system ceases to be active. “To this extent, sleep and
death are brothers” (LPS, 105). In sleep, irritability in muscle movement is not directed to
an outer world. Even though the organism may indeed sustain life through the
continuation of the system of organic life, in lethargy, it is as good as dead. Hegel
develops this in his own articulation of the play of difference within natural individuality
by calling attention to the alterations in natural spirit insofar as it differs from itself in the
states of sleep and wakefulness; to do this, he makes a distinction in individuality itself:
“Individuality existing for itself is contrasted to individuality in itself; initially these two
are only contrasted and this relation is the façade of alteration” (LPS 103). These are two
sides of one and the same individual, where being in itself is the simple being of
individuality, or alternatively stated, it is “slumbering natural life” (LPS 104). Being for
itself excludes this self-aspect from itself; it is in opposition to slumber.
Hegel calls attention to the fact that “in sleep, I withdraw, I sink within myself,
but not because I place myself in opposition to my universality, but because I immerse
myself in substantiality, which is the power of the individual” (LPS 108). He further
states, “To be at home with self constitutes the dimension of rest, but this is a being with
self that is at the same time a coming to self” (LPS 105). Here, the fragment of Hegel’s
favorite expression— bei sich in anderen zu sein, being at home with oneself in
another—is essential. Notice that Hegel links being at home with oneself to rest and also
to the movement of “coming to self;” as natural soul, spirit is at home with itself, but in
an immediate and transient way (LPS 105). This is because as Naturgeist, spirit is at the
starting line, the beginning point, the “least true mode of spirit’s existence” (LPS 81). The
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moment anticipates being at home with self in another, but in order to realize this, spirit
must keep moving forward, and the present movement is to the state of wakefulness.
The movement from sleep to wakefulness, from time's dismemberment to time's
regularity, indicates the centrality of temporal experience in natural spirit's progression.
In waking, the soul is confronted with the outer world. One re-gains her center, her power
over images, and thereby the steadiness of clock-time.20 “Wakefulness,” Hegel states, “is
the being-for-itself of the individual that is at the same time directed outwards” (LPS
104). The individual has roused from sleep and excluded that opposition from itself, and
yet, it is further divided between a tranquil relation to itself and a relation to the outer
world: “The waking individual existing for itself has divided itself, has excluded its
being-in-itself from itself, and relates itself to itself. Precisely this divided being is the
individual itself” (LPS 104). Moreover, following Bichat, in wakefulness, irritability is
raised, and one is directed to an outer world, which in turn, enlivens sensibility. Thus, in
being awake, one returns to herself, marking the movement to a new state, where
difference in relation to itself “is sentience as such” (LPS 108). This experience of time
takes place viscerally and is rendered explicit in and through bodily life. Hegel claims
that upon waking, spirit knows itself immediately through simple sensation and feeling.
Sentience [Empfindung] and feeling [Gefühl] are quite similar; the minor distinction to be
drawn between them is that “sentience [Empfindung] expresses the same [sense] more
from the subjective side, while feeling [Gefühl] expresses this sense in its determinacy
according to content” (LPS 111). The distinction between immediate being and being-initself is present for spirit in feeling, and thus feeling has two moments in which it must
20

“Waking consciousness has power over the entire complex of images” Hegel, (LPS 106).

34

determine itself: the first is in outer sensation as immediate being, and the second is in
inward sensations or feeling. These two sides happen in a concrete “I” that is being-forself or being-in-itself; its immediacy is determined in its corporeity. All feeling originates
in corporeity, and moreover, all external sensations are processed by being “recalled and
made inward” (LPS 115).21 Therefore, in order to have senses and thereby the sensations
of sense, one must be embodied, for the body is necessary for the operation of the five
organs of sense. Hegel’s discussion of the senses is divided into three parts. First are what
he calls the senses of simple ideality: sight and hearing; second the senses of difference:
smell and taste; third the totality of the two: touch.
Dedicating the bulk of his discussion to sight and sound, Hegel treats the other
senses only in passing. Beginning with the senses of taste and smell, the natural soul
differentiates the ideal from the real senses. One has some beginning of self-sensing,
insofar as with smell and taste, one senses the body’s “volatilization” (LPS 118). The
sense of touch is the complete return to the self, for when I touch something, I feel it
resisting me.
What seem to be more important for him are the remaining two senses. He
emphasizes them because at this natural stage of spirit, things are immediate and
uncultivated, and lives in a simple world of time and space, where “in space, everything
exists [and] in time everything passes away” (LPS 74). Hearing and sight are the senses
that best suit spirit at this stage, for they are the “ideal senses,” or those that involve the
simple perception of space and time. When we use our vision, we do not sense ourselves;
rather, the eye sees objects in the world, not the eye itself. We see things that materially
21
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take up space, and the movement of sight is thus directed outwards. When we hear, we
sense the movement or vibrations of sound waves through time. Explicitly wedding time
and the corporeal, Hegel states, “Hearing is the sense of physical non-abstract time,”
(LPS 117) or more emphatically, “hearing is time become physical” (LPS 117).
What is more, one way in which one can perceive the constellation of things in
waking life is by seeing. When one is awake, irritability is directed outward, constituting
the movement of the muscles. The sense of sight is also stirred, as sensibility in the eyes
is activated. But, as one grows bored, the sense of sight dulls, and images lose their
otherwise pristine qualities. This is the movement towards sleep. As with hearing, if the
individual falls asleep, the system of irritability and sensibility will no longer function,
and the images of the external world are no longer there for her. Instead, she opens
herself to the haphazard maze of inward and timeless images in dreams, as she covers
herself with herself in sleep.
Although Hegel does not expressly do so, this discussion of vision and of hearing
grafts onto an account of the dulling of the senses, and can be expressed as feeling of
boredom. When one is bored, time moves slowly, and when time moves slowly, what is
otherwise background noise comes to the fore and dominates our perception: ticking
clocks, leaking faucets. To return to Hegel’s Bichat, sensibility in the doubled sense
organ of the ears is scarce, and yet, certain sounds seem more distinct. It is not that one’s
hearing becomes more acute, it is rather that the particular sounds that render the
monotony explicit take precedence; since time ‘feels’ elongated, the sounds ‘feel’ more
pronounced. The system of animality has not shut down entirely, for the individual is not
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asleep. If the individual were to fall asleep, sensibility would stop functioning, and the
sounds would cease for her.
As natural immediacy, inner sensation, like external sensation, is embodied and
finds expression in and through the body. Embodiment is also the means by which the
content of feelings can be perceived (LPS 122). Inner sensations are feelings, like love,
hate, anxiety, joy, and so on. Underlying natural spirit's affectations is an elementary
experience of time—one that is fleeting and transient, just as are the feelings themselves:
“Sensations and feelings are singular, transitory, are alterations of immediacy” (LPS
124). Natural spirit's engagement with time through affectation is thus instantaneous and
elementary.
Linking his version of Bichat’s system to inner sensations, Hegel claims that “a
psychic physiology would be the system of embodiment of this inner content” (LPS 122).
Qualifying his appropriation of Bichat, he continues, “Earlier we noted the distinction
between animal and organic life. Here, the psychic physiology would have to state the
psychic significance of the organs, e.g., the liver” (LPS 122). He does not offer this
account, but nonetheless, applies the system to the heart as a way to talk about the
changes in the body in states of affectation:
Anger is the outbreak of my self-feeling or mood in response to injury…In anger,
humans become red, for the breast, the heart, is the center of irritability, the latter
is driven outward, a being-directed externally. With anger and courage, the heart
and especially the blood are brought into motion, wherein these inner feelings
embody themselves (LPS 122).
Hegel thus links the movement of the heart by irritability with the emergence of an affect.
Anger is the outward expression of irritability and appears in physical manifestations,
such as a reddened face— something we can empirically see in the angered individual.
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Furthermore, when someone’s heart pounds, we can, if we are close enough, hear it
beating. If we do not hear the heartbeat directly, we have indirect and inferential evidence
of it when we hear their gasping or heavy breathing. This seems to be one example of the
way in which Hegel claims feeling and sentience are without great distinction. That is to
say, inner sensations or feelings find their expression and are perceived through the body.
The musculature Hegel allots to the theme of embodiment stresses natural spirit’s
finitude, thus feelings must also be interpreted in the light of time. When angered or
agitated, the pulse quickens, the methodic beating of the heart accelerates, and time as it
is experienced through the body appears to race. In short, the affect of anger disrupts
regularity and enflames the experience of time, making it seem wildly erratic.
Examining the affective states of anxiety22 and terror, Hegel states: “With anxiety,
there is a withdrawal of blood from the extremities” (LPS 122). Indeed, when anxious,
one is unable to advance; one becomes, as it were, frozen. Following Hegel’s Bichat, this
is because irritability ceases to move the blood, and in turn, muscle movement directed
out towards the world halts. Without direction to the world, the anxious individual
envelops herself in her own subjectivity. She is not asleep, and so has not covered herself
in herself completely, but nonetheless she has suspended her engaged involvement in the
world. Abandoned from external ordering, her experience of time also freezes. The same
can be said of terror, an emotional response to a perceived threat. In contrast though, the
effect of terror is an acceleration of clock time that prematurely thrusts one into the
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future. This experience is recorded on the body, for as Hegel claims, “[t] error makes the
hair grow gray” (LPS 122).
Hegel turns next to two expressions of affective sensibility—crying and laughing.
Unlike anger, anxiety and terror, crying and laughing are not feelings proper, but
expressions thereof. The expressions are audible and visible, and thereby also implicate
an experience of time and space. Crying and laughing are expressions, but also the means
through which the feeling passes through time. With “the loss of a person” or “such an
event...inner determination becomes feeling and expresses itself to the point of tears”
(LPS 123). By crying, “the pain becomes water, as it were” (LPS 123). Hegel continues,
Tears make matters easier because the sensibility finds this expression and the
oppression of the breast ceases. If pain is inwardly concentrated so that it cannot
come to tears, it becomes still stronger and can produce illness and death. But
through tears the pain is turned outward and relieved (LPS 123).
The feeling of sorrow wells up inside the individual as an excess of sensibility. When it
reaches a threshold, it can remain inside, but will transform into illness, as we will see
with more concretion in the following section. Alternatively, the abundance of sensibility
can be released, externalized, and thereby alleviated in the act of crying. The point to be
underscored is that a surplus of inner sensation (sensibility), or, harboring the inner
sensation over time, can become pathological. To become 'stuck' in the feeling is to
become temporally immobilized. The feeling must be transient and to be so, it must
fleetingly pass in time. Natural spirit must let it go, it must allow the feeling to find
outward expression, in a timely manner, through the body. Here, Hegel strongly
foreshadows his account of madness, whereby spirit's fluidity (Flüßigkeit) becomes
blocked, obstructed, and eventually it tumbles into a pathological state (PM § 371).
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Crying is something that we see and hear in other people. Others are superficially
and immediately perceived in space and time, and thus through our senses of sight and
hearing. By contrast, when we ourselves cry, all of our senses are potentially activated:
We taste our tears, we hear our sobs, we feel moisture on our cheeks, and if we catch a
glimpse in a mirror, we see all of this in ourselves. Similarly, laughter is an external
release and as such, is intimately related to crying: “Laughter can go to the point of tears,
just as people often cry for joy” (LPS 123). There are “many gradations from raw
laughter to laughing with tears in the eyes… ” (LPS 123).23 Yet, Hegel confesses that a
“physiological investigation of laughter is not easy,” and therefore he does not explicitly
develop one in Bichat’s terminology (LPS 124). He does however, highlight the relation
between laughter and sound and in turn, hearing: “It is connected with language; it is a
noise that is not articulated and thus spoils itself” (LPS 124). Making this connection,
laughter is an expression deeply connected to the sense of hearing, for as with crying,
experiencing someone else’s laughter involves hearing their joyful utterances. As an
audible expression, laughter thus implies an experience of time, one that is as immediate
and ephemeral as laughter itself.
The heretofore exposition of Hegel's “psychic-physiology” as articulated through
Bichat will recur in various ways throughout the analysis of madness that is to come. The
groundwork Hegel lays here sets the foundation of how he will articulate the human
organism in states of excitation and depletion, in emotion and sensation, in health and
pathology. Each, as has been shown, invites us to think about the fundamental temporal
structures that underline the most basic to the most sophisticated of human activity. In the
23
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course of what is to follow, we will revisit Bichat, feeling, excitation, and temporality-explicitly or implicitly—and each time, in typical Hegelian fashion, with more and more
grandeur.
The “Zeitlos” Time of Madness and its Impossible “History”
After having contextualized Hegel in the previous section within a brief history of the
concept and treatment of disease in the prominent discourses of the 19th century, our
analysis must back step, must re-consider history and the 'history' of madness, by
reconciling its lineage with Hegel's claim that madness has no history. What might Hegel
mean by this assertion, and to what extent can it be understood in light of the history of
pathology just exhibited?

Hegel, Freud, and the “Zeitlos” Time of Madness
The point of entry into Hegel's counterintuitive claim is none other than the rabbit hole
through which Alice tumbled, a tunnel descending to a topsy-turvy world known to Hegel
as the 'life of feeling' (Gefühlsleben), the prime territory of madness. Reversing through
this threshold, spirit rewinds, as it were, digressing into the earliest phases of its
development, in what Hegel calls Naturgeist, and seeks refuge in this primitive world,
ruled by instincts and feelings. This realm is subjective spirit's most immediate state, its
starting line, the beginning point, and as Hegel insists, its least true expression. It is a
stage through which spirit as soul must pass through in order to cultivate an awareness of
itself as consciousness.
Withdrawing into itself and creating its world there, spirit ensconces itself within
itself, isolating itself from its ties with the common world, or in Hegel's words,

41

derangement is “spirit which is confined, spirit which has lapsed into itself...” (PM §408
Z). In a movement motivated by the desire to overcome vulnerability, dissatisfaction, and
contingency, deranged spirit turns inward and seeks shelter in the comfort of a world
woven from the strings of its own imagination. Cultivating its own internal world,
deranged spirit lives amidst a rich labyrinth that follows logic of its own construction that
is at best indeterminate and groundless. The currency of exchange in the life of feeling is,
of course the privacy and seclusion of emotion and feeling. Relating only on the level of
feeling, deranged consciousness forecloses the possibility of communication and/or
negotiation, for a feeling is just that— it is what I feel— and as such, requires no further
legitimization. As Hegel explains in the “Introduction” to the Phenomenology, “Since the
man of common sense makes his appeal to feeling, to an oracle in his breast, he is
finished and done with anyone who does not agree; he only has to explain that he has
nothing more to say to anyone who does not find and feel the same thing in himself.” (PS
§69). To this extent, feeling is another way of saying “I;” appealing to the mode of
communication encapsulated in “I feel” serves to “shut oneself up within oneself,”24 and
for deranged spirit, strengthens its internal orientation by further removing the need for
shared engagement with the world at large.
What is more, in derangement, “...there is a fixation upon a particular feeling,
which so conflicts with the deranged person's objective consciousness that the feeling is
not posited as of an ideal nature, but has the shape of being, of something corporeal...”
(PM §408Z)—which, as we have seen, always involves for Hegel a spatial and temporal
24
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experience. Fixating on an emotion, deranged consciousness becomes obsessed,
infatuated, ossified; enshrouded in itself, it is paralyzed and lives in a cessation of
movement. As Hegel illustrates, “soul spin[s] this cocoon around itself” and “hold[s] fast
to anything definite” (PSS §363). Holding tight, its deliberate annulment of motion is
occasioned by a “fixation of the finitude within it,” (PM §408) which, invites us to linger
on a consideration of the union between finitude, a particular expression of temporality,
and madness. This, as will be shown in what is to come, is an attempt to restructure or
decenter every-day linear time and the contingency that it entails.
Commentators on Hegel's theory of mental life and his understanding of madness
have found evidence to occasion a comparison between Hegel and Freud. Indeed, such
juxtaposition is particularly illuminating when considering the phenomena of
melancholia. In many ways the entirety of the Phenomenology of Spirit can be read in
part as a book-length exhibition of the power of loss, contingency, vulnerability, and
spirit's psychological response to each. A fundamental premise of this text is spirit's intersubjective constitution; there is a crowd of people and worlds harbored in every person
and as such, spirit is inextricably woven with others. One might infer then, that if spirit's
relation to other(s) constitutes it, then it is always psychologically vulnerable to losing (or
to finding) itself in them. In this moment of its development, self-consciousness does not
realize that through the course of the Phenomenology spirit will learn that it knows itself
because other people recognize it as a knowing subject— that is, we are, in short,
completed by other people’s recognition. Consequently, what we see throughout the
Phenomenology is spirit in unrelenting states of dissatisfaction, indefatigably impelled to
reassemble more complicated arrangements, work through more sophisticated forms of
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deception, and learn more insidious appearances of the Absolute. The journeying
consciousness’ world is thus always in dissolution, for it is always losing a world (and the
others that give that world shape), to gain a new insight.
It is precisely this psychological makeup that makes spirit expressly vulnerable.
Offering an example of what causes madness, Hegel, in the Encyclopaedia, isolates
instances of intolerable loss, and argues that such experiences can give rise to
melancholia:
In his subjective presentations and plans he also has before his eyes both this
understandable connectedness of his world and the mediating of this presentations
and purposes with objective existences, which are themselves thoroughly,
mediated internally. This world outside him therefore has its threads within him in
such a way, that they constitute what he is actually for himself. Consequently, he
too would die internally, just as these externalities disappear, if within himself,
through religion, subjective reason and character, he is not more expressly selfsubsistent and independent of them. …. One might cite as an appearance of this
identity the effect that the death of a beloved relatives, friends etc. can have on
those left behind, when the one dies or pines away for the loss of the other (PSS
§408 Z).
Here and in the Phenomenology, Hegel seems to be anticipating Freud’s psychoanalytic
insights by philosophically thinking about the meaningfulness of the work of grief,
whether mournful, melancholic, or something in-between. Although Freudian theoretical
advances do not seamlessly graft onto Hegelian trajectories, they nonetheless provide a
useful backdrop upon which we might interpret the psychological components of the
project of spirit.25 Freud considers melancholia through “a comparison with the normal
emotion of grief, and its expression in mourning.”26 In the work of mourning, or, “the
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reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken
place of one, such as fatherland, liberty, an ideal and so on,” one reconciles oneself into a
new reality by accepting loss, whereby the suffering of mourning eventually establishes
an ability to let go of the loss.27 Once the work of mourning is complete, tension is eased,
and one emerges whole and intact. In melancholia, the pathological counterpoint to
mourning, there is no economy and no return. Instead of gradually releasing its lost
object, the melancholic consumes and retains it by incorporating the object into its ego.
This internalization disrupts the ego, breaking it in two. Libidinal energy is redirected to
one’s own ego, and consequently, the sadistic super-ego is born. The unsavory project of
the super-ego is one of incessant self-laceration, where the divided melancholic selftortures the lost object that has been incorporated into its ego.
While the phenomenology of melancholia Hegel offers is far less systematic than that
of Freud, it follows generally the same logic. For the Hegel of the Phenomenology, the
affective link connecting the different moments of consciousness’ movement throughout
its worlds is the “highway of despair,” the experience in which consciousness accounts
for its losses. Making its home the highway of despair, spirit is constantly retracing,
reenacting, and learning anew from its old wounds. Similar to the melancholic, grief is
inextricably bound into spirit’s life, yet, Hegelian grief is not futile, self-loathing, or in
Freud's term 'pathological,' but instead has directedness, meaningfulness. Rapture and
subjection prolifically haunt spirit and impel its journey forward, but of course, as we
have seen, the opposite is possible. Unlike the melancholic, healthy spirit holds onto its
loss without being consumed by it. Yet, like the melancholic, it consumes or incorporates
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the loss. Nonetheless, while ceaselessly grief-ridden, spirit appears to be infinitely
resilient in its effort to constantly reconstruct new worlds for itself.
Both the healthy and pathological responses to loss expose the fragility of spirit's
complex psychical life. In each moment, spirit is vulnerable to a world that causes too
much pain; Hegel tells us that the cause of melancholia is unbearable pain, and the origin
of pain, we can infer, is unequivocally connected to time. Insofar as “This world outside
him therefore has its threads within him in such a way, that they constitute what he is
actually for himself,” each individual is internally constituted by the external world – by
space and time and entities living therein. Spirit's projects, work, engagements, and
relations all come with a temporal tag, and thus, as when spirit internalizes these, it
implicitly internalizes the temporal. One could say then, that the baseline for spirit's life,
internally and externally, is time. And, insofar as life consists in moments of time, each
of which is contingent, spirit is unceasingly vulnerable. Illustrating this point, Hegel
identifies the loss of a loved one as an impetus for a melancholic reaction. But what is the
basest definition of death, if not the end of physical existence? When the time of a loved
one's life comes to an end, when their animation in time draws to a close, so too do we
die inside a bit. Something as commonplace as saying goodbye, even if only temporarily,
bears the same structure, an experience that the French expression captures well: Dire
adieu c'est mourir un peu.28 Or, when a plan is foiled, for example, the time that we
expected to have vanishes, leaving within us the residue of something missed, something
that should have been, but was not; in short, when time is missing, we miss it. Thus, the
tenuous way in which we are, a way in which we have no other choice to be, bears an

28

Also: Partir, c'est mourir un peu.

46

enormous affective and to be sure, temporal weight. Because of this, when time itself
moves too fast, or is cut short, the seeds of melancholia, a potentiality within each of us,
begin to sprout.
Exploring further the relation between Hegel and Freud, Daniel Berthold-Bond, in his
text Hegel's Theory of Madness, defines four primary ways in which Hegel's 'life of
feeling' anticipates Freud's developed concept of the unconscious, two of which are of
particular relevance to this analysis: first, the absence of it/their relation to outer reality,
and secondly it/their timelessness.29 Regarding the first, recall that Freud delineates in his
Interpretation of Dreams, two realities, “psychical” and “material;”30 Undeniably for
Hegel, deranged consciousness also has two centers: “one in the remnant of its
understanding consciousness, the other in its deranged presentation” (PSS §408 Z).
Developing this claim, Hegel tells us that deranged spirit lives in a “negation of the real,”
and instead, inhabits the subjective reality of the inner world – the contents of which we
have already glimpsed (PM §403); “Insofar as it is deranged, it cleaves to a merely
subjective identity of the subjective and the objective, rather than to an objective unity of
those two sides” (PSS §408 Z).
In regards to the second, Berthold-Bond claims that Hegel's 'life of feeling,' like
Freud's unconscious, is timeless. Freud, who introduced the concept of Zeitlos in his
essay from 1915, “The Unconscious,” describes the experiences of the unconscious as
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“timeless, i.e., are not chronologically ordered, are not altered by the passage of time,
indeed bear no relation to time whatsoever.”31After five years, in Beyond the Pleasure
Principle, Freud's articulation of the notion of timelessness matured only slightly. Here
he states,
As a result of certain psycho-analytic discoveries, we are today in a position to
embark on a discussion of the Kantian theorem that time and space are ‘necessary
forms of thought.’ We have learnt that unconscious mental processes are in
themselves ‘timeless’. This means in the first place that they are not ordered
temporally, that time does not change them in any way and that the idea of time
cannot be applied to them.32
In both instances, Freud clearly distinguishes the unconscious from temporal ordering.
Yet, what exactly “timelessness” might mean for Freud, and in turn by implication for
Hegel, is far from resolved, as is evidenced by the prolific debates the question has given
rise to in psychoanalytic and philosophical literature alike.33 Despite Berthold-Bond
unwavering certainty that Hegel's 'life of feeling' resembles the timelessness of Freud's
unconscious, it seems that further distinctions need to be made. We know that the 'life of
feeling' must be transgressed in order to progress, but this does not necessarily mean it is
'timeless' in one sense exclusively. Throughout his larger discussion of madness, Hegel
mentions the word 'timeless' only once and in a Zusatz: “In this totality or ideality, in the
timeless, undifferentiated inwardness of the soul, the sensations which crowd each other
do not, however, vanish absolutely without a trace, but remain in the soul as ideal
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moments...” (PM §402 Z). What significance this word has is all but clear. To be sure, we
cannot but ask: what temporal modes are referred to by the 'timelessness' of the life of the
'life of feeling'—linear time of progress, cyclical time of nature, phenomenological time,
psychical time? And lastly, if the state of 'the life of feeling' to which spirit digresses in
madness is in fact timeless, does it follow that the experience of madness itself is
timeless?
Without doubt, a disruption in temporality, or more emphatically falling apart of
temporal connections is a common, underlying feature of the expressions of madness
(PSS §408). For example, cases of foolishness (die Narrheit) “involve spirit's being
obsessed by a single and merely subjective presentation, which it regards as objective.
For the most part, the soul gets into this state when the person is dissatisfied with
actuality, and finds that it is only at home in its subjective presentations” (PSS §408 Z).
Discontent with actuality is at root weariness with the way things have come to be in
time—that is, a frustration with the present state of affairs. Turning away from the
present and actual, engaging only in an internal world, deranged spirit alienates itself
from the regularity of clock time—the passing of seconds into minutes, minutes into
hours, hours into days. In another example, Hegel describes the imprisonment in the past
that is typical of the ontology of madness, and is particularly characteristic of madness or
derangement proper (die Tollheit, der Wahnsinn). Here, “an individual dwells so
continually on the past that he becomes incapable of adjusting to the present, feeling it to
be both repulsive and restraining...” (PSS §408 Z). Displacing time is the way in which
this expression of deranged spirit responds to its inability to make objective linear time
and its experience of it cohere. This state, Hegel continues, “can easily be brought about

49

by a stroke of great misfortune, by the derangement of a person's individual world, or by
a violent upheaval which puts the world in general out of joint (Aus-den-FugenKommen)” (PSS §408 Z). Whether Hegel's invocation is deliberate or not is unclear, yet
his description echoes Hamlet's famous line: “Time is out of joint.” What might it mean
for Hegel, for deranged consciousness, and for us, for 'the world in general,' and more
specifically for 'time to be out of joint?'34
One finds clues in two early sections of the Anthropology, firstly in his discussion
of natural soul, and secondly in the discussion of feeling soul in its immediacy, where he
details the phenomena of dreaming – remarkably, a phenomena by which he later in the
text describes mental derangement. In the former instance, Hegel calls attention to the
fact that “in sleep, I withdraw, I sink within myself, but not because I place myself in
opposition to my universality, but because I immerse myself in substantiality, which is
the power of the individual” (LPS 108). Sleeping, the soul remains active, but in a
disjointed way. This is because “spirit, soul is essentially activity” (LPS 105); spirit is
going somewhere, and must remain active, even while at rest.35 Yet, while sleeping and
dreaming, spirit has no direction. In the mosaic of slumber, images get lumped together
without connection or purpose, and things present themselves without order or reference.
Natural spirit is powerless, for in this state, it does not relate to itself as concrete center.
The rational ordering of time and space within which one normally constitutes herself
gets scrambled, thrown into disarray. More emphatically, not only the order that time
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brings, but time itself breaks down.36 What emerges then is a different experiential mode,
one that is experienced outside the bounds of linear time. Hegel compares this mode (in
sleeping, dreaming, or fatigue) to a state of vertigo, a swirling state where “one [loses]
the consciousness of the center point, the center of gravity, and…the will, the ground on
which one stands, is weakened” (PSS 402). Several paragraphs later, in the latter
invocation of dreaming, Hegel claims that,
...the human soul in a state of dreaming is not merely filled with single affections,
but that more than is commonly the case amid the diversions of the waking soul, it
attains to a profound and powerful feeling of the entirety of its individual nature,
of the complete compass of its past, present, and future, and that it is precisely on
account of this sensing of the individual totality of the soul that mention has to be
made of dreaming when the self- awareness of the soul is being concerned (PSS
§405 Z).
Underlying both descriptions of dreaming, then, is an experience of time. What is most
salient, as just mentioned, is that Hegel describes the life of madness as a “waking
dream” (PSS §401 Z/EIII 162)—that is, all of life for mentally deranged spirit is like the
time of a dream, without rational ordering, connection, or flow. This idea, set forth as
early as Heraclitus, enjoyed heightened popularity in 19th century literature, including
that of Kant. Living waking life as a dream, madness finds expression temporally as
detachment from every-day linear time, and a life lived in ever-changing kaleidoscope
that is the time of dreams (PSS §408). Thus, dreaming while awake, the deranged “Spirit
which nestles within itself in this manner easily loses touch with actuality, and finds that
it is only at home in its subjective presentations” (PSS §408 Z). This means that deranged
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consciousness can live in any experience of time it fancies. While the ordinary time of
nature, or clock time, is forsaken, a temporal experience is still prevalent, however
deviant. It is not then, that deranged consciousness is without time or timeless, but rather,
it abandons the coherency of linear objective time in a hyperbolic explosion of time's
methodic division and linear ordering.

Hegel's Impossible History of Madness
As a retreat inwards, madness is a disconnection not only with linear time, but as Hegel
claims, also with history— by abdicating linear time, deranged spirit also renounces
history, for while deranged spirit can drop out of linear time, as it were, time's universal
flow cannot be stopped. Yet, how is it that Hegel, the philosopher par excellence of
historical conditionedness, could deny madness a history? The previous section offered a
phenomenological exposition of the way in which deranged spirit experiences time, yet
left unstated the temporal structure of the 'life of feeling', the time of nature. The time of
'nature' facilitates madness, opens a path for thematizing the lack of a place for madness
in Hegel's twofold concept of history—which we will examine via the Philosophy of
History and Phenomenology of Spirit. This in turn unfolds the logic underscoring Hegel's
insistence that madness is not historical in the truest sense.
While some scholarship has done so, conflating 'nature' of the 'Anthropology' with
the 'state of nature' as found in Schlegel and social/political theorists amounts to a
misreading of Hegel. It is not a fictional time of worldly existence demarcating all that
came before human entry into cooperative sociability in history. By contrast, the life of
feeling in nature is “pre-historical” only in the Hegelian sense, whereby the world of
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nature is simply and unsophisticatedly spatial and temporal: “We know that the natural
things are spatial and temporal, that in Nature one thing exists alongside another, that one
thing follows another, in brief, that in Nature all things are mutually external, ad
infinitum...” (PM §381 Z). Yet, that nature is temporal does not make it historical.
Understanding why this is the case first involves inquiring into the way in which time
itself functions in nature.
While the theme of time appears in each of Hegel's texts, it is in the Lectures on
the Philosophy of World History that he describes in closer detail time's variations. Here,
he proclaims, the time of nature operates within a framework characterized by circularity
and endless repetition: “The reawakening of nature is merely the repetition of one and the
same process; it is a tedious chronicle in which the same cycle recurs again and again”
(LPH 61). Just as the progression of one day to the next involves seconds spilling over
into minutes, minutes into hours and hours into a day, only to renew the same cycle again
and again, so too is the cycle of natural time. Hegel calls this the “continuity in time”
whereby change is constantly occurring, but no progress is made (LPH 198). In this
cyclical swirling round and around, without forward movement, “there is nothing new
under the sun” (LPH 61).
This means that mad spirit, stuck in the time of nature, is deplete of a full range of
temporal axes; there is no genuine past, present, or future, just a series transient nows,
one moment giving way to the next and then the next. Healthy spirit, by contrast is
temporally extending outward and inward, forward and back; it is striving, moving
forward futurally, overcoming what has been, while simultaneously preserving these past
moments. For it, the past is not something that was, that has no bearing on the future, but
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rather, is something that constitutes its very fabric. That we are our past means that
history conditions both our present life and future ambitions; history is not a lifeless
artifact, but that from which a new life springs. But, it is just this—the past that is still
with us is that which impels our goals for, and visions of the future, and opens us to the
possibility of indeterminacy—which madness rejects. While the life of healthy spirit is a
process of subjective enrichment that gives rise to new shapes of the world, in madness,
the links and joints with time that enable a dialectical constitution of the individual
subject are severed. Finding its world too painful to endure, mad spirit renounces its
capacity to move forward, to cultivate a new world, and instead, “sinks back” both into
itself, and into a structure in which the future is foreclosed. Unable to transform itself and
its objective world, it alternatively seeks protection in the comfort and stability of a world
seemingly deplete of transience, of uncertainty, of the fright of an unknown future by
cutting itself off from external mediation. Without mediation impelling it forward,
inciting change and the new, deranged spirit circles round and round in the time of
nature, but does not advance in time, does not project a vision of itself in the future, and
does not recognize itself as a complex temporal being; to this end, it is affected by time,
but it does not sculpt itself in time. Reducing itself to utter passivity, its temporal
existence becomes comparable to that of a stone— it is subject to and weathered over
time, but does not actively contribute to its self-formation that takes place in time's
duration.37 Choosing to live in bondage, to be passive and to be objectified, it renounces
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its own most freedom. Giving up its freedom, deranged spirit abdicates its position in
history in the Hegelian sense.
Since true history for Hegel is characterized by progress, that is, the movement in
which spirit comes to know itself most fully, gradually enriching itself and gathering the
progressive moments of its life in recollected images, mad spirit is defeated from the
start; the wrench in time that is madness keeps it from attaining to the track on which
consciousness cultivates Bildung, and in doing such, unfolds towards goal of Absolute.
Instead, in madness one remains in nature which,
... cannot comprehend itself, so that the negation of the forms it creates does not
exist for it. But in the case of the spiritual phenomena, higher forms are produced
through the transformation of earlier and less advanced ones. The latter
accordingly cease to exist; and the fact that each new form is the transfiguration
of its predecessor explains why spiritual phenomena occur within the medium of
time (LPH 128).
Nevertheless, that madness emerges in the flow of objective time, and that Hegel has a
two-fold concept of history means that it is possible for us to historically trace and
catalogue the various and changing classifications and therapies for mental illness. But
this does not make madness a historical phenomenon. Rather, it is an object for historical
inquiry, much like Heidegger's Historie.38 It is something that can be observed and
analyzed as a historical artifact, but it remains subject to this derivative historical
grouping.
Hegel's withholding a place in history for madness lends itself to a host of
questions: who or what else is forbidden from Hegelian history, and what resemblance, if
any, do these bear to madness? Does Hegel silence the voices that fall outside of a
38
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developed and secure sense of rationality, outside of temporal regularity, or outside of
normative sociability?

Structural Madness: Hegel's Women and Africa(ns),Yesterday and Today
Taking up these questions, we seek to think through madness in a social context – that is,
attuned to social categories of difference. Although social differences and conditions
normally serve as guiding principles throughout Hegel's thought, he notoriously omits
these in his account of madness, and thus leaves suspended the question of how particular
social currents sculpt and define the category of madness. What is more, Foucault,
perhaps the most celebrated thinker of madness' social genealogy, surprisingly fails to
mention him in either of his two major works cataloguing the history and genealogy of
madness, despite the proximity of his philosophical lineage to Hegel. Nevertheless,
following a Foucauldian spirit, we aspire to unearth the conceptual marriage uniting
madness and categories of social difference—specifically, women and Hegel's rendering
of Africa. The aim, then, is to show the ways in which Hegel's thought harbors strands of
structural racism and sexism that have contributed to a history that unifies marginalized
social categories of difference with madness, a fusion which also has a homologous
rendering of temporality.
Hegel's Women
Hegel's personal biography is particularly colorful, whilst considering his relation to
women. His relation with his mother is recorded as being quite close, though he makes
little reference to her after her death when young Hegel was only twelve and his sister
Christiane, who as previously mentioned, suffered from mental derangement, but also
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lived within Hegel's family household for a time, and eventually committed suicide
shortly after Hegel's death. His obsession with the name “Maria”— or more fully “Maria
Magdalena,” the traditional family name of his maternal grandmothers for generations,
his mother, Maria Magdalena Louisa Fromm Hegel, his wife, Maria von Tucher,39 Jesus'
mother and his companion, whom Hegel writes about in his philosophical work40 – has
given rise to the suspicion that Hegel's lack of resolve with women in his personal life
seeped, however inadvertently, into his philosophy.41 Indeed, this ambivalence emerges
for example when he, on the one hand in the Philosophy of Right, regards women as
deficient of reason in comparison with men,42 and on the other hand, in the
Phenomenology, eulogizes Antigone as the hero of the chapter 'Spirit'; in the words of
J.M. Bernstein, “He loved her. Exorbitantly.”43 When asking about Hegel and women
then, the terrain is at best rocky and at least uncertain.
Women in the 19th century, as Hegel undoubtedly knew, and is now common
knowledge, were frequently diagnosed with a kind of madness, particularized to women
as “women's problems” (hysterikos), of which men could neither understand or partake
in; this particular form of madness consisted of spiked episodes of mercurial
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emotionality, linked to menstrual cycles, and was often associated with lunar motion.44
While Hegel does not specifically thematize this idea, aspects of it can be located in his
thought. For example, as feminist scholars have tirelessly argued, such beliefs about
women have infiltrated even the most seemingly neutral concepts and philosophical
thematics, including that of time, whereby the conceptual marriage of women and cycles
of nature find expression in two of the dominant tropes of time that the philosophical
tradition has advanced: cyclical and linear time. The cyclical model of time found in
nature has been attributed to women and feminine characteristics; by this model, women
and the feminine are situated within the realm of nature, of repetition, of reproduction, of
continual change without progressive movement, as discussed previously. Men and the
masculine, on the other hand, are associated with a linear model of time, one that is
characterized by activity, volition, progressive change, and reason. These two models of
time underscore the traditional gender binary, relegating women and the feminine to the
cyclicality of nature and embodiment, and men to the futurity of progress and reason.
Indeed, Hegel is suspect in this tradition, insofar as he links so-called feminine
attributes with nature, the most acute example of which has been treated in detail in this
analysis: the time of nature in the 'Anthropology' is simple, bears a relation to bodily and
emotional life. Hegel substantiates this idea when, in the Philosophy of Right, he allocates
women's utmost strength to natural relationships, particularly that of the family. Since
women, he claims, do not have the capacity for community, and because women base
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their decisions on “contingent inclination and opinion,”45 they should not be involved in
governmental affairs. Relegated to feeling, emotion, and bodily life, women cannot attain
the level of reason as exalted in men.46
However, the linkage between women, nature, the time of nature, and madness
functions in even more insidious ways, as is suggested in cameo appearance of women in
Hegel's brief elaboration of madness in the Encyclopaedia, particularly in his description
of the second main form of madness, folly, foolishness, and world-weariness:
This [form of madness] occurs when the natural mind which is shut up within
itself and whose various modifications we have just considered, acquires a
definite content and this content becomes a fixed idea, the mind which is not as
yet fully self-possessed becoming just as much absorbed in it as in idiocy it is
absorbed in its own self, in the abyss of indeterminateness. It is hard to say
exactly where madness properly begins. For example, in small towns one finds
people, especially women, who are so absorbed in an extremely limited circle of
particular interests and who feel so comfortable in this narrow life of theirs that
we might rightly call them crazy...This psychical state mostly comes about when
someone who is dissatisfied with his actual world shuts himself up in his
subjectivity. The passion of vanity and pride is the chief cause of this psychical
self-imprisonment. Then the mind which is thus nestled in its interior life easily
loses its understanding of the actual world and is at home only in its subjective
ideas (PM §408 Z).
Unlike melancholia, which is a response to a world that causes too much pain, folly can
be read as a reaction to an under-stimulated experience of time, one in which the
individual reacts to the feelings of boredom, agitation, and restlessness that obtuse time
gives rise to by retreating into a self-created world. Particularly illustrative of the
slowness of time is Hegel's specification of a small town insofar as it invokes the image
of a distinct temporal experience: unhurried, leisurely, and perhaps even sedate. Insular,
familiar, and routine, small towns are devoid of the urban disarray, contrasting cultures,
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ideas, events, and peoples; without such activity, the time of small towns can appear
prolonged. Yet, should someone find this intolerable, they could become, as Hegel
claims, 'dissatisfied with [their] actual world.' Impelled by the desire to escape the
mundane experience of everyday life, refuge is cultivated in a fictitious world of one's
own creation, where each moment harbors the possibility of a novel amusement,
pleasure, or thrill.
The features of small town life and its down-tempo temporal constitution are
precisely the lot which Hegel allocates to women, unlike man who “has his actual
substantial life in the state, in learning (Wissenschaft), etc. ....[woman] has her substantial
vocation (Bestimmung) in the family...”47 Making the family and the home woman's
primary center of the world, Hegel at once encourages woman to cultivate her “form of
concrete individuality (Einzelheit) and feeling (Empfindung)” but then also makes her
subject to the criticism of living in “narrow life.” As the “other,” she is permitted to be
involved in a limited range of pastimes, not because she cannot imagine or attain to
others, but because a masculinist discourse prescribes for her in advance the realm of
sociality, including activities, of which she can partake. If she finds such activities
unfulfilling, we are to understand that it is not that she is 'bored to tears' (to invoke the
illustrative colloquial expression) and then moved to folly, foolishness, or worldweariness, but rather suggests Hegel, she has in her very constitution a proclivity to
madness. From the outset, women are doomed to be hysterical, depressive, manically
emotional, or, in a word, crazy. Discerning what is implicated in Hegel's description, one
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must ask, is he offering a phenomenology of madness, or perhaps a prescription for
sexual hierarchy?
Irrefutably, echoes of the 19th century psychological diagnoses of “women's
problems” live on today in jests, witticisms, and cultural myths. More significantly
though are the quiet ways in which women today, despite the illusion of sexual equality
as advertised by the post-feminist movement and the sexual revolution, to cite only two
brief examples, remain conceptually yoked with hysteria, emotionality, and inferiority.
Though things are changing each day, we must continue to vigilantly think through the
inaudible, and thereby forgettable, ways in which the biases of history of philosophy
permeate the structures and institutions within which we presently dwell. This includes, if
we begin from the ground up, questioning the seemingly neutral philosophical categories
and classifications, two of which are madness and time.
Hegel's Africa(ns)
Any thorough reading of Hegel must look for parallel echoes of each thematic throughout
the text at hand, and across his larger corpus. Indeed, Olson begins this task by relating
Part 3 of the Encyclopaedia to the “treatment of judgment in the section on subjectivity in
the Logic (Part 1), and his treatment of finite mechanics, especially gravity, in the
Naturphilosophie”48 to Hegel's account of feeling and madness that has been the focal
point of this investigation. However, one can also locate analogous accounts in his
Lectures on the Philosophy of History, that harbor, as I argue, a detrimental logic (of
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overt and) structural racism, that calls for attention in philosophical, historical, and
psychological disciplines.
Amidst this discussion of nations, cultures and peoples, Hegel imbeds his account
of race—a thematic of which he is anything but reserved. His unforgivingly extreme
descriptions of peoples, races, and cultures comes to the fore not only in his Lectures on
the Philosophy of World History but also in The Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and the
Philosophy of Right. Within the pages of these works, Hegel makes his most profound
and shocking claims about Africa and its inhabitants, who are, to be sure, exclusively
black skinned.49
What is remarkable for our purposes is that even though Hegel dedicates a section
of the “Anthropology” the emergence of racial difference, including a description of the
distinguishing features of each race, his representation of Africa and in turn black
Africans in each of the aforementioned texts parallel his definition of Nature in the
“Anthropology,” that is to say, the uncultivated Gefühlsleben that shelters the expression
of spirit in its simplest form as soul, and that is the terrain of madness. In the Philosophy
of Right, Hegel includes among his classification of the uneducated, uncultured, and
uncivilized (das Ungebildete), Arabs, the poor, children, savages, and the mad; but as
Bernasconi notes, while Africans do not appear on this list, they are most definitely
implicated50— demonstrating the structural relation between madness and Hegel's
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exposition of Africa, and thereby showing Africa's place on the list, is our next
undertaking.
Recalling the language of isolation and containment by which madness is
portrayed, the reverberations in Hegel's portrait of Africa are unmistakable: “Generally
speaking, Africa is a continent enclosed within itself, and this enclosedness has remained
its chief characteristic” (LPH 173). While the mad revert to a type of unconsciousness,
Africans are “unconscious” of themselves (LPH 178). The resemblance of madness and
Africa(ns) continues in Hegel's discussion of deportment. Ruled by passion and instinct,
Africans, Hegel claims, behave mercurially: “Good natured and harmless when at peace,
they can become suddenly enraged and then commit the most frightful cruelties” (PM
§393 Z).51 Similarly, “the fury of the insane often becomes positive mania for harming
others, and can flare up into the desire to murder” (PSS §408 Z), but also, they can be the
most “affectionate partners and fathers” (PSS §408 Z). The common denominator for
both then is the proclivity for an abrupt swing of the emotional pendulum – from gently
obliging, to savagely brutal. Even the most trite of observations about physical attributes
common to specific manifestations of madness warrants a comparison between madness
and Africans:
As regards the physical side of mania, … it is known that in strong, muscular
persons with black hair, fits of rage are usually more violent than in blond
individuals (PM §408 Z).52
Negroes have narrower skulls than Mongols and Caucasians, their foreheads are
arched but bulging, their jaw-bones are prominent and the teeth slope, their low
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jaw juts well out, their skin is more or less black, their hair is woolly and black
(PM §393 Z).
Identifying Africa as nature's corollary allows Hegel to claim that “...man as we find him
in Africa has not progressed beyond his immediate existence” (LPH 177), and therefore,
“[t]he characteristic feature of the negroes is that their consciousness has not yet reached
an awareness of any substantial objectivity” (LPH 177). That is to say, Africa(ns) have
existed in time, and have been subjected to time, but have not actively contributed to any
form of self or cultural advancement. The people and the continent are entrapped in the
same cycle as women and the mad: time is circling round and around, but nothing new
happens.
Continuing this line, Hegel's account of the unfolding of the soul into gradual
stages of more sophistication in the Philosophy of Mind includes a division of humans
into the inferior and superior races. As the lowest rung on the ladder, or in Hegel's own
words, the first level (Stufe) (LPH 177) “the Negroes are to be regarded as a race of
children who remain immersed in their state of uninterested naiveté” (PM §393 Z). He
makes a similar claim again in the 1827-8 Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit: “The
Africans retain a pure inwardness the never proceeds to development. The Africans are
now as they have been for the last thousand years. They have never gone outside of
themselves, but always remain within themselves in a childlike manner” (LPS 91).
Hegel's analogous categorization of the human races with the stages of an individual
lifespan brings back into focus the latent question of time, temporality, and the question
of history, as previously thematized. As with deranged spirit, Hegel ascertains that
Africans inhabit the most naïve experience of time as Nature, but also and moreover,
identifies Africans as being equally callow. Hegel's finds evidence for this in the fleeting
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way in which he sees African live: existing only in each moment, as does a young child,
without reflecting upon the distant past or immanent future, compliant to the passion or
emotion griping one in one moment, but then abandoning it in the next, Africans are for
Hegel like a child who yearns in one second for a piece of sweet candy or shiny new toy,
then abandons it in the next. But additionally, the racial inferiority implied in identifying
Africa(ns) in the diminutive—as a child—should not be overlooked.
Africans for Hegel are people who “are accustomed to slavery,” and therefore
have no concept of freedom, “for freedom can exist only where the human being is
conscious of himself as a universal and end in itself, and reflectively knows himself as a
thinking person” (LPS 91). It is on this basis that Hegel claims that Africa, an unfree and
natural land (LPH 153), is inhumane and unthinking; it is a land without culture
(Bildung), and without its own actualizing principle, the mark necessary to be deemed
world historical.53 Thus, the heretofore discussion of the unhistorical nature of madness
recurs in Hegel's infamous declaration that Africa “... has no history in the truest sense of
the word” (LPH 190/VPH). As with madness, Africa “is still enmeshed in the natural
spirit...” (LPH 190/VPH 129), and as such “... is an unhistorical continent (keine
geschichtlicher Weltteil), with no development or movement of its own” (LPH 190/VPG
129).
While the conditions and many features of mental derangement bear a qualitative
resemblance to those which Hegel attributes to women and black Africa, a substantial
difference lies in Hegel's insistence that unlike deranged spirit, who digresses from a
more advanced stage of reason to the primitive life of feeling, or that of women, who can
53
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attain a form of reason, but not in its ideality, black Africa on its own never emerges from
the undifferentiated state and therefore, never transgresses the boundaries of nature into
any form of rationality. Africa(ns) seem to represent Hegel, the analogous equivalent of
'natural imbecility,' the first category of madness in which deranged spirit is limited by its
own natural capacities. However, this analogy is not without qualification.
If a 'cure,' as it were, could be possible, allowing Africa(ns) to emerge from the
state of natural simplicity, it would consist in contact with reason, culture, and freedom as
spread throughout Africa by Europeans—in a word, through colonialism.54 “The
conclusions to which his theorizing lead was that the colonization of Africa would
complete the process of introducing Africans into history, a process that had begun when
the first slaves were transported into America. Colonialism was the destiny to which
Africans had to submit.”55 Contact with Europeans was meant to be the panacea for
Africa(ns), one in which they learned the concept of freedom, and thereby became
candidates for entry into the European-defined timeline of history. Although endorsing
such contact served undoubtedly to justify European desires, the legitimating narrative
for Hegel, among others, was that colonization and at times slavery served to enrich
Africans, to show them freedom (from themselves?), and stabilized their temperament
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(their excitability as medical discourse would have it)—in short, it 'coerced' them through
a type of sedating therapy.56
Hegel's ideas on Africa have reverberations for us today in analyses of mental
health, and without a doubt, many other fields as well. To be sure, it does not require a far
reach of the imagination to see the ways in which Hegel's line on black African can be
read as a conceptual predecessor of the fate of African Americans, and the propinquity
with mental illness. In The Protest Psychosis: How Schizophrenia Became a Black
Disease, Jonathan M. Metzl looks into the ways in which social forces and racial tensions
color mental health diagnoses, that is to say, the silent ways that mental health has been
and continues to be also a matter of race. Metzl offers an overview of the past relations of
race and madness, including a litany of which that arose in conjunction with American
slavery, where forms of madness of this type were diagnosed in slaves who disobeyed or
sought to escape from their masters (drapetomania, dysaesthesia aethiopis). One such
case, Metzl states, “claimed that “Negroes” were “psychologically unfit” for freedom,”57
a line of argumentation in close proximity with Hegel. Examining the often invisible
ways “that psychiatric definitions of insanity continue to police racial hierarchies”58
Metzl exemplifies specifically rise of schizophrenia in black men in the American Civil
Rights era in the 1960's-70's, and tracks the changing discursive representation of
schizophrenia from a disease of “white, docile femininity,” to “a condition of angry,
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black masculinity.”59As a result of a “confluence of medical and social forces,”60
schizophrenia became, as he argues, a structural attempt to control black men,
particularly those who were actively political in the Civil Rights movement. By
pathologizing political protest, it and the protestors themselves need not be take seriously.
The residual Hegelian notion of 'coercion' and his justification for colonization and
slavery as emancipatory tickets for Africans from barbarism recurs here. Ironically
though, what is protest, if not following the quintessential Hegelian principle, namely
striving to transform the historical conditions within which one finds herself or himself?
In the case of African Americans, as with Africans for Hegel, such change has been
rendered impotent, or carefully policed, by colonialism, or pathologizing psychology.
It is clear that madness has been used as a placeholder for discrimination –
intention or accidental—against minority social groups, and has been used to justify the
use of coercive power. Hegel's reference to Bedlam, the British psychiatric center, whose
name means 'uproar and confusion,' at least suggests that he was aware of the ways in
which madness and therapy have been interwoven with social coercion, cruelty, and
inhumane behavior. He states, “The medical remedies employed are...for the most part
empirical, and are therefore uncertain in their action...the worst method of all is the one
formerly practiced at Bedlam, which was limited to a through purging of the lunatics four
times a year” (PM §408Z). Nevertheless, by making natural differences “concerns of the
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natural soul,” (PM §393 Z) Hegel displaces importance of the question of social
difference, and seems to turn a blind eye to the forces of power within which they are
immersed. It is also evident that a conceptual link amalgamates madness with social
categories of difference, and that Hegel's thought, as has been argued here, plays a role in
this process. Yet, while Hegel fails to rigorously think through the ways in which social
categories of difference in effect become equated with madness, one can nevertheless
uncover resources in his work that facilitate a critique against Hegel himself, resources
that provide a model for thinking through otherness in general. It seems at least viable
that current scholarship could find in Hegel's work the philosophical foundation
facilitating a critique of one method theorists and activists alike have employed to combat
such forms of discrimination, namely identity politics. Such a project would use Hegelian
tools, in spite of Hegel himself, to first evaluate this method of social critique that this
analysis sees as failing, and secondly to offer a new, sharper, philosophically rigorous
approach to thinking through difference and discrimination. While this project is outside
of the framework of the present analysis, there is significant evidence suggesting the
fecundity of such work. To speculate, however briefly, one might imagine the ways in
which robust identity—sexual, racial, national, etc.— could have imprisoning effects.
Hegel would no doubt claim, over identification with a particular natural difference
impedes spirit's gradual unfolding of self-knowledge to its pure self-recognition in the
Absolute. Thus, critiquing the obstruction that is stringent individuality, Hegelian thought
would aim to set free any stumbling block that keep spirit from realizing its intrinsic
relation with the universal—be it racial difference, sexual difference, or madness.
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Nevertheless, the question left unsettled is, are other voices—of women, of
Africans, African Americans, and particularly for our present analysis, of the mad—
buried, discarded, avoided, silenced? Tending to this question first involves examining
Hegel's theory of therapy, the process whereby spirit loosens its steadfast grip on its
private world, and begins to engage again with the world.

Freedom from the Self—the Therapy of Work, Trust, and Humor
It is by turning to the final pages of Hegel's treatment of madness in the Encyclopaedia,
dedicated to an exposition of the 'cure' or 'therapy' for mental disorder, that our analysis
comes full circle. Here, as will be argued, Hegel's previous rendering of a 'psychic
physiology' through the conceptual model of Bichat, transitions from bone to flesh. In
this more sophisticated account, the single, bare emotion that occupied Hegel in
abstraction returns, but with the complication and intricacy of a spirit that has drunk from
the well of reason, but then sunk back in horror from the fragility, instability, and
contingency that the shared life of reason entails.
As we return with spirit to the 'life of feeling,' we recall its most salient contours:
privacy, emotionality, and imprisonment. Yet, the penitentiary in which deranged spirit
resides is its security, it refuge, its most uncomplicated home, and to sustain this safe
haven for itself, mad spirit must shut the door to the outside world, lock it, and throw
away the key. In its self-entrapment, one that is without the regularity of time as an
anchor to the shared world, mentally deranged spirit becomes further ensnared, tumbling
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deeper and deeper into the vicissitudes of its own privacy.61 The catch of this world
though, is that while it gives spirit comfort and sense stability, it is also that which makes
it ill: “consciousness is still subject to disease in that it remains engrossed in a
particularity of its self-awareness which it is unable to work up into ideality and
overcome” (PSS §408). To emerge from the pathology of madness amounts to recovering
precisely what it surrendered in its retreat inward: the freedom of self-actualization, and
time that is both shared and meaningful. The initial step of therapy then must be
extracting mad spirit from self-imprisonment, and for guidance with this process, Hegel
turns to the French physician, Philippe Pinel.
Pinel and the Therapy of Work
That Hegel was deeply touched by Pinel's ideas regarding the treatment of the insane
goes without question. Pinel's innovation in the field of psychology involved contributing
to the introduction of a never-before thought, humane method for treating those afflicted
with madness. This so-called 'moral therapy' had for its basis the claim that the mentally
insane are not barbaric and reasonless creatures, worthy of only the 'treatment' of
animalistic living conditions, scorn, torment, whipping, beating, and isolation, but rather,
are suffering human beings who deserved to be treated with care and dignity.62 With the
overall goals of reinforcing the patient's rationality, their sense of hope and the ability to
reestablish connections with the outer world, Hegel finds in Pinel an ally both in theory
and in practice.
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Drawing from Pinel, Hegel extends his line on treatment for disease and sickness
to that of mental illness: Just as “ordinary medical treatment consists in... restoring the
fluidity of the organism,” so too is the treatment for madness (PM §406 Z). If one
remains blocked in an emotion, as Hegel demonstrated through Bichat, it will fall into
disorder. Because of this, emotional stimulants must find a way to be externalized—
crying releases sorrow, laughter releases joy, and so on. But, the case for deranged spirit
is more complex, as it has not only withheld a feeling, but made that feeling the center of
its life. Liberating the densely blocked emotionality of mad spirit means first sifting
through layers of compacted emotion, archaeologically digging mind, as psychoanalysis
might say, in an effort to reach the nucleus of spirit, where, according to Hegel, a kernel
of reason remains. While the scaffolding of these ideas was built in Hegel's rendering of
Bichat, it is only now, returning to Bichat after analyzing Hegel's phenomenology of
madness, that we can understand better why “insanity is therefore a psychical disease, i.e.
a disease of body and mind alike...[and why it is that] the commencement may appear to
start from the one more than the other, and so also may the cure” (PM §408).
What might Hegel mean in his claim that a cure for madness can be of the body
and mind alike? If one follows Pinel, physical work performed through manual labor is
the only type of work effective as a form of therapy: “It is the time-tested, universally
valid result of experience that in all public asylums, as well as in prisons and hospitals,
the most certain and perhaps only method of preserving health, good order, and good
custom is the strict observance of a law of mechanical occupation.”63 While Hegel

63

Pinel, Philippe, A Treatise on Insanity in Which are Contained the Principles of a New and
More Practical Nosology of Maniacal Disorders. Trans. D.D. Davis, Scheffield: W. Todd for
Messrs, Cadell and Davies, 1806, p.195. Foucault finds in Pinel's method a regime “implicit in

72

follows Pinel's idea of implementing work as a form of therapy, his understanding of the
function and importance of work deviates substantially from that of Pinel. For Hegel,
work (Arbeit) is not merely corporal, but is a form of self-actualization through selfexternalization. Appropriating Aristotle's notion of ποίησις as the governing model of
production, whereby at the heart of the experience of work is a distinction between form
and content, work for Hegel involves negating matter's original form and imposing a new
form upon it. The imposition of form is one’s own contribution – the product in which
the worker can see herself. When striving towards the goal self-transcendence, work is
the essential means through which this can be achieved because it takes one out of her or
himself and transposes their effort into the product. Work (Arbeit) as a form of therapy in
the Hegelian sense should then be distinguished from simply getting a job, or filling time
with a string of exclusively mechanical activities, as follows from Pinel's proposed
method of treatment. To be sure, we can recall the danger of the alienating effects work
can have, as Marx thematized, and Hegel anticipated already in his infamous chapter of
the Phenomenology, specifically the transition from master/slave dialectic to stoicism;
here, spirit is alienated in her labor and seeks escape from her cruel reality into the realm
of thought alone. What is essential to remember though is that at this moment in the
Phenomenology, stoic consciousness is still enslaved, much like mad spirit, precisely
because it sees itself free only in thought, and so its freedom is still an abstract idea. It is
only able to sustain this idea by forsaking the concrete, real conditions of its own life,
which is to say, by denying the truth of its own enslavement for the freedom it has in its
private thoughts. The echoes of mad spirit, who thinks its world is unbearable and seeks
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freedom in its own mind, are unmistakable. The life of abstract freedom in which stoic
consciousness (and mad spirit) live, arose as a response to justify the refusal to act; but
this life as Kojève points out, quickly becomes simply boring, or as Hegel states
“tedious” (PS §200).64 The recurrence of this listless feeling that emerges when time is
plodding and/or fails to satisfy reaffirms the importance of time for health, vitality,
movement, and change. One could even say that the way one responds to boredom
contributes to her health or pathology: while deranged consciousness sinks back into the
old and familiar, healthy consciousness, as we see in the Phenomenology, moves on to
something new.
Work, in the Hegelian sense, is at its heart, emancipatory. For this reason, Hegel
can follow Pinel in part, by prescribing work as a therapy for madness: “This work,
although mechanical at first, serves then to promoted movement, vitality, and health”
(LPS 150). Under this wide umbrella definition, work can take on many forms, but most
essentially in the therapeutic context, it stimulates the first stretches, bends, and yawns of
an awakening spirit, similar to what we previously saw in Hegel's appropriation of
Bichat; arising from slumber mad spirit, who once retreated in hibernation in the frigidity
of winter, begins with work to slowly rouse to the budding, blossoming, and flowering of
spring. For this reason, work functions as a “method of extrication from dementia” (LPS
150). It opens up a space that allows the deranged spirit to re-establish an engagement in
and with the world, for, as Hegel maintains, “by working they are forced out of their
diseased subjectivity and impelled towards the real world” (PM §408 Z). Externalizing
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the hyperbolic temporal interiority that underlies mental derangement, work “distance[s
spirit] from his accustomed world” (LPS 150) of self-imprisonment and strives to
disassociate it from the haphazard time therein. The brilliance of therapeutic work lies in
its ability widen the gap between mad spirit and itself, while simultaneously facilitation
its self-enrichment.
While recognizing the importance of physical work, in cases of madness, thinking
of work in other terms in addition to and beyond materialistic production, as Hegel
himself insists, is imperative. Most broadly, “To work means to become interested in a
cause, to become interested in a cause outside of subjectivity [outside of subjective
folly]” (LPS 150). Concretely, this means stepping out of the self and the imprisoned
time one creates therein, and re-engaging with the world and its time.
One form that work in this sense takes is the 'work' that is required in clinical
therapy. The 'work' of therapy, as we now know it, is closely related to Hegel's
understanding of work (Arbeit): it involves the transfiguration of emotion, latent or
manifested, to the end that the analysand undergoes a self-transformation and selfactualization in and through talking and reflecting with another. If we open up this space,
then the 'work' of therapy involves not only reintegrating mad spirit with the time of the
objective world, but also and perhaps more significantly, establishing a way in which it
can begin to imagine making its time meaningful. Work underscores that the world is not
just given, but is made; as the path of the stoic slave in the master/slave dialect
exemplifies, work may open the gateway to freedom, but true Freedom is only actualized
by acting. Taking action can take form in terms of one's contribution to a project,
investing in a cause, or caring for a plant, animal, or another being more generally.
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Investing in the welfare of something or someone else takes the pressure off of mad
spirit's individualism and isolation, and refocuses that same energy on something other,
or something new. Finding enjoyment in this makes one's time meaningful, and therefore,
the experience of the self as a temporal entity reflects this, creating a robust experience of
the temporal self, replete with existential projects, goals, and activities. Making
something new, or making something new happen is creating a new world, actualizing a
new time. However, the quality of sharing an experience with others warrants a deeper
investigation, and so it is to this experience that we now turn, through an exploration of
the therapy of trust.
The Therapy of Trust
The etymology of Verrücktheit points to a state of 'being out of one's mind.' While Hegel
does not guide us through the steps reinforcing the importance of the significance of the
word, it is inferred without difficulty: Geist, translates nearly interchangeably into
English as 'spirit' or 'mind,' but in a deranged state one withdraws into her own mind,
away from the true path of Geist, which, as we saw in the first section, is being at home
with oneself in another (bei sich in anderen zu sein). Mad spirit, who is at home
exclusively with itself in a state of simplicity, must get back on track, as it were, and to
do so involves reestablishing its engagement with others, that is, not only in the sense of
being alongside and amidst them, but moreover, it must find itself first in other people,
and second in the Absolute, that is as spirit itself. The first movement in this direction is
at once a baby step and a leap: that of trusting another human being.
Accordingly, Hegel terms his second therapeutic method—trust—“the beginning
of an objectivity since by this trust, one awakens an interest in the other” (LPS 150). As
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something that “must be earned,” (LPS 150) trust does not immediately appear, but
develops over time. Insofar as trusting another person brings the deranged spirit out from
its self-imprisonment and distances it from its customary sphere, trust facilitates the
development of an experience of time outside of, and indeed free from, solipsistic
madness; but more crucially it signifies its willing reintegration with the internalized time
that inter-subjective relations presuppose. The movement is monumental, for fleeing from
the vulnerability that this entails, is, as was previously discussed, mad spirit's catalyst for
melancholia.
In deranged states, “what is simply subjective is just as much a matter of certainty
as what is objective. Their being centers upon the simply subjective presentations from
which they derive their self-certainty” (PM § 408 Z). The shift from pathology to health
entails transitioning from finding self-certainty simply in its self-presentations, and
instead, mediating their content through another: “in order for me to have selfconsciousness, it is necessary for me to know myself in another” (LPS 190). Or again, as
Hegel states more explicitly in the Phenomenology: “Self-consciousness exists in and for
itself when, and by the fact that, it so exist for another; that is, it exists only in being
acknowledged” (PS §178). Yet, the life of solitude into which mad spirit tumbled
intentionally kept this at bay. To recover, mad spirit must find itself again in the throes of
another: in this sense, learning to trust is healing. Stemming from the root heilig, 'healing'
connotes the whole or holy. With disease and mental illness alike, healing is a process
whereby “the organism is excited into annulling the particular excitement in which the
formal activity of the whole is fixed, and restoring the fluidity of the particular organ or
system within the whole” (PN §373). In madness, this means ridding itself of its
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individual, emotion-based blockade, and finding itself in another person. In a word, to
heal, or to become whole again, mad spirit must recognize that it is completed in other
people.
One of Pinel's therapeutic aims is to reignite hope in the deranged individual, and
to hope, cashed out in temporal terms, is to be wishfully open to a possibility in the
future. Pinel's goal, which Hegel accepts but advances only in the context of trust, is that
of re-establishing futurity. With possibilities to look forward to, despite the fact that they
may never come to fruition, the deranged individual begins to recover what it surrendered
in its retreat inward—the range of its own most temporal spectrum. To achieve this,
deranged spirit must learn to trust not only others, but itself, which is to say, it must learn
again to trust its relation to time. As we have seen, if time moves too quickly, anxiety can
ensue; on the contrary, if time flows too slowly, boredom will take hold; but to become
and to remain healthy, spirit must establish itself within an intermediate, harmonious
experience of time. Of course this is a fantasy, for the naturally harmonious moments of
time are as fleeting as they are rare. Instead, it must learn to trust its ability to mediate an
experience of time in spite of the contingency, vulnerability, and fragility that being a
living entity entails. In short, it must learn how to act in a way that adapt to, overcomes,
and laughs at the fallacies, uncertainties, and faults within the world, and within itself.
The Therapy of Laughter
In addition to the two therapeutic methods that Hegel endorses, he mentions very briefly
a third remedy for madness, namely humor. While this point receives the least attention,
it is, as will be argued, the most inclusive and inter-subjective of the therapies Hegel
proposes, precisely because it directly involves not only the mentally ill, but also those
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whose lives madness touches beyond the deranged individual him or herself – doctors,
nurses, caretakers, family, friends, and even strangers. Humor and the ability to laugh
together draw both the deranged individual and the ones in his or her world outside of
themselves, their unspoken thoughts, fantasies, worries, and desires, and for a brief
moment, unite them in an equal, shared, genuinely inter-subjective experience.
Olson has drawn attention to Hegel's multifarious humorous descriptions, that of
“applying leeches to the rectum,” (PM §406 Z) to jabs about a depressed Englishman who
tried to hang himself, (PM §408 Z) and suggests that such inclusions may indicate
Hegel's wish to “lighten up a bit.”65 But if we take humor seriously, as it were, one can
see the centrality of it in Hegel's thought. For example, in the last lines of Hegel's
analysis of the 'cures' for madness, he states,
Sometimes lunacy can also be cured by a word or by a joke, acting directly on the
delusion. For instance, a lunatic who believed that he was the Holy Ghost
recovered when another lunatic said to him: How can you be the Holy Ghost? I
am it. An equally interesting instance is that of a watch-maker who imagined he
had been guillotined although innocent. The remorseful judge ordered that his
head be given back to him, but through an unfortunate mishap a different much
worse, thoroughly useless head had been put back on him. As this lunatic was
once defending the legend according to which St. Dionysius had kissed his own
severed head, another lunatic retorted: You arrant fool, with what did St.
Dionysius kiss his head, with his heel perhaps? This question so shook the lunatic
watch-maker that he completely recovered from his delusion (PM §408 Z).
Here humor, much like work and trust, has a liberating effect. In moments of irony or
surprise, it jars one out of their accustomed train of thought. It displaces an established
idea, illusion, or feeling by breaking the spell of such a thought, by taking us out of
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ourselves, and allowing something new to usher in. This, as we have seen, is essential to
therapeutic practices for madness.
However, this is only one of the possibilities for humor, for as is obvious, when
something is funny, we laugh. Laughter can be provoked by a host of things, including
but not limited to: a joke, being tickled (literally and metaphorically), nervousness, irony,
fatigue, or just simply because. It can emerge in various gradations, from callous
chuckles, to breathless gasps. Consider, for example contagious laughter, when the
reception of another's laughter involuntarily inspires it in us; hysterical laughter, whereby
everything and nothing at the same time is uncontrollably hilarious, and each effort that is
made to stop laughing induces another round of it; inappropriate laughter, which grasps
us in the most unfitting and improper situations— a serious lecture, a funeral, a church
sermon. In all of laughter's variations, one thing remains the same: experiencing it
transports us outside of our normal comportment, into various states of pleasure, ranging
from mild enjoyment to mad frenzy.
Laughter's proximity to madness is precisely what makes it so effective as a
therapeutic tool, bringing together disparate individuals who may otherwise have nothing
in common: laughter takes two worlds, however similar or different and for a few
moments, makes them one. It has a decidedly social core, and therefore can signify
approval and stimulate the positivity in a group, giving the feeling of social bonding.
Arguably, it is best experienced in the company of another. The sociability of laughter
was prefigured already in Hegel's appropriation of Bichat, the account with which this
analysis commenced. Here, we saw the relevance of laughter's temporal texture, as it
were, for Hegel's understanding of it. As a phenomenon which we see and hear in
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ourselves and others, it invokes a simple experience of time. But what is more, laughter,
as we saw, is temporary, fleeting. It is, we would like to suggest, precisely these mere
moments that provide the occasion and open the space for a genuine experience of shared
time for mad spirit. Unlike work, which takes deranged spirit out of isolation and places
it in objectively shared time, one that is somehow still remotely distant, or trust, which is
exclusive and intimate, laughter by contrast, is deeply personal, but nevertheless can
happen spontaneously and with anybody. While Hegel stops short of making this point, it
springs from the seed he planted: laughter, as a third form of therapy, is the most easily
cultivated form of shared time, bears the best qualities of the other two forms of therapy,
but adds to them by contributing an element of ecstatic release. And perhaps most
importantly, it can bubble up anywhere, anytime, anyhow, and thereby is a constantly
available therapeutic resource for drawing deranged spirit out of solitude and into
objective, yet intimate time with others.
Hegel seems to be suggesting, albeit in a convoluted way, that the germ of reason
in mad spirit can find expression in laughter— reason has a sense of humor! If humor is a
gateway to hearing, seeing, and in short recognizing the vast range of ways in which
communication and expression can take place, then the robust way in which such
recognition can occur is what must be tended to next.

Hegel's Speculative Method: Listening to the Voices of Madness
While laughter can provide an inroad to a shared experience of time and indeed is an
expression of joy, it nevertheless does not and can never fully bridge the gap dividing
mad and healthy spirit. To this end, Hegel, Pinel, and many other thinkers of mental
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derangement have been criticized for ignoring the concrete lived implications of madness
as a form of otherness. Though he remains silent regarding Hegel, Foucault has criticized
in a broad way treatments for the mad, particularly its medicalization, claiming that it
“merciless[ly] silences the voices of the insane through an act of sovereign reason.”66
And Foucault is not alone in this assessment. In Beyond Hegel and Dialectic, William
Desmond argues that Hegel does not fully recognize otherness, insofar as everything
within his system can be reduced to unity of reason and logical concept.67 Therefore, we
must ask: Does Hegel's account of madness as something occurring within the bounds of
reason deny insanity a space of its own outside of accepted rational categories? Or,
alongside and in the words of Berthold-Bond: “...we may ask, whether Hegel's ontology
of madness, for all the impressive show of such conceptual categories as regression,
doubling, and projection, and for all the intricate dialectical interplay of the principles of
a 'speculative' theory of illness, does not cover over and leave silent what might be called
the existential intimacy of madness, the horror and tragedy of the concretely lived
experience of the insane?”68
While Hegel has been accused of the indifference to such matters, it has
alternatively and persuasively been argued that he is anything but insensitive to the
concretely lived experience of the insane, and one can find work that provides substantial
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evidence of the ways in which the existential intimacy of madness affected his life.69
Extending this claim amounts to unearthing the rich soil of Hegel's thought to show the
ways in which his method prescribes, and indeed demands, that the voices of the mad are
heard. This is a central aim, as this final section contends, implicit in Hegel's speculative
theory.
Finding the particles of reason and raising their insights to a higher level of
understanding, while also delimiting the limitations of a position, is Hegel's speculative
task. Accordingly, a fundamental aspect of speculative thinking in general involves
thinking through and overcoming antithesis i.e., between subjective and objectivity, faith
and reason, mind and body, Romantic and Empirical psychology: the task “of
philosophy, is nothing but the overcoming of this antithesis through thinking.”70
Concretely, this involves recognizing the incompleteness or one-sidedness of a single
term on its own, and seeing the identity or ideality of their unity: in Kant's words,
“Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”71 Since the
psychologies of his time isolate the mind from the organic whole, that is from the person,
their methods support an unwarranted and untrue division of the human being: “The
former makes mind into a dead essence divorced from its actualization, while the latter
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kills the living mind by tearing it asunder into a manifold of independent forces, which
neither derive from the Notion, nor are they held together by it” (PM §379 Z). Upholding
in their own way the philosophical 'mind/body problem' they fail to recognize the unity of
the human being as Spirit. In brief, neither method thinks: “Through lack of thought, no
advance is made beyond the abstraction of the limit, so that even where the Notion itself
enters into existence as it does in life, there is a failure to grasp it. This thoughtlessness
keeps to the determinations of ordinary thought, such as impulse, instinct, need etc., and
does not ask what they are in themselves” (PN §359 Z). As a consequence, they 'despiritualize' human beings, and thus (PM §378 Z) neither have “claim to the name of
genuine speculative philosophy” (PM §378 Z). Any truly speculative method considering
the mind must recognize the fullness of life— that is, the unity of factors constituting
each individual. And, as Bichat introduced, this also means considering the life of
pathology, including the life of madness itself, and the lives of those who are mad.
Hegel's speculative method further entails finding the moment of most importance
in a philosophical position, where something is stated, but the full thrust of it is perhaps
not intended; this important moment for Hegel is always that which bears, but does not
develop, a speculative insight. This too, is Hegel's task when offering a
phenomenological, philosophical account of the expressions of madness. Hegel
reformulates the way reason has been understood in relation to madness, whereby
madness, as we have seen, is not an absence of reason, but its digression—which is just
to say, each mad individual still has reason and the capacity to express it. Accordingly,
when Hegel insists that madness is not the absence of reason, but a digression from it, he
cannot be silencing the voices of madness, but rather, he must be heeding a call to
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attempt to understand what is being expressed by the mad individual, her or himself, in
their own way. To this end, the philosophical task is to isolate the element of reason in
the utterances of the mad. Hegel anticipates this in his account of vocality in the
Philosophy of Nature. Here he states, “The vocal faculty comes closest to thought, for in
the voice pure subjectivity becomes objective, not as the particular actuality of a
condition or sensation, but in the abstract element of space and time” (PN §351).
Speaking is the way in which human beings approximate thought, and in doing such, they
enter into the objectivity of simple space and time, which, as one will recall, is an aspect
of the liberatory aim of Hegel's three-pronged theory of therapy. While Hegel's
therapeutic methods have for their aim a 'cure' for madness, that is reestablishing spirit's
'normal' 'healthy' constitution, one that does not deviate from the beaten path, implicit in
the prescription for healing the ails of malady is a call to healthy spirits to open their eyes
and ears, to hear what is said in what does not conform to their standard, and to become
attuned to the choir of mad reason, its tenors, bases, altos, and sopranos. For example,
Hegel speaks of a “warden [who] entered into quiet conversation with [a deranged man]
and gave into his absurdities, which calmed him… continuing this kind of treatment
cured the lunatic in a very short time” (PM §408 Z). In another example, Hegel cites a
case of a man who believed he had a hay cart and horses in his stomach. The
...doctor, who having assured him that he could feel the cart and horses...gained
his confidence, persuaded him that he possessed a remedy for reducing the size of
the things supposedly in his stomach. Finally, he gave the lunatic an emetic and
made him vomit out the window, just as with the doctor's connivance, a hay-cart
was passing by outside, which the lunatic believed he had vomited (§408 Z).
The content of the mad individual's claims may be deranged, but underlying the words
that are actually said is a meaning, perhaps one that will never be known, but regardless,
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requires expression and reception. We can now see the evolution that has taken place
from Hegel's early account of emotionality to its development in madness: In the
'psychic-physiology' that Hegel offered via Bichat, simple affectation merely needed to
be released, externalized. In madness, however, as was previously demonstrated, mad
spirit must not only discharge its thoughts and feelings, but they need to be recognized by
another. In what came before, this was articulated in terms of trust. Just as important
though is the every day occurrence of simply being heard as articulating a thought or
idea, however obscure; part of the speculative method then involves the 'other' to the mad
individual affirming that they are still worthy of genuine attention and time.
Thematizing time, one can better understand the necessity for Hegel for the
“voices” of the insane to be heard. This endeavor means not merely allowing “other”
voices to speak, but also genuinely hearing them as they are in their own right, which
involves, as is implicit in the speculative method, thinking through the unity of the
subject. To be heard is to be embraced in the common world, the world in which clocks
can be synchronized, Tuesday is Tuesday for the entire world, sharing a laugh means
sharing a moment, and speaking means being someone who deserves to be listened to. An
unwillingness to or an inability to listen to or to take seriously the mad is equivalent to
silencing their effort to speak. And this, in short, reinforces to mad spirit that the
objective world is not a place to call home. If an antithesis between mad and healthy
spirit persists, it will remain until the aspects of reason that the mad still harbor are heard
and taken seriously.
Hegel is well know for taking up and adapting famous philosophical formulations,
handed down to us throughout the history of philosophy, particularly those of the thinkers
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most influential to his own thought. In the “Anthropology” of the Philosophy of
Subjective Spirit, a text fully and openly indebted to Aristotle, it fitting that Hegel could
make his insight here his own: Just as 'being is said in many' ways, so too as Hegel's
account of the voices of madness demonstrates, is reason.
Conclusion
By putting pressure on time and the temporal components underscoring spirit's mental
derangement, this analysis has attempted to show the essentiality of thinking the two in
unison. However, by concentrating on this sole theme in Hegel's theory of madness,
despite the relatively limited attention he affords it, many stones have regrettably been
left unturned. A longer work would doubtlessly benefit from looking closer at the
leitmotifs left untouched including: surveying in further detail madness in German
Idealism more broadly; examining the influence of Kant's ideas on madness on Hegel and
Schelling; appraising the relation between Hegel and Schelling, both philosophically and
personally, including their friendship with the tragically mad Hölderlin, the influence of
Schelling's brother, Karl who treated Hegel's sister Christiane; examining Hegel's
understanding of climate and land as determining factors of subjectivity, as inherited
from Kant; analyzing the 'evil' that is at the heart of madness; and the list goes on.
Given the rage of theoretical problems that madness gives rise to, why then think
about madness in terms of temporality? A rigorous answer begins by way of a brief
historical detour: Until recent efforts, beginning with Derrida and developed through the
work Catherine Malabou, Hegel has been regarded as an important thinker of history, but
deemed to be without anything substantial or revolutionary to say about time. Cast as a
figure par excellence of 'vulgar' time by Heidegger, it has become common to follow this
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assessment and to refrain from seeing anything besides a résumé of Aristotle's Physics
Book IV in Hegel's accounts of time.72 On the other hand, Foucault, the preeminent
thinker of madness in the 20th century, whose intellectual tentacles have indisputably
extend into even the most recent philosophical examinations of madness, did not once
mention Hegel's theory of madness in his great works dedicated to the topic, even though
both he and Hegel were deeply interested in both Bichat and Pinel. The fact that Foucault
acknowledges Kojève's reading of Hegel as deeply influential on his own work, and also
studied Hegel with the foremost French translator and interpreter of Hegel of the time,
Jean Hyppolite, makes Foucault's negligence of Hegel even more surprising. Although
subsequent work has supplemented this, it seems likely that the relative lack of attention
to Hegel and madness is at least in part influenced, ironically, by Foucualt's silence.
While thinking madness and temporality together is obvious, even commonsensical in
other accounts, including—the French phenomenological tradition of Merleau-Ponty,
Richir, Maldiney, and Marion, the work of Binswanger and Erwin Strauss, and of course
Lacan and Melanie Klein—it has not, as of yet, and for the reasons discussed above I
believe, received the attention it deserves in Hegel. This analysis has attempted to mend
this gap. Accentuating what is present, but often muted in Hegel's thought opens up an
inroad into the intricacy of the experience of being human, including the entanglements
of emotional life, and its pathological potential as madness.
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Chapter 2. A Desire for Life: The Time of Reproduction and Love
That love and sexual relations are both personal and public, both violent and tender, both
volatile and steadfast, demands from us – lovers, friends, and sexual beings in general – a
certain openness to contradiction, to mercuriality, to variance. This tension, residing at
the center of such a prevailing human phenomenon, as a constituting factor and
potentially destructive hazard of love, of sexualities, of sexual identities, and of
communities thereof, is also an anchor of human experience that can neither be erased
nor ignored. Yet, those whom we love, or, the ways in which we express our affections
are never merely private matters, but are at the heart of our existential goals, political
alliances, and personal sympathies. Inquiring into and creating a space to demonstrate, to
live the web that constitutes the relations among love, sexualities, and communities
thereof, is central to any articulation of self-knowing.
As a thinker of human relations—liaisons in all of their manifold forms—Hegel’s
work centerpieces, albeit at times in veiled ways, the themes of love, desire, and sexual
relations. Scattered throughout Hegel's corpus, they emerge in various changing forms
including, life, love, desire, and the daunting, phantasmal 'enemy' (Feind), each of which
has a bearing on time and temporality. Indeed, whether one borrows from Freud's
innovation of introducing temporality into accounts of psychosexual development or
merely empirically observes human and animal cycles of reproduction and the recurring
physiological changes induced by reproductive hormones (i.e. human menstrual cycle,
animal estrous cycle), the simple relation between time and sexual reproduction is
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undeniable.1 Reading Hegel with this in mind, our aim is to inquire into Hegel's various
renderings of sexual love and reproduction considered in light of the temporal, and in
conclusion to advance a model for sexual relations rooted in Hegelian philosophical
resources, based not only on reproduction, but also and more significantly, on a cocreated, shared notion and experience of time.
Doing such first entails tracing Hegel’s trajectory on love and sexual relations from
his Early Theological Writings, spanning through his robust articulation of sexual
difference and sexual relations in the Philosophy of Nature, and cashing out the
implications of such for subjective spirit in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and the
Phenomenology. Section one, “Naturphilosophie: Kant, Hegel, and the Purposiveness of
Living Beings,” contextualizes Hegel’s encounter and engagement with the philosophies
of nature of his time – fueled by his ambivalent relation with Schelling, and building on
his philosophical inheritance from Kant and Aristotle – in an effort to broadly articulate
the presuppositions of his line on sexual difference (Geschlechtsverhältnisse)2 and
sexual-relations, which will be the topic of section two “The Time of Life: From Giving
Life to Living Life.” Fleshing out the concrete implications of Hegel’s theoretical
inheritance and motivations, the section offers an exposition of the role and function of
‘Life’ and its temporal underpinnings in sexual difference and reproduction. Following
Alison Stone, who points out that the arguments advanced in Hegel’s theory of
consciousness in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit run parallel to that of the Philosophy
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of Nature, we will also read the two texts in conjunction, though not for the aim of
grasping a stronger foothold in the obscure philosophy of nature, as does Stone, but rather
for substantive textual support, to flesh out Hegel’s discussion of sexual difference and
sexual reproduction from the standpoint of nature, which recur as echoes in his
articulation of subjective spirit.3 Transitioning next to a reading of the two levels of
desire underscoring Life, section three, “The Course of Desire: Unity, Appetite, Selfunderstanding,” tracks the development of Hegel’s thought from his early model of love,
to his bipartite rendering of desire in “Self-Consciousness” in the Phenomenology,
Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, and in the Encyclopaedia. Illustrating the two ways
in which the desire for life works—as continuation of the species through reproduction in
animal life and as an enriched understanding of the self that emerges through the
intimacy of sexual self-consciousness, that is, as being radically dependent on others and
their response to it for its own sense of self—the section argues that the development of a
sexual self-consciousness entails the internalization of time. The chapter concludes by
advancing a model for love and sexual relations, developed out of Hegel’s thought, which
emphasizes the production of a shared life, constituted by the time lovers create together,
in juxtaposition to the reproduction of life through the generation of a child.

Naturphilosophie: Kant, Hegel, and the Purposiveness of Living Beings
The question of how to understand nature philosophically is one that plagued Hegel from
his early years in Jena (Jenasystementwürfe 1803-1806), and indeed is the site of a
lifelong tension, as appears often without reference, sometimes in kinship, others in
3
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voracious polemics, particularly with Schelling, but also with other figures in German
Idealism. Inversing Schelling, who argued for an understanding of culture and history
stemming from nature, spirit for Hegel is the primary factor for understanding social life,
and nature is its unsophisticated form. Nature emerges specifically as a thematic for
Hegel in his Early Jena System, Differenzschrift: The Difference Between Fichte and
Schelling, the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807, Preface, Reason), the Encyclopedia
Philosophy of Nature: (1817, 1827,1830), and the Lectures on Naturphilosophie (1805-6,
1819-20, and 1821-22). Yet the unfolding of a Naturphilosophie in both philosophers
offer, in their own distinct ways, a rejoinder to the Kantian antithesis between nature and
freedom, as posited in the Critique of Judgment. As Harris recounts, “After Schelling's
departure from Jena, when Hegel began to lecture on the Philosophy of Nature himself,
the division between “Nature” and “Spirit” at the finite level began to assume more
importance than the division between finite and infinite spirit (that is, between parts 3 and
4). After Schelling's departure, the influence of Fichte (with the radical Kantian antithesis
between “Nature” and “Freedom”) began to dominate Hegel's mind.”4
The Encyclopedia contains what Hegel considers to be the body of dialectically related
philosophical knowledge, consisting of three parts, whereby the Philosophy of Nature lies
between his Logic and Philosophy of Spirit. Many questions regarding the purpose,
validity, and logical possibility of Hegel’s account of nature remain unsettled, including
that of the transition between his Logic and his Philosophy of Nature, which Schelling
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thought to be inconsistent with Hegel’s overall system, his idealism in particular.5 While
important to Hegelian scholarship overall, such a polemic will nevertheless remain in the
periphery, leaving open a central space for demonstrating the foregrounding structures of
Hegel’s consideration of nature as the appropriate sphere into which philosophy must
begin to understand differently sexed entities and their relation to the species.
Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature is above all a philosophical reading of the
interworking of nature, which illustrates the generation of forms of nature in relation to
the logical movement of the concept. As a logical expression of the Concept, Nature for
Hegel is for composed of thought and matter, whereby thought becomes instantiated in
matter in a dialectical progression. Accordingly, Nature is a series of stages—materiality,
bodies, “physical” qualities, and life – each of which emerges out of that which came
before it, and the task of a philosophy of nature is to give an account of this movement by
understanding the ways in which they are generated (PN §242). Well-read in the science
of his day, Hegel was familiar with the debates and controversies of the field, and
understood them as moments in the self-realization of the Concept in his conceptual
analysis of the natural world. Offering an understanding of nature that differs
substantially from empirical sciences, “Hegel equates these various stages with regions of
nature as described by and theorized in the empirical sciences,”6 whilst aiming to show
that the categories constituting the Concept are first derived logically, not parasitically on
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the empirical sciences (PN §353Z).
However, in his particular and probably biased reading of Critique of Judgment,
Hegel found a philosophical renewal for questions of nature, as has the development of
biological knowledge and philosophies of life, which have continued even today to return
to this text, citing it as the birthplace of modern biology, and nearly all of the period now
known as German Idealism, for whom this text served to carved out the guiding lines of
philosophical inquiry. Here, Kant deals most famously with nature and the question of
purposiveness, risking, as some have argued, undermining the positive limitations of
knowledge established by the Critique of Pure Reason. Revisiting briefly Kant’s
formulation, and interrogating the power or faculty that supports the philosophical
development that emerged out of the Third Critique, will facilitate a deeper philosophical
understanding of Hegel’s motivations in his philosophy of nature, and in particular will
draw into focus the particular role of sexual difference and sexual relations in Hegel’s
system.
The Third Critique opens with the reminder that in order to think, to judge, or to
know about the world, we must be able to bring our intuitions under empirical concepts.
However, in order to classify intuitions under empirical concepts, we must be able to
compare intuitions, to determine their degree of similarity and difference, and to do this
we need to be able to form new concepts. In order to have empirical concepts at all,
natural phenomena must not be infinitely heterogeneous, as that it would make it
impossible to regard those objects as possessing shared empirical properties. Nature as a
crude, chaotic aggregate would make reflection upon the given representation to produce
a possible concept impossible. So even to begin the business of knowing the world, as
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evidenced most clearly with nature, we have to make some presuppositions. The issue
here is that of if there is a sufficient ordering in nature, in order can make ordinary
empirical concepts, and hence empirical cognition, possible. Because empirical concepts
are universal, they are either highly condensed laws of nature, or are derivable from laws
of nature. Ordinary conceptual practices are all bound up with law likeness, and therefore
we have to be latching on to things—which makes some minimal degree of the arbitrary
unavoidable – but there must be sufficient grounds, even for multiple carvings. At the
transcendental level, all we know is that anything that appears must be in appearance
with the categories, but this does not show how empirical knowledge is possible; there
must be more given. The aggregate of different concrete judgments are so capricious that
there is no possibility for the unification of knowledge into one systematic whole. This
would be in direct conflict with the assumption that nature is as a causal whole. After
Kant, one can see that prior to Newton, science did not have an account of, for example,
why cannon balls fly, or the way in which this is implicated in the motions of the
heavens. The Third Critique effectively opens up a new domain of thought or inquiry,
particularly one that was precluded in the Critique of Pure Reason, and unaccounted for
in the sciences of the time.
What will distinguish Kant’s aesthetics from psychology will be the fact of a new a
priori, justifying the grounds for judgments of taste – namely, the principle of subjective
purposiveness. Unlike the first two Critiques, which had the world and freedom
respectively as their objects, the principle of purposiveness in the Third Critique does not
have an object, for it legislates no domain, only our activities in seeking knowledge: it
determines my thinking about nature, not nature itself. As he summarizes in the first
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Introduction,
Therefore it is subjectively necessary for us to make the transcendental
presupposition that nature [as an experience possible for us] does not have this
disturbing boundless heterogeneity (Ungleichartigkeit) of empirical laws and
heterogeneity (Heterogeneität) of natural forms, but that, rather, through the
affinity of its particular laws under more general ones it takes on the quality of
experience as an empirical system.7
This is the transcendental presupposition of judgment. Thus, the principles of purposive
judgment do not give us a priori knowledge of the world at all, for they really are
subjective, and as such, they do not determine the object. However, they do not tell us
that nature is orderly, but that we must act towards it as if it is orderly for the sake of
knowledge; that is to say, that nature is not chaotic is a necessary presupposition for the
possibility of inquiry. The principle is our idea of the intelligibility of nature as a system;
without it, we cannot undertake scientific inquiry. It is a transcendental condition for the
possibility of inquiring into nature, but it differs from the transcendentalism of the First
Critique, insofar as it provides no basis for the theoretical cognition of nature. The
presupposition relates not to nature itself, but rather, governs our own activity, and this is
the sense in which it is a “transcendental” presupposition. Such a principle appears at first
glance to be about the world, but rather, it is a principle about my stance towards the
world, internal to the activities of acquiring knowledge of nature. This can be considered,
as Henry Allison suggests, as if it were a problem of induction: the problem of empirical
chaos as a problem of induction is the movement from some features agreeing to all
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features agreeing.8 So, this is not an a priori guarantee that nature will behave in certain
ways, nor is it a metaphysical or ontological solution, but rather a normative one. Kant’s
claim is that we are rationally constrained to approach nature as if it is so ordered, and
therefore, the principle of purposiveness defines the space of judgment, just as the
categories give us the space of reason. It provides the rational, normative framework in
which rational reflection upon nature is possible. Kant’s gesture is that of taking a
metaphysical problem about the world and turning it into a normative problem about how
we must think about the world for the sake of certain activities.
Following Kant, Hegel will undergo an extensive analysis of nature, including
living beings or organisms and their relation to the species—but Hegel’s concern
surpasses Kant’s aim to comprehend the way we think about nature and living beings,
insofar as he seeks additionally to situate nature in relation to the Concept. Even though
Kant takes care to regulate his positive claims regarding teleology, Hegel finds his
concept of “inner purposiveness” (innere Zweckmäßigkeit), that is, ends or purposes
internal to a system, not only to be deeply resourceful for understanding living beings,
but also provides the link to positive knowledge that Kant himself turned away from.9 For
Hegel then, Reason is intrinsic to the forms of nature, and expresses itself in the changes
a natural form undergoes, as set out by its own rational requirements. The idea of nature’s

8

Allision, Henry. Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic
Judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
9

The role of teleology in the sciences has since been a source of debate, one that, from
the perspective of contemporary scientific theories may seem obsolete. Many articles have
already been written critiquing teleology from the standpoint of contemporary biology, and
instead of adding to this pool of literature, the present chapter seeks instead to read Kant and
Hegel on their own terms, and in doing such, point to a different line of philosophical import that
emerges from their original engagement with teleology.

97

purposiveness traces back to Aristotle, but Hegel finds inspiration in its re-emergence in
the thought of Kant:
The fundamental determination of living existence is that it is to be regarded as
acting purposively. This has been grasped by Aristotle, but has been almost
forgotten in more recent times. Kant revived the concept in his own way however,
with the doctrine of the inner purposiveness of living existence, which implies that
this existence is to be regarded as an end in itself. The main sources of the difficulty
here are that the relation implied by purpose is usually imagined to be external, and
that purpose is generally thought to exist only in a conscious manner. Instinct is
purposive activity operating in an unconscious manner. (PNp §360 remark).
Or again in the Encyclopedia Logic:
The teleological relation is the syllogism in which the subjective purpose
concludes itself with the objectivity external to it, through a middle term, which is
the unity of these two. The unity is both the purposive activity and the objectivity
posited immediately as subservient to the purpose; [in other words] it is the
means.10
Most fundamentally for Hegel, the whole of a system is that which gives its parts their
proper meaning. To this end, an organism has no separate part outside of their unity: “the
hand, when separated from the body, putreﬁes” (PN §248Z). As an organism in nature,
the individual is considered to be a self-organizing totality—just as the truth of a
philosophical system is located in its unity.
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The Time of Reproduction: From Giving Life to Living Life
“The fecundity of the earth causes life to
break forth everywhere and in every way”
(EPM §370Z).

In the 2006 Hegel-Lexicon, Annette Sell offers an extensive, comprehensive
interpretation of the multifarious uses and meanings of Hegel’s concept of Life, from his
Early Theological Writings to The Science of Logic, and distills it to the following base
definition: Life is “the movement characterized by division and reintegration into unity,”
which gives expression to the “relationship of individual and universal [von Einzelnem
und Allgemeinem].”11 The concept of Life, as it is expounded in the Encyclopedia Logic,
structures his subsequent discussion of the three broad categories of mineral, vegetable,
and animal life, that come in the Philosophy of Nature, and of human life in The
Philosophy of Spirit. As James Kreines points out, Life as it emerges in the Encyclopedia
must be met by three requirements: First, like Kant, Hegel maintains that “the organs are
the means of life, and these very means, the organs themselves, are also the element in
which life realizes and maintains itself . . . this is self-preservation;”12 second, it must
involve itself in the world, which serves as the means through which it strives to actualize
itself; third, “Hegel’s concept of Life also requires that individuals must be mortal, and
must aim for the reproduction (e.g., sexual reproduction) by which a species endures.”13
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Sell, Annette. “Leben” In Hegel-Lexicon. Ed. Paul Cobben, Paul Cruysberghs,
Peter Jonkers, and Lu De Vos. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft,
2006, 305. See also Cinzia Ferrini’s unpublished essay, “Hegel’s Idea of Organic Life.”:
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In Hegel’s own words: “Life is a means, but for this Notion, not for another; it is
perpetually reproducing its infinite form. Kant had already determined living existence as
constituting its own end. There is change here, but it is only present on behalf of the
Notion, for it is merely the otherness of the Notion that changes” (PN §337).
Insofar as Life, as something alive, is both the precondition for and consequence of
reproduction, Hegel considers them co-extensively. In the Encyclopedia Philosophy of
Nature and Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, it is within the realm of 'nature' and the
transition to the domain of ‘spirit as soul’ that Hegel's most elaborate discussion of sexual
reproduction and of sexual difference, that is, of embodied beings that are differently
sexed, appears. Hegel finds sexual difference to be ultimately bound to the ways in which
an individual via its animal functions relates to the species in terms of its reproductive
capabilities, the logical outline of which begins prior to the Philosophy of Nature,
however, in the Lesser Logic, where the categories that lay out the disposition and
potentiality of things—including the different sexes and their relation to sexual
reproduction—are derived. Here, Hegel states that in animal life, the singular organism is
dominated by its genus, and will perish while the species will continue to survive.
Hegel’s primary concern for sexual difference is to understand the relation between
differently sexed individuals in terms of their species, an account that will carry over to
sexual division of humans, based primarily on the individual’s potential role in sexual
reproduction. Reproduction, for Hegel, is a process set at the purpose of producing, in a
third term, the collective identity of the two other animals. Each animal in the process of
reproduction must perform a different role, delineated by the purposefulness of the
organism, which must divide itself into various systems of organization. Expounding this
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is the task of “The Process of the Genus,” in the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel’s explicit
consideration of reproduction and destruction as a dialectic of life, sex, and death. The
dialectic, as moment of at once death and birth, is a pivotal hinge that opens to a new
level self-knowledge. In “The Gender of Spirit” Laura Werner summarizes the dialectic
as the following:
Hegel’s Geist is described throughout his work above all as alive [lebendig], a
description linking it to natural life in Hegel’s multitudinous descriptions of “spirit”
as a bud, a flower, birth, and, indeed, (sexual) love. As could be inferred from the
importance of the process of the genus as the acme of the philosophy of nature, the
relation of spirit and nature is not indifferent to sex. Hegel’s metaphor for the
relation is carnal and clearly gendered: “Spirit has the certainty which Adam had
when he looked on Eve: ‘This is the flesh of my flesh, and bone of my bone.’ Thus
Nature is the bride which Spirit weds.14
As Werner notes, the leitmotif of sex dominates the dialectic, to the extent that, for many
feminist, it represents Hegel’s overall line pertaining to all things sexual. In what is to
come, we seek to frustrate such an interpretation, by reading with Hegel from perspective
of spirit in its infancy. Reading in this manner emphasizes in phenomenological terms
what can be seen through the eyes of spirit, not exclusively Hegel’s definition of sex and
sexual difference. Furthermore instead of taking the body as the basis for identity, we
take as a starting point the experience of the body as time—growing old, menstrual
cycles, pregnancy, graying of hair, transitioning bodies (as trans-individuals), and one
might even add, the effects of gravitational pull on bodies. Putting pressure on the
temporal selves that we all are adds specificity to the materiality of the body, while
avoiding the pitfalls of essentialism and normative categories of sex and sexuality, which
frequently serve as implicit frameworks for heteronormativity.
14
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“The Process of the Genus,” commences by describing animals’ sexual
reproductive anatomy and their contact, what David Ferrell Krell calls a “dialectic of
genitality,”15 where Hegel depicts the difference between the sexual genitalia of females
and males, as they relate to the Concept: “As the different sexes constitute the sex-drive
as differentials, there must be a difference in their formation; their mutual
determinateness must exist as posited through the Notion. The implicitness of both sides
is not merely neutral, as it is in chemism; however, for on account of the original identity
of their formation, the same type underlies both the male and female genitals” (PNp
§368Z). In contrast to what feminist critiques, the female human is not defined as inverse
of the male human: each is the inverse of the other, precisely because they are not defined
in relation to each other, but in terms of their relation to the species.
Hegel’s account of irreducible sexual difference occurs not at the level of genitalia,
but in the process of reproduction, and more specifically in the ways in which the sexes
differently experience reproductive life. For animals, the sex drive has a life of its own,
whereby the experiences ‘naturally’ or automatically unfold differently to sexed
creatures, varying in relation to their difference: “Yet these animals have no choice, for
the drive is immanent in such a way, that this specific determinateness of the grass, and
indeed of this grass, and this corn etc., is present in the animal itself, and it is simply
unconscious of the presence of anything else” (PNp §361Z). While animals have a sense
of themselves in sensation, they have no conceptual self-knowledge; their sexual
reproduction requires no thought, no will, no conscious reflection, but rather is merely the
individual animal’s unconscious response to an urge: “The sexual relation…is a drive
15
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(Trieb), a desire in relation to the species” (LPS, 103). To illustrate, one can imagine a
female cat in estrus cycle: during this time even the most domesticated of house cats will
invariably exhibit erratic and uncharacteristic behavior including, ear-piercing howling,
particularly at night; excessive rubbing of herself against any and all surfaces, and most
characteristically, that of often displaying itself by adopting a stance of sexual offering,
which displays her receptivity to mating. The feline appears to be controlled by
something other than its own self, and will continue this behavior until the estrus cycle
comes to an end.
In contrast to animals, human beings have the capacity to consciously consider their
sexual life, and make personal choices accordingly.16 While humans are endowed with an
animal function in the form of an urge, what Hegel calls the “animal element of the
species,” a “… process [that] belongs in the reflection of life as such, therefore in the
philosophy of nature [, individuals nevertheless] have the disposition to cancel their onesidedness. This is the task of particularity through which the universal is posited. This is
love in general, which has an animal aspect” (LPS 100). Following in part Aristotle’s
distinction between βίος and ζωή insofar as humans, unlike animals, have a life, they are
not bound to their biological lives, a point Hegel forcefully makes in the dialectic of
“Self-Consciousness” in the Phenomenology, when each individual stakes their own life
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for recognition.17 The concept of Life thus undergoes generation, enrichment, whereby
this movement is the dialectical progression from bios (or what some philosophical
schools might now call bare life) and communal life as conditioned by historical and
social factors. Sexual procreation is thus not a process in life to which human creatures
succumb instinctually, but one upon which they can reflect and incorporate into their own
self-understanding.
In her critical reading of Hegel’s presentation of sexual differentiation in the
Philosophy of Nature, Elaine Miller in her book The Vegetative Soul, From Philosophy of
Nature to Subjectivity in the Feminine, finds in Hegel a simple equation of femininity,
passivity, and plant life, and the characteristics of masculinity and activity associated
with animal life: “In the man there is disruption and in the woman there is a plant-like
unity of spirit” (LPS 102/59). To this end, she argues, Hegel’s portrayal of plant life in
the Philosophy of Nature is a concealed expression of misogyny. In response, we assert
that by implicitly aligning the reproductive capacities and experiences of individuals with
female reproductive capacities with the time of nature, of circularity, Hegel sets the stage
for a phenomenological description of female reproductive life. That the human female’s
period of reproductive fertility, on both a short-term monthly scale, and that of a lifetime,
is drastically truncated in relation to that of men’s can give rise to an experience of time
divided sharply along the line of reproductive sexual difference. In this sense, individuals
born with female reproductive organs, regardless of their desire to or not to reproduce,
are in their concrete daily lives immersed in an unavoidable awareness of their
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reproductive capacities. From the onset of menses, women’s temporal relation to
reproduction is indeed circular: the cycles of ovulation and menstruation occur at
approximately the same time each month for roughly forty years, ending only with
menopause; while these cycles can be tracked, they cannot, except with medicinal
intervention, be stopped. That woman has virtually no other choice but to endure the
alterations that take place in her body binds her, without choice, to the circular time of
nature. In temporal terms, mothering amounts to an extended exercise in waiting:
gestation is a nine month exercise in waiting: a woman waits for the fetus to develop;
before she gives birth, she must wait for her water to break, wait for contractions, wait for
dilation, wait for crowning, and so on. If she keeps the child and rears it, she waits and
watches as it slowly grow from infancy, to childhood, to adolescence, to adulthood. Seen
from another angle, the child in the womb for whom the mother waits,
…is human but only potentially. The child is not at all independent, but is like a
member of the mother. The mother pervades the child psychically; the child is a
moment of its mother…it is, so to speak, only an attribute of its mother. This is an
immediate relation, the mother is a sentient totality and the child is only a moment
in her (LPS 126).
Without a fixed boundary delimiting the child and the mother, their relation is indivisible.
To this end, “The life of the unborn child resembles that of the plant. Just as the latter
does not possess an interrupted intussusception but feeds itself by a continuous flow of
nutriment, so too does the babe feed itself by sucking and does not as yet possess a
rhythmic respiration” (PM 395Z). In the time of gestation, a mother, like the soil from
which a plant springs forth and is nourished, is bound without boundary, by virtue of
pregnancy, to the vegetative entity growing from within her.18 For the mother, this
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persists as long as the child exists in a vegetative state in the womb, until it “passes into
the animal mode of life” in the “tremendous leap” that is birth (PM 396Z).
As always for Hegel, an enriched understanding, such as the leap from natural life
to animal life in the birth of the child, or from the perspective of spirit, the transition from
nature to spirit, must proceed by the way of an immense change – a negation, a death, or
in this instance, a fall. In passing comments, Hegel has referred to nature as the “Abfall”–
rendered in every day German as waste, garbage, or discard – of spirit. While
commentators have found in this term evidence of Hegel’s disregard for natural life, we
maintain that as spirit’s foundation, its springboard, nature marks for Hegel an
irreplaceable stage, one that is immediate, yet nevertheless fundamental, and as such,
Abfall calls for further engagement. It seems viable that the word “Abfall”— in this sense,
can be rendered the falling from, or breaking-away-from— could serve to illustrate the
action spirit undertakes when departing from the realm of limited immediacy. Indeed in
the opening chapters of the Philosophy of Spirit, when discussing the actualization of the
genus in the anthropological sphere, or human birth, he claims that it “falls into time”
(PM §396 Z). Hegel makes further use of the imagery of falling—of the fall from
innocence—early on in his Naturphilosophie:19
The philosophy of nature is in such a perilous condition however, that it has to
demonstrate its existence, and in order to justify it, we shall have to trace it back to
what is familiar. In the dissolution of the subject-object opposition a specific shape
may be noticed, which has been made known partly by science, and partly by
religion, in which it is however a past, and which readily overcomes the whole
difficulty. The unification of both determinations is what is called the primal state
of innocence, in which spirit is identical with nature, and the spiritual eye stands
19
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immediately in the center of nature. The standpoint of the division of consciousness
is the fall of man from the eternal and divine unity. This unity is represented as a
primal intuition, a ratiocination, which is at the same time a vision, forming and so
rationalizing sensuous shapes. This intuitive reason is the divine reason, for we may
say that God is that in which spirit and nature are one, and in which intelligence at
the same time has both being and shape….This unity of intelligence and intuition,
of the being-in-self of spirit and its relation to externality, must however be the goal
not the beginning; it must be a unity which is brought forth, not one which is
immediate. A natural unity of thought and intuition is that of the child and the
animal, and this can at the most be called feeling, not spirituality. But man must
have eaten of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil and must have gone
through the labor and activity of thought in order to become what he is, having
[opened up and then] overcome this separation between himself and nature (EN
§246 Z).
In the mystical state of nature—or what Biblical accounts call the Garden of Eden, and
what Hegel will term simply nature—time exists as perpetual recurrence without change
or novelty. But, “in the myth of the Fall, the Bible expressly declares that man acquires
knowledge of the Truth only when that original paradise-like unity of man with nature
had been disrupted” (PM §405 Z). Falling into time, one becomes aware of one’s own
sexual capacities and desires, and insofar as this awareness radically re-organizes one’s
relation to their own body and to the body of another, it instigates a break with the simple
givenness of nature—and the time thereof. Coming to a reflexive awareness of itself, a
new experiential model of time emerges: the simple experience of time as circularity
shifts to linearity when spirit thinks of itself. This is precisely because time is the means
through which spirit progresses, the arena in which it manifests itself in models of
increasing sophistication; it is in this sense that linear time, progress, and education
(Bildung) come into unification as a moment in spirit’s dialectical unfolding.
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The Course of Desire: Unity, Appetite, Self-Understanding
In his Early Theological Writings (1795-1800), Life and love are articulated in the same
breath: thinking through the concept of Life, Hegel gives expression to sexual relations
through the model for mutual human recognition he finds in love.20 In Hegel’s early
works, including “The Spirit of Christianity,” “Fragment of a System,” (1800), and his
fragments “Love” (1798), Life is the concept that unifies opposites insofar as it refers to
the unity of existence, whereas love is the sensuous recognition of this unity. While
sensuous, love is not simply an “emotion” that occurs between beings, for as Alice
Ormiston explains, “to view it so would be to view it from the perspective of the
reflective understanding. Rather, love is the experience of the harmony of mind and body,
of thought and being, of consciousness and existence, of reason and emotion. But it
speaks in the language of emotion rather than in the language of concepts. This must not
provoke the view of it as “irrational,” however, for it also embraces the side of the
rational. Love is a transcendence of the position of reflective rationality, a re-finding or
re-experiencing of a primordial experience of unity that had been lost due to the
separative influence of reflective rationality. It is the overcoming of the subject-object
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divide.”21 The fragment, “Love,” marks the inaugural moment of Hegel’s dialectical
method, and speaks specifically to the relation between love and human mortality. As
“the conscious recapturing of that unity,” love is “the one living spirit which acts and
restricts itself in accordance with the whole of the given situation;” “it is a living link that
is said to be something divine.22 The lovers are separated only in the sense of their
individuation as mortal bodies. But even this they strive to overcome in the act of love.”23
Love, as early Hegel insists, is living and accordingly takes place between living beings:
it is a “living bond of the virtues,” their “all-pervasive soul”:“[I]t does not set up a
determinate virtue for determinate circumstances, but appears, even in the most
variegated mixture of relations, un-torn and unitary. Its external shape may be modified
in infinite ways; it will never have the same shape twice. Its expression will never be able
to afford a rule, since it never has the force of a universal opposed to a particular.”24As
something alive, love and the beings who share it, are both fundamentally temporal,
which is to say, the precondition of love in general is to be both limited by time (mortal)
and in the experience of love, fulfilled temporally. Each lover is its own individual
organism, and while lovers come together as one as it were, each is still independent. The
condition for this distinction is mortality, for death can and will separate lovers. Even so,
love and lovers, claims Hegel, strive to overcome this distinctness by eternally
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ensconcing love in the generation of a third term – a child. Hegel states, “What in the first
instance is most the individual's own is united into the whole in the lovers' touch and
contact; consciousness of a separate self disappears and all distinction between the lovers
is annulled. The mortal element, the body, has lost the character of separability and a
living child, a seed of immortality, of the eternally self-developing and self-generating
[race] has come into existence.”25 In short, love overcomes the limitations of time, and
thus of death, in fecundity. What is most essential for our purposes is Hegel's coarticulation of human sexual relations and temporality—both of which serve to constitute
the individual’s self-understanding.
With the publication of the Phenomenology in 1807 through to his final writings
in the 1830’s (Encyclopaedia and Lectures on Philosophy of Spirit) Hegel’s treatment of
sexual relations at once intensifies and darkens from the sunny, optimistic tone of his
Jena theological writings. In the Phenomenology's chapter, “Self-Consciousness,” and in
parallel, though in vastly condensed form, in the Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Spirit in a
section of the same name, Hegel offers a phenomenological explication of the new form
of self-understanding one gains by becoming aware of itself vis-à-vis an other.26 In these
texts Hegel alters not only his tenor, but also his terms from his early Jena writings: love
and the desire for love – as Kojève points out – become the desire for life and recognition
and the battle till death in the dialectic of lordship and bondage and its preceding
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moments.27 Although the terms are new, pieces of Hegel's earlier model based on love
recur here, albeit in veiled form – initially under the term “Life.” When Hegel discusses
Life, it is clear as we have already seen, that he is not invoking it only as a concept
opposed to Death, but rather, it is to be understood in terms of the unity of existence as
has been articulated in terms of the philosophy of nature – following from, as we have
already seen, his lifelong engagement with Kant and debates with Schelling over the
theme of Naturphilosophie and the sciences of the time that underscores them. Life for
Hegel, as we have already seen, is the unfolding of being alive, the precondition of which
is the act and process of procreation. To enter into the realm of Life is also to enter into
the realm of infinity, for reproduction preserves the individual in its universal generation,
and is the way in which independent members are nonetheless dependent; they must
come together and must sublate their individuality in order to give rise to another in the
process of Life. Yet, in its most bare articulation, reproduction is an instantiation of
givenness, of the animal necessity for the continuation of life. Stripped of the unifying
and harmonizing effects of love that constituted the Jena period, desire (Begierde)
alternately and initially conveys an animal appetite or an instinctive desire that is at best
uncomfortable, like that of hunger, or an animal-like sexual instinct: “the sensuous and
perceptual world is desired in the sense that it is required for consumption and is the
means for the reproduction of life.”28 Desire as appetite of instinct (Die Begierde) marks
the first, immediate stage; but the progression of the dialectic is always towards increased
sophistication, towards an augmented self-understanding, and for Hegel this means
27
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concretely stepping forth beyond the determinations of givenness. Cultivating a selfreflexive understanding marks in short, consciousness' transition from the “natural” in
“The Truth of Sense Certainty” to the bourgeoning moments of “Spirit” in “Lordship and
Bondage”— what Hegel might call a movement from “certainty” in sexual reproduction
to “truth” in sexual self-consciousness. In these moments, a second and higher level of
desire will emerge, that of “self-consciousness recognition (Das anerkennende
Selbstbewußstsein) (PM §426, §430). Understanding itself anew means most basically
refiguring consciousness' relation to its own body. Glancing retrospectively, one recalls
that at this moment in the Phenomenology, self-consciousness is embodied and seeking to
be spirit insofar as its movement is away from the particular, toward the universal. Its
understanding of itself as universal spirit is essentially impoverished, and therefore,
Hegel depicts this experience through most accessible means available to selfconsciousness at this stage of its development, namely, the language of finitude, of
embodiment. Correlatively, throughout the course of the “Anthropology” consciousness
relates to itself and seeks to express itself through and as its body – and thus Hegel aims
to illuminate a series of psychophysical states in corporeity—as was thematized in
chapter one of this dissertation.
Yet, this level shows itself to be inadequate to express the multifaceted
complexity of consciousness and as its understanding of itself exclusively as one of
simple sensuous identity expires, consciousness “repel[s] itself from itself”(PM §413).
“The individual thus detaches its natural life from itself, but in such a way that is not yet
free or for itself” (LPS 103, PM §429 Z). Doing such, it does not to simply abolish the
body, but rather, comes to think that the corporeal world—including its body—is

112

something external and other to it, which it can observe and study. It does not yet realize
that the body is not just an object for reflective contemplation, but is living. This moment
marks the recurrence, albeit at a higher level, of the movement in which spirit sheds a
layer of its self by raising its self-understanding to a higher level – at this moment, the
next level of sophistication involves heightening its self-awareness from that of being its
givenness, to that of reflecting and meditating upon its own givenness. It is in this sense
that Hegel says, both in the Phenomenology and in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit,
that self-consciousness has itself as its own object. While its natural elements persists, it
can now see with sharpened intricacy that sexual procreation is not only an external
occurrence that takes place process in life, as was understood from the perspective of
nature, but also and moreover it is an experience that provides a gateway to a new form
of self-understanding. Hegel’s point seems to be simply that as spirit, one no longer fully
defines itself by givenness, and thus, a space emerges allowing for the ascent to a higher
level of self-understanding, where one can reflect upon the givenness of the self and the
world as we find it. With an increased awareness comes a more nuanced range of
sensation and emotion – whereby the simple drive to procreate matures into sexual selfconsciousness, and if one is fortunate, reciprocal erotic love.
In The Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit 1827-8, Hegel states that while his
explicit aim of the dialectic overall is to describe a structure of consciousness in
general—that is, not specifically a historical or ongoing event—one concrete way in
which the drama can unfold is in the phenomenon of love:
These abstract determinations are present in much more concrete forms. The
substance of self-consciousness is the universality of a self-knowledge that leave
behind self-seeing [particularity] and that continues itself in union with the other.
This condition is found in love. I exclude all others, and precisely because I am
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this singularity, I am no longer a self-seeking I but a free self-consciousness that
knows itself in another, and since I know this, I know myself to be identical with
myself. All the virtues have this foundation, as does love... Since the human being
appears to lose himself, he cannot endure in his isolation, but needs another
consciousness. Thus he loses himself [in another]. But precisely in this condition
of self-externality [Aussersichsein], of being outside himself, he gains his
substantial self-consciousness. … This [condition of self-externality, of being
beyond oneself] is the condition of being recognized.... I am free insofar as the
others are free, and I let them count as free just as they let me count as free. In
love and friendship this [counting] is more at the emotional level, but in civil
society, I count as an abstract person without regard to my subjective peculiarities
(LPS 194).
Standing outside of oneself, what Judith Butler will call an ek-statik subject, is a second
level of desire, that of “self-consciousness recognition” (Das anerkennende
Selbstbewußstsein), (PM §426, §430) whereby seeing oneself in another has the effect of
self-displacement— standing beside oneself as it were— and as such, permits us to
become an object of inquiry for ourselves. Seeing itself as an object, self-consciousness
can no longer separate itself from the world of ‘otherness’ – but becomes, in short, other
to itself.
Retaining these experiences in the following dialectic, consciousness comes to
know and to experience its body anew, outside of its immediacy and indeed with more
complexity – that is, as a site where its sexual feelings are experienced. The dialectic
presents three attitudes or approaches to the conflicts consciousness faces: first, stoicism
is a flight from life, a response to suffering that denies reality and retreats into privacy;
second, skepticism is an attempt to annihilate the world through ceaseless criticism; and
third, unhappy consciousness—the attitude we will remain with for the remainder of this
analysis—is the attitude of self-division and contradiction, an image of one at war with
her or himself. In these moments, unhappy consciousness, becomes aware of its body in a
new way, delimits corporeal pleasure as the inferior element in the spirit/body dichotomy.
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It strives to absolve itself of all aspects of natural life and to align itself with the
spiritual— what Hegel terms “the Unchangeable” (PS §208). While stoicism denies its
body and skepticism incessantly critiques and punishes it, unhappy consciousness suffers
from the gulf that the body wedges between it and the Unchangeable. Since the body and
its capabilities separate unhappy consciousness from the Unchangeable, sex and the
erogenous zones of its own sexed body become a critical problem. Finding itself guilty,
unhappy consciousness transforms an experience of enjoyment into an experience of
wretchedness. Summarizing in Hegel's words,
Consciousness is aware of itself as this actual individual in the animal functions.
These are no longer performed naturally and without embarrassment, as matters
trifling in themselves which cannot possess any importance or essential
significance for Spirit; instead, since it is in them that the enemy (Feind) reveals
himself in his characteristic shape, they are rather the object of serious endeavor,
and become precisely matters of utmost importance (PS §225).29
On one level, unhappy consciousness is suffering because it cannot bring unity into its
existence. With the realization that it too is a radically dependent being, that its sense of
self is fundamentally bound up with other people, unhappy consciousness comes to
understand that its sexual feelings affirm its vulnerability. The seeds of this lesson were
planted in the master/slave dialectic, where consciousness discovered that its internal
constitution is inextricably woven with others. Since self-consciousness can only achieve
itself in another’s self-consciousness, it therefore learned that its identity is intimately
tied up with the identity of others. Through the experience of desire, these ties to others
that constitute and compose it were delineated. Thus, consciousness discovers itself
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irrevocably tangled in a web of others that simultaneously constitute and dispossess it.30
Perhaps most substantially, we learn what it means to risk all, for death is not only a
physical threat, but also a psychological and existential, and although we know that we
can be destroyed by the other, we must nevertheless tarry with them, mingle with them,
and in a sense become them; our psychological maturity and livelihood depends on
lucidly entering in such an engagement.31 Developed in psychosexual terms, we see
alongside unhappy consciousness, that it is never only a singular bodily animation in
time, but is always already bound up with others and the alterity that otherness entails.
Unhappy consciousness understands that the external world and those who constitute it
cannot be kept at bay, but love and sexual love raise the stakes of this experience. Love,
sex, and erotic love then, not only confirm our contingency, but in affirming our
vulnerability, dependency, and fragility, fundamentally alter the terms for knowing the
self—an occasion that unhappy consciousness has not yet learned to celebrate.
Understanding now that it is not only a creature that can procreate as a necessary
condition of life, but is also replete with the tension and strife that arises vis-à-vis
recognizing oneself a sexual being, the body for unhappy consciousness is no longer
merely natural, but also the site of its struggle with its own ambivalent sexual feelings. In
the Phenomenology, Hegel remains relatively silent regarding this radical transformation,
and focuses alternatively on the ways in which it abdicates these feelings by confessing
them to a “mediator…who has a direct relationship with the unchangeable Being” (PS
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§228). One finds definitive clues for understanding it in his essay that we have already
examined, “Love,” where he explains that, “... shame enters ... through the recollection
[Erinnerung] of the body, through the presence of an [exclusive] personality or the
sensing of an [exclusive] individuality.”32 Most basically, Erinnerung is recollection, but
recalling the importance of its Hegelian rendering, it is moreover an inwardization, or a
making internal. Thus, consciousness' previous experience of the body is recalled, and
now, the meaning the sexual body as the cause and site of its fiercely ambivalent sexual
feeling is internalized. Furthermore, the understanding of time, which in the preceding
moments changed from circular to linear, now turns inward, or is internalized. Whereas
time in nature constituted how something was externally perceived, time now is
incorporated as an experience of what we are, it is taken up as part of our substance. Both
movements of internalization did not transpire in nature, for “…what nature lacks is the
dialectic of inner and outer; spirit is the internalization of externality and of all otherness
and the externalization of interiority.”33 With this awareness, consciousness' selfunderstanding develops from a given animal creature existing in time, to sexual human,
with a psychosexual inwardness, reflectively aware of its increasingly mature temporal
interiority.

Conclusion: A Sexual Life – From Reproduction to the Production of Shared Time
One of Hegel's persistent claims is that philosophy must address the needs of the time, a
claim upon which he staged his critique of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, to mention only a
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few names, and which further served as the impetus for his advancement of what he saw
to be a new philosophical enterprise all together. The Hegel of the Philosophy of Right
reminds that “…each individual is in any case a child of his time; thus philosophy is its
own time comprehended in thoughts.”34 What then, we might ask ourselves, are the needs
of our time for questions concerning love, sex, and sexuality, and what, if anything might
Hegel offer us in this light?
Taking seriously Hegel's account of the ways in which love and sexuality
contribute to our self-constitution and knowledge, we would like to conclude by returning
to our beginning— that is, to Hegel's model of love based in sexual regeneration – and
reconsider its implications in the light of this analysis that has highlighted time. Recall
that Hegel insists that love is living and is striving to become eternal in the generation of
a third term; why however, must the musculature of this formulation be allotted only to
biological procreation as the generation of a third term? That is, why must natural descent
and genealogy be the operative terms defining creation? Although Hegel’s emphasis on
the unification of sperm and egg as a condition of reproduction remains just as necessary
today, our age nevertheless demands that the heretofore antiquated terms defining
creation be destabilized, and instead a multiplicity of creation be highlighted.35 Thus, if
we are to appropriate Hegel for contemporary means, initially the worth of the concept of
34
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life for our times must be interrogated. As is well known, the right-wing and conservative
movements of contemporary times have adopted the term “life” for the purpose of
limiting and/or abolishing women's reproductive rights: In the name of respecting “life”
or better yet, the “right to life”— so goes the argument—a woman's right to choose to
carry her pregnancy to term, or to abort it, should be abolished in the name of the life of
the fetus. And, such debates house further questions and contentions—such as the
question of when human life begins, when and how it should be allowed to end; and the
list goes on. Put to use in this way, life functions as a coercive and hetero-normative
concept politically employed for the purpose of regulating and freedom of choice and a
woman’s right to legislate her own body. Other projects, such as those of Judith Butler’s,
conserve the concept of life, but put it to work for different purposes, including taking
critical stock of what counts as a ‘life’ deserving of recognition. Building from the
Hegelian claim that “desire is always a desire for recognition, and that recognition is the
condition for a continuing and viable life,”36 Butler inquires into the conditions that
constitute a livable life, and which of such lives count as livable. If we, like Butler,
follow Hegel’s Spinozistic37 intuition that desire is the precondition for recognition, then
life itself can be understood as a process by which we must negotiate with and navigate
through a complex web of desires. One finds evidence for this, now more than ever, in
the proliferating debates that occupy feminism(s), gender studies, queer studies, gay and
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lesbian studies, and indeed, in mainstream political culture.38
Despite such flourishing, one still finds that from the therapist's couch to everyday
social encounters, sexuality has historically and continues to be something to be pinned
down, defined, diagnosed, and given origin and cause. One sees this prominently in
psychoanalysis, whereby the analyst's methodology involves tracing the analysis and
sexual life to a point of origin. In the recent media, a flurry of attention has been given to
the gay community in the United States in the wake of bullying, hazing, and suicides of
college students; campaigns supporting gay rights have appealed to the natural
argument— that one is born gay— in effort to legitimate the rights of the gay students.
One could additionally imagine social encounters within the larger community, queer or
otherwise, whereby a look, style, or mannerism (She looks butch; She looks easy.) is read
as the truth of identity, as if one's entire history of love and sex could be summed up in
just one glance. The essential and collective aim of each of these examples, as I take it, is
to formulate and to legitimize an identity, and such is understandable, perhaps even
desirable, for having an identity is a way in which we give ourselves recognition.
However, the flip side of identities and claims thereof is the way in which they lock us
into one way of being, and moreover, into one acceptable way of being perceived and
living as a sexual creature. When we deviate from our norm, questions about the
authenticity of our personhood and our allegiances come to the fore.
That the philosophical resources within Hegel's thought stretch far beyond the
constituting boundaries that Hegel himself delimits gives rise to the possibility of
considering anew each of his articulations of sex, sexuality, and love on the basis of time
38
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and temporality that underlie them. This means that in spite of himself, Hegel's attention
to time paves the way for envisioning another path for love and sexuality—one that puts
less pressure on the classical model of filiation and more emphasis on temporal fecundity.
Such thinking also leads to the possibility of radically re-articulating the terms in
which we can organize, explain, and most significantly live our lives as lovers, as sexual
partners, and as sexual creatures more broadly. Can shift the terms of engagement from
what is natural or biologically determined, to think about ourselves in terms of a history
of acts, of choices, of relations? If we follow Hegel, and come to see that we are always
at a temporal and spatial remove from ourselves, how, with any authenticity or integrity,
could we define ourselves as anything other than entity with its own unique historical tag,
fighting each day against the vanishing of time, by investing in a possible future? Would
not then, a sexual life, and a gendered history be a better and indeed more truthful way of
articulating our experiences and ourselves? Drawing from Hegel, one can explore the
productive possibilities of a sexual life defined not by naturalized categories, but rather,
by experiences and occurrences, that is, by the times of a life. Utilizing Hegel’s thought to
cultivate a plurality of ways of loving, what Toula Nicolacopoulos and George
Vassilacopoulos call in Hegel and The Logical Structure of Love “multiple loving
forms,”39 we return to the themes of time, desire, and love in effort to unveil in them a
new foundation for loving. Recalling Hegel’s argument that desire, by virtue of its own
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generation, takes on at least two forms, one appetitive as is involved in animal
consumption and reproductive, and another self-conscious, and necessary in the
production of self-conscious recognition elevated out of givenness, a new model for
sexualities and erotic loves emerges. As productive, this second face of desire makes a
living; that is to say, it to constructs, sculpts, and shape specifically desired ways of
experiencing time. In Deleuzian terms, one could consider this as a revaluation of
alliance instead of filiation;40 similarly, it offers proliferation outside of the triangular
(Oedipal) familial structure. Cast in this light, the alliance of lovers in their shared time is
a source of creation—and in the rhythm of togetherness that lovers forge, together they
co-create a new way of knowing themselves, each other, and their mutual interaction in
their lives. This occurs in a collection of little moments—in the routines and patterns in
which lovers participate—from the banality of standing side-by-side brushing their teeth,
to who wakes up first in the morning to make coffee, lovers establish together a new life
outside of their singular existence. Spending time with one another, even in the daily acts,
gestures, and details, lovers actualize a novel life composed of their collective instants.
Such creation finds its source— as Hegel anticipated—in the marriage of time with erotic
love. Allotting more fortitude to the productive possibilities of time and temporality in
love and sexuality opens up a space of inclusion, of multiplicities, outside of and in
addition to traditional models of human affairs; it is a space that, answering to Hegel's
call, can respond to the needs of love and sexuality in our time.
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Chapter 3. Historical Genders – Hegel’s World History
If the framework through which one thinks through difference is the temporal, then
history—the extended accumulation of time in years and centuries—must also be
implicated. Understood in this light, difference and the ways in which differences are
understood, is subject to change, not only in relation to time, but also over time, in
historically and culturally specific ways. Many feminist critiques, in their attempts to
delineate masculinist bias in Hegel’s thought, fail to rigorously think through the
generation of the categories by which humans understand and identify themselves—
including gender—and, by neglecting to account for gender as something temporal and
historically specific, elide the differences in gender, even as they wage critiques in the
same name. Gender is not stable and abiding through the sands of time, but develops over
time, as Judith Butler reiterates in a recent collection of works, Undoing Gender:
To understand gender as a historical category, however, is to accept that gender,
understood as one way of culturally conﬁguring a body, is open to a continual
remaking, and that “anatomy” and “sex” are not without cultural framing (as the
intersex movement has clearly shown). The very attribution of femininity to
female bodies as if it were a natural or necessary property takes place within a
normative framework in which the assignment of femininity to femaleness is one
mechanism for the production of gender itself. Terms such as “masculine” and
“feminine” are notoriously changeable; there are social histories for each term;
their meanings change radically depending upon geopolitical boundaries and
cultural constraints on who is imagining whom, and for what purpose.1
Accordingly, any engagement with Hegel vis-à-vis gender—either in the form of critique
or appropriation—must take into consideration, not only Hegel’s own insistence on
contextualizing the history of the generation of any concept, but also the renewed
importance of historicity, as develops out of feminist critique itself.
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Hegel’s philosophy of history has been deemed many things—the most grandiose
of philosophical theologies (Adorno), bourgeoisie (Marx), and schematically occidental
(Patočka and Merleau-Ponty)—but heretofore has not, as we will argue in what follows,
been interpreted as a phenomenology of the dialectical unfolding of the categories of
gender through history. Offering a philosophical reading of the movement of spirit
through time, by uniting history with the movement of the concept, Hegel gives an
account of the different forms spirit has assumed throughout history—what he will call
“worlds”— and, in doing such, attributes characteristics to these “worlds” that we can
now identify as structured by changing norms of gender. Insofar as we can
retrospectively track the gender categories in his work, Hegel's Philosophy of History
harbors important lessons for us today, even though our uncovering of such resonances
does not entail his explicit intention for such. Hegel’s account of history and thus of time
employs gender categories that on the one hand, problematically convey assumptions
about cultures and the historical peoples therein, but on the other hand, allow us today to
bring into focus the ways in which a combination of sexual symbolism, naturalized
gender roles based on sexual difference, and a hierarchy of temporal ordering, convey
something meaningful about a historical formation of categories of gender in Hegel’s
thought. Within his use of common social categories to structure and describe the spirit of
worlds, Hegel plays with a logic of opposition—binaries, such as masculine and
feminine, men and women, circular and linear time—which, we argue, dialectically
demonstrates the unsustainability of these opposing structures, and ultimately, to shows
their resolution.
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The overarching task of Hegel’s Philosophy of History is to demonstrate the
progression of spirit coming to know itself through nations in history not through an
account of the recorded events and happenings of the world's past, but rather through a
rendering of world history in accordance with reason. While “...world history as a whole
is the expression of the spirit in time,” (LPH 128/ VPH) the measuring stick for spirit's
development in history is—as always for Hegel—understood in terms of a philosophical
knowledge of the identity of subjective spirit and divine spirit, of subject and substance,
of finitude and infinity. The project then involves interpreting and organizing the past—
former nations, “worlds,” and the people who constituted them— in light of the
dialectical progression of spirit, from its most simple expression as nature, to its most
sophisticated expression, as the recognition of the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, of
human and the divine. The unfolding of spirit in the course of world history is, in short,
spirit coming to know itself in its most adequate form, where the forum for spirit to
display itself in external forms—or to give itself externality—is world history. Hegel's
task, then, is to see how universal spirit expresses itself in the spirit of a nation, in its
world historical peoples and their respective principles, and then to trace spirit's passage
from one nation to another. Explicating the dialectic movement, Hegel tells the story of
the worlds through which spirit passes in history with the analogy of an individual
lifespan: childhood, adolescence, adulthood, and old age. This analogy organizes the
ever-increasing sophistication of spirit’s phenomenological vision as it proceeds to the
height of its visibility in the Germanic world.
Yet, the picture that Hegel paints, to be sure, is not always commendable: In this
movement towards spirit’s self-knowledge, as we have already seen, two models of time
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are logically necessary, and dialectically derived—linear and cyclical models that recur in
world history. Such models, as we have already shown, are heavily marked by gendered
assumptions, and, now in world history, are co-implicated with the cultural race of a
nation. Tracking this via the analogy of the temporal stages of human life, we will begin,
firstly, and perhaps most controversially, in the sphere denied from history, spirit’s prehistory, its phase of gestation in the womb, as it were, in Africa—a glimpse of which we
have already seen in Hegel’s likening of Afri(cans) to madness and its time. Reading
Hegel's description of pre-colonial Africa, together with Fanon's retrospective view of the
colonized and the Black, we will illustrate the paradoxical relation of spirit's gestation to
time. Transitioning next to spirit’s infancy and adolescence—the “Oriental” world—we
bring to light the linking of the “feminine” with circular time, implicit in Hegel’s
presentation of this sphere. Penultimately, we look to spirit’s “manhood,” and its
corollary of masculinity, as it emerges in the defining principles of this world—
individualism, passion, and linear time. We will turn, lastly, to the Greek ethical world, as
it has a specific and special role for Hegel and his German contemporaries. The Greek
world proper is, historically, a moment in the movement of spirit that gives way to the
Roman world, but it is also contemporaneous with Hegel, insofar as the retrieval of the
Greek ethical world is fundamental to the German “Romantic” imaginary. To this end,
we must understand it simultaneously as two times—as both a moment couched inbetween the Oriental and Roman worlds, and in amended ways, as a present and active
ideal in Hegel's time.
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Spirit’s Pre-History: Black Afric(ans) via Fanon
The movement of spirit's progression through world history, as well as through the
history of a particular national spirit, is given expression by an analogy to the temporal
stages of human life: childhood, youth, manhood, and old age. Omitted in this analogy
and, indeed, in Hegel’s overall conception of world history, is the state from which each
person, thought, and spirit as nation begins—namely, the embryonic state of the fetus. At
this stage, Hegel claims, “spirit is only potentially present” (LPH 178), resting in
dormancy, and, because of this, “history is in fact out of the question. Life there consists
of a succession of contingent happenings and surprises” (LPH 176). Defined here, life, in
the robust sense, seems to begin, for Hegel, at birth—the entrance into a lived time that is
shared—and, lacking this, Africa(ns) cannot fit into historically-generated categories of
gender. While Hegel does describe both men and women in Africa, no human
attributes—including traits of gender—are to be found in his account of the world and its
inhabitants; instead, he finds there “a primitive state of nature” that exists in “a state of
animality” (LPH 178/VPG). Diagnosing “Africa as a whole” as a state in which “man is
as yet unconscious of himself” (LPH 178/VPG), Hegel finds in Africa(ns) “no
subjectivity, but merely a series of subjects who destroy one another” (LPH 176/VPG).
Existing in isolation and apart from history, Africa(ns) “lack[s] any integral ingredient of
culture (Bildung)” (VPW 214 /PWH 174), which is to say, the past is not recorded in the
substance of the nation. This lack of history—understood as inheritance and
appropriation of the past—coincides with the absence of classifications of gender.
In spite of Hegel’s horrific rendering of Africa(ns), his description of pre-colonial
Africa inversely anticipates much of what later emerges in the writings of Frantz Fanon,
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particularly regarding their shared idea (albeit for different aims) that Africa(ns)— or, for
Fanon, the Black and the colonized—are, in some sense, cut off from historical time.
If the problem of racism is a problem whose roots are grounded in the structures
of society, Fanon’s task is to further expose what sustains racism, in an effort to
understand why racism still flourishes. Accordingly, Fanon’s account of colonial and
Black experience is framed in terms of temporality, which is, by his account, the
fundamental structure of individuals and of society. Looking at temporality with more
concretion, Fanon implicitly shows the extent to which Black historical life falls outside
of, and remains unknown to, western ontologies and models of temporality. Placing the
temporal at the center of human existence, he argues that temporality, in the colonial
context, follows a different logic from what one commonly finds in philosophical
ontologies. Fanon speaks to this theme in Black Skin, White Masks, where he describes,
among other things, the plight of the colonized or the Black, who discovers herself as the
object of a white gaze, and, as a result, finds herself inalterably objectified as an identity
that is not of her own making. Contrasting his account with that of the Jew, whom his
interlocutor, Jean-Paul Sartre, describes in Anti-Semite and Jew, the Black cannot “pass”
and, accordingly, as Fanon states, is “given no chance. I am over-determined from the
outside. I am the slave, not of an ‘idea’ that others have of me, but of my own
appearing.”2 In short, one’s bodily appearance as perceived by the white onlooker locks
the Black into the role of other for the white gaze.

2

Fanon, Frantz. “The Lived Experience of the Black,” 187. See Sartre, Jean-Paul. AntiSemite and Jew. Trans. George J. Becker, Schocken Books: New York, 1995.

128

Thematizing the internalization of this imposed identity, which arises vis-à-vis the
gaze of the other, is central to Fanon’s project. The object of the gaze is fossilized in time
by virtue of being cut off from an identity of her own design, and, therefore, is resigned
to the construction of “the White, who has woven me out of a thousand details, anecdotes
and stories.”3 Petrified in time, her future is cut off, as it were, because she is confined to
an identity from which she is alienated, and, as imprisoned, she lacks the possibility of
becoming something else. Decisions about who one is, and choices about who one could
be, have already been made for her, with the consequence that she is alienated from
herself as a temporal being, and is thereby alienated from time:4 “Disoriented and
incapable of being outside with the other, the White who unmercifully imprisoned me, I
took myself far away, very far away indeed from my being-there, thus making myself an
object.”5 Alienated from one’s own self as a temporal being, one turns “far away”—to a
place Fanon does not explicitly define—but, following the unfolding of the text, appears
to amount to a turn inside one’s own self.6
Turning inward, Fanon puts pressure onto the “massive psycho-existential
complex”7 that arises from the colonial context. On the level of the psyche, when one is
alienated from one’s own self and thereby barred from the future, one lacks internal time.
3
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Fanon describes the psychological effects of scarcity and, particularly, the scarcity of
time as experiencing oneself as “[t]oo late. Everything has been foreseen, discovered,
proven, taken advantage of…Too late, but still I want to understand.”8 Experiencing
oneself in a perpetual delay, as too late, the Black is denied, both becoming in the future,
and in the present. Interrogating time, Fanon exposes the partiality present, even in the
seemingly most neutral categories of thought and, indeed, of human experience. As
Gordon describes,
He shows that colonization occurs also at the level of how a people produce
knowledge. Let us call this epistemological colonialism. To respond to this kind of
colonialism, the intellectual must offer a critique that shows how concepts can
make us dependent on systems that colonize us.9
The value that Hegel saw in colonialism—as a force transporting the principles of the
west, including freedom, monogamy, and Christianity—has already been pointed out in
chapter two. The question of whether or not Hegel was philosophically a racist thinker, in
part because he omitted Africa(ns) from history and, thus, from his Western ontology,
remains under dispute in the secondary literature, and lies outside of our present scope.10
What stands out for our specific purposes however, is that, by leaving Africa(ns) outside
of history and outside of humanity, Hegel left the world unmarked by human attributes,
including gender distinctions—a slate, which was soon thereafter, and continuing into
today, painted within a colorful tableau of colonialism. As Judith Bulter reiterates:
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For the human to be human, it must relate to what is nonhuman, to what is outside
itself but continuous with itself by virtue of an inter-implication in life. This
relation to what is not itself constitutes the human being in its livingness, so that
the human exceeds its boundary in the very effort to establish them. The
rethinking of the human in these terms does not entail a return to humanism.
When Frantz Fanon claimed that, “the black is not a man,” he conducted a
critique of humanism that showed that the human in its contemporary articulation
is so fully racialized that no black man could qualify as human. In his usage, the
formulation was also a critique of masculinity, implying that the black man is
effeminized. And the implication of that formulation would be that no one who is
not a “man” in the masculine sense is a human, suggesting that both masculinity
and racial privilege shore up the notion of the human.11
Understood within this framework, gender only appears once in western temporality, and
thus, historicity has been established (read, colonization has occurred), and then its
materialization takes place as an imposition of the western imagination—one that
replaces the former animalistic terms of definition with those of gender: emasculating
black men and exorbitantly sexualizing black women. Read in this light, we can return to
Fanon via Hegel: if gender emerges in history, and that history is not one’s own
substance, then one is, as Fanon underlines, cut off from one’s own present and inhibited
from navigating the social currents that actively sculpt their future—including the ways
in which gender is differently allocated, and in ways that aim to further re-inscribe an
element of animality, or, at best, a debased notion of the human.

The “Oriental” and Roman Worlds
After discussing what he finds to be the “most terrible manifestations of human nature” in
Africa, Hegel “cross[es] into the threshold of world history itself,” (LPH 190/ VPG 133)
moving from east to west, and thus beginning in Asia12 where the “spirit of childhood” is
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Asia is the beginning.” (LPH 197).
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in unity with nature, and finds expression in the “Oriental World” (LPH 130/VPG). This
first mode of national consciousness is found in a patriarchal relationship, characterized
by faith, trust, and obedience (LPH 198/ VPG). In this “early patriarchal world,” spirit
recognizes itself as in a childlike or subordinate position (LPH 130/ VPG). In its infancy,
spirit understands time in the manner best suitable to its concept—as nature. As we have
already seen, the time of nature presents a “continuity in time,” wherein change is
constantly occurring, but no progress is made (LPH 198/VPG): “Changes in the natural
world, no matter how great their variety, exhibit only an eternally recurring cycle; for in
nature there is nothing new under the sun, and in this respect its manifold play of forms
produces an effect of boredom” (LPH 124/VPG).
Contextualizing Hegel's account of time and its relation to the East within the
history of philosophy, it is imperative to recall the two dominant tropes of time that the
philosophical tradition has advanced, and their intimate association with specific forms of
subjective standpoints—circular and linear. These two models of time underscore the
traditional gender binary, relegating women and the feminine to the cyclicality of nature
and embodiment, and men and the masculine to the futurity of progress and reason. This
oppositional logic pervades the concept of time that is affiliated with national spirit and
emerges in Hegel's descriptions of nations and peoples. At this moment in the text, he
does so by grouping together the childhood of history, nature, simple cyclical time, and
femininity, as a collective expression of the ‘spirit’ of the Oriental world. The substantial
and revealing parallels between feminine gender characteristics and Hegel's classification
of the East and the peoples of eastern nations is insurmountable: Just as woman, or the
feminine, is relegated to the body in the cyclical model of time, so too does the East
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“appl[y] to the body, but not to the spirit” (LPH 32/VPG). This national spirit is childlike,
subordinate, passive, and cyclically reproductive, to the effect that Hegel implicitly
feminizes the national spirit of the East, not only in his descriptions, but also on the basis
of the concept of time in nature.13
The use of gender categories to identify and describe cultures and races is
certainly not unique to Hegel, as evidenced, for example, by one the most notorious
voices in the nineteenth century, Arthur de Gobineau. Appealing to the legitimacy of
naturalized gender classifications, Gobineau analogously divides races into the categories
of “male” and “female,” whereby the “white race” represents the former, and the “black
and yellow races” the latter.14 In general, gendering racial difference fortifies the
strength, dominance, and supremacy associated with masculinity and the male sex, whilst
transcribing onto the “western” or “white race,” and, simultaneously, reinforcing the
image of frailty, inferiority, sexual passivity in femininity, the female sex, and racial
“otherness.”15 While Hegel's division of peoples into the spirit of a nation is subtler than
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In his four volume treatise on the rise and fall of civilization, The Inequality of the
Human Races, de Gobineau advances a theory in which race operates as the central determining
and explanatory key to unlocking the doors of understanding to past and future civilizations. On
de Gobineau’s account, all humans are one single monogenetic species that are however,
differentiated by permanent types or races, some of which are stronger, others weaker. He states
that the innately and permanently unequal races “naturally divided into three, and only three—the
white, the black, and the yellow.” The “black” and “yellow” races have aesthetic prowess and
creative powers, but are nonetheless barbaric, and by virtue of Gobineau’s thesis of racial
permanency, they will always remain so. The only possible hope for creating future generations
with seeds of civilization is by a “crossing of blood.” his, he argues is because the “white or
Aryan race” is civilized, and thus bears a civilizing instinct. His belief in this special endowment
possessed by the “white race” leads him to claim that history only exists in and through the
activities of the white race, the “chosen people.”
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De Gobineau, The Inequality of the Races, 92, 189.
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Secondly, de Gobineau naturalizes the intercourse between the races in an image of
what at first glance appears as a heterosexual union between man and woman; that is, the
“white/male” race is naturally meant to copulate with the “black and yellow/female” races.
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that of Gobineau, one can still find a similar logic guiding his argumentation in the text—
particularly when examining the underlying temporal structures that constitute the stages
of national spirit addressed here. To be sure, Hegel's analogy of childhood and his
implicit use of gender categories to describe the spirit of a nation and its people
underscore the most forceful stereotypes of women, the feminine, and Eastern cultures. In
the second occurrence of the analogy of the stages of human life, Hegel uses it to
describe the rise and fall of a particular national spirit—that is, to show the progressive
movement of a national spirit from its beginning (birth) to its end (death).16 In its youth, a
nation is vivacious and active, setting itself and striving towards final ends that benefit
the nation. Here, a young national spirit is by no means repetitive or stagnant, and is not
bound to the cyclical model of time, as is the youth of universal spirit that is manifest in
the East. Transitioning to its “manhood,” a nation “enjoys the fruits of its efforts,” and
finds that the “present has no further needs left to satisfy” (LPH 59/VPG). When the
national spirit grows into old age, it falls into a routine, as it were, in which nothing new
or novel takes place. All is regular and predictable, and, as Hegel characterizes it in
temporal terms, “The clock is wound up and runs automatically” (LPH 59/VPG). Falling
into habit, the spirit of the nation has “nothing to oppose it” and, without such opposition
impelling change, activity, and the needs of the nation, “nothing remains but political
stagnation and boredom” (LPH 59/VPG).
Ironically however, de Gobineau says nothing about the actual sex of the individual in the
feminized races to whom the “white/male” is attracted. In doing such, de Gobineau implicitly
leave open the possibility, at least conceptually, for homoerotic desire. Homoerotic anxiety then,
contributes to yet another constituting layer of his discourse of desire and repugnance. Racial,
sexual, sadistic, and homoerotic transgressions are all uttered concurrently in de Gobineau’s
coupling of desire and repugnance.
16

Despite the course a particular individual nation takes, “universal spirit as such does
not die; it only dies in its capacity as a national spirit” (LPH 61/VPG).
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The uniting thread that bridges Hegel's two uses of the analogy of the stages of
human temporal life is the link he draws between time and boredom. In both instances, it
is spirit itself that grows restless with the lack of change, with the repetitive and
predictable experience of time. In the Eastern world, Hegel situates boredom within a
temporal context, and attributes the model of time producing boredom to that of the
prevailing national spirit. Yet, putting pressure on the function of temporality shows that
the feeling of boredom emerges, not from the peoples of the East, but from a simple
modality of time, one that is devoid of the new and novel. The experience of boredom is
located within a model of time allotted to women, the feminine, the mad, and feminized
nations or peoples, such as Africa in part, and the East. In short, the experience of time
disclosed through boredom is conflated with a specific configuration of subjectivity—in
this case, women, the feminine, and the Asian world. It is precisely this associative
clustering of boredom, nature, circular time, women, the feminine, and the gendering of
race that spirit must transgress. That Hegel does not challenge conceptually uniting the
feminine with women, nature, and a simple, recurring configuration of time, and,
moreover, emphasizes the marriage of these categories, has served as supplementary
evidence of his misogyny for many feminist critiques. Regarded immanently however,
we can see that amalgamation, from the standpoint of spirit in its immediacy, as early and
naïve; the simplicity of this configuration will inevitably be overcome as spirit uncovers
new, more sophisticated, and truer models of self-expression.
Moving further west, and deeper into the text, one finds additional instances of
subjectivity modeled on an experience with time, where the central road into this
problematic is Hegel's account of passion. Spirit moves into its analogous “manhood” in,
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what Hegel calls the Roman world—a world “in which the individual has his own ends
for himself, but can only attain them in the service of a universal, of the state” (LPH
130/VPG). This period in the history of spirit is defined by “arduous labor and service...It
is no longer a world of gladness and joy, but of hard... toil” (LPH 203-4/VPG).
The great men of history in general—those whose individual passionate wills
contribute to the advancement of spirit in history—share a similar fate to the spirit of
manhood in the Roman world. Like the national spirit in its “manhood” in the Roman
world, their goals originate in personal gain, but the attainment of them is in service of
the universal. Hegel describes such individuals in terms of their “subjective will—or
passion—[which] is the activating and realizing principle” (LPH 94/VPG). As in the
manhood of the Roman world, “it was not happiness that they chose, but exertion,
conflict and labor in the service of their end...Their actions are their entire being, and
their whole nature and character are determined by their ruling passion” (LPH 85/VPG).
It is this insatiable, all-consuming passion that makes these men extraordinary in
Hegel's eyes, for as he (borrowing Goethe’s words) famously claims, “nothing great in
the world has been accomplished without passion” (LPH 39/VPG). Examining the
content of passion described here, we see that Hegel distinguishes it from emotion, for,
he claims, emotions are purely private and keep individuals locked within themselves,
separated from others and isolated from the progress of history; as such, they are base.
Emotions are a way to “shut oneself up within oneself [for] everyone is equally entitled
to say 'But I feel differently' and then all common ground is lost.”17 Echoing his account
of the feminine and the East, Hegel situates emotions within the most basic and least
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sophisticated mode of spirit, the realm of nature. To this end, emotions are implicitly
associated with women, the feminine, and the East. While both emotions and passions are
subjective and personal, and “do admittedly seek to further their own interests [, and so]...
in one respect they do appear base and selfish,” (LPH 73/VPG), passion, as a force
impelling future change, is an aspect of the Divine Idea, and, as such, is part of the
content of reason. Thus, while Hegel maintains the canonical tradition of contrasting
reason with emotion, he blurs the lines of this distinction by giving passion a place within
reason. To this end, reason is not strictly characterized by the qualities of abstraction,
thought, and detachment, but is rather a moment of the integration of feeling into
rationality. Nonetheless, the defining qualities of passion are far from neutral.
The cornerstone of passion is its activity and motivation—a force that is
discontented with the present time and strives forward into the future. Men of passion
have “attitudes which conflict with the present circumstances” (LPH 83/VPG), and their
dissatisfaction with the way things are in the present impels them to try to change it. They
“do not find their aims and vocation in the calm and regular system of the present, in the
hallowed order of things as they are. Their justification does not lie in the prevailing
situation, for they draw their inspiration from another source, from that hidden spirit
whose hour is near but which still lies beneath the surface and seeks to break out without
yet having attained an existence in the present” (LPH 83/VPG). In terms of the traditional
philosophical renderings of time, Hegel underscores the valor of linear time—one that
advances forward and, as such, is futurally orientated—and implicitly, its affiliation with
men and masculinity. The defining characteristics of the passion of great men of history
are activity and drive; they are futurally oriented, dissatisfied, and conflictual. With these
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qualities, they are the bearers of the advancement of reason in history. So, when Hegel
claims that “passion is the prerequisite of all human excellence”(LPH 71/VPG), we can
understand that what is valorized in action, volition, determination, and progress is, in
short, masculinity.
Historical spirit presents itself in manifold forms, yet a shared essence is at the
core of each historical nation, and, when left unrealized, spirit will inevitably move
towards increased satisfaction through the reconciliation of opposites in a higher
dialectical synthesis. Perpetually undergoing an unceasing flow of transformations, spirit
finds satisfaction within the one-sidedness of either of the previously mentioned models
of time, not in oppositions between the East and the West, woman and man, feminine and
masculine, emotion and reason, or passivity and activity. Their overcoming, however,
must be demonstrated, which is a process that takes place in the Germanic imaginary
retrieval of Greek ethicality, in and through the figure of Antigone.

Antigone’s Gender Trouble: The Germanic Fantasy of Greek Sittlichkeit18
If spirit, in the analogous stage of old age, is marked by a return to a previous time, by
nostalgia for the past, then, in the Germanic world, it must be a return to the Greeks. One
could argue that the one-sidedness of time and of gender in the “Oriental” and the Roman
worlds come together in a fictitious, though harmonious union, in the German retrieval of
Ancient Greek ethical substance (Sittlichkeit), as expressed in Sophocles’ celebrated
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Hegel uses the term Sittlichkeit, or ethical life, to stand for the familial, civil, and state
institutions of which modern societies are composed.
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tragedy, “Antigone.”19 Contrary to prevalent accusations waged against Hegel, namely,
that his reading of the play anachronistically imports modern and Kantian notions of
freedom, legality, and the human into the Greek world,20 we, following J.M. Bernstein’s
reading of Hegel's Antigone in the “Spirit” chapter of the Phenomenology, take its
subject to be the spirit of the Greek world, as reclaimed by Hegel's post-Kantian
contemporaries: Lessing, Winckelmann, Schiller, Hölderlin, Schelling, Schlegel, and
Goethe.21 For this reason, the Greek ethical world emerges, paradoxically, after Rome
and Kantian ethical theory.
Despite the fact that Antigone was meant to be done away with by being sent to
her death, Hegel seems to anticipate her legacy when he christens her the “eternal irony
of the community,” for, indeed today, as the 2011 anthology Feminist Readings of
Antigone maintains, “this ﬁctitious woman, at the center of a drama written 2,500 years
ago, continues to shed light on the speciﬁc problems of every historical generation.”22
Antigone’s legacy holds immense significance for Hegel as her appearance in nearly all
of Hegel’s writings attests. Isolating Hegel's invocation of Antigone, both the woman and
the work, as a concrete example of the fantasy of an ethical-political figure in the German
revival of the Greek world, as he articulates in the Phenomenology (and, briefly, in the
19

This present turn to Hegel's Antigone, however, is partial insofar as it does not consider
Hegel's larger theory of tragedy and the role of the play within his broader aesthetics. Because our
focus is on contextualizing Antigone in the history of gender, we 1.) presume the reader’s
familiarity with both the play and Hegel’s account of it in the Phenomenology, and 2. leave to the
side a comprehensive discussion of the section to focus more concentration on gender.
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Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, 1827-8), our aim is to illuminate the ways in which
Hegel’s presentation, contra prevalent feminist readings, in fact dialectically dissolves a
gender binary and further disrupts the mapping of gender onto differently sexed bodies.
Our present objective then, is to restore integrity to Hegel’s position, and to its bearing on
the sex/gender binary.
In this fictional world, the feminine and masculine principles that heretofore
served to characterize the overall spirit of a nation in the Oriental and Roman worlds find
specificity in individuals—that is to say, in women and in men. The ethical substance of
this world is understood as a “given,” which initially organizes the division of substance
by sexual difference.23 The sexual division of the ethical substance further unfolds into
the division of gender roles, whereby men assume masculinity, and women femininity.
This means that values of the ethical world are woven within the fabric of the community
itself, and thus are understood in an immediate, unmediated, way: customs (die Sitte) “are
not so much consciously held as immediately embodied in individual agents and their
deeds.”24 Hegel describes a world built upon the idea of complementary opposition,
whereby a gender binary (masculine and feminine) maps onto a sexual dimorphism (men
and women), producing masculine men and feminine women, who join together to create
a balanced community in which each individual knows, according to nature, the role that
must be played in contributing to the harmonious whole of the community. As the bearers
of masculine principles, of universality and reason, men tend to the public sphere, the
polis. As essentially feminine, women by contrast, tend to the home, the family, and are
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understood to be more apt to the emotional and intuitive sphere. Each member of the
community feels a sense of responsibility to the other's role, as well as to the completion
of the individual role in sustaining the life of the whole, where this finds expression in
additional, naturally given, binaries: family/polis, nature/culture, divine law/human law,
and woman/man. The world appears, in short, to be divided, but in such a way that
balances and harmonizes the antinomies dividing the past expressions of worlds in
history.
Appearances however, are known to deceive, a point that Hegel will here utilize,
in finding the seeds of destruction for this form of ethical life within its own structure.
Since the individual and the rights thereof are given inadequate attention, the community
falls apart because it cannot endure its own internal conflicts. Simply the opposition that
has its basis in givenness, like that of opposing the differently sexed bodies in which one
finds oneself (as discussed in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature), cannot serve as the basis for
ethical life. As an unmediated ethic based in nature, the social and ethical configuration
does not have the fortitude to withstand the power of the negative—the inevitability of
spirit's movement beyond a form that is not adequate for its concept. As a state of
immediacy, the ethical community is doomed to failure.
If the harmony of the ethical world is one of appearance, then what significance
might the appearance of Hegel’s gendered differentiation have? On the one hand, Hegel's
depiction of women's prohibition from the social sphere accurately offers a
phenomenological description, and should be understood in this manner, and not as an
endorsement of the plight of women in this realm. The balance of the German-Greek
ethical world hinges on a division of spiritual labor, which is construed along lines of
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sexual and gendered differentiation: “The sexual stamping of ethical identity, in essence,
naturalizes a spiritual scheme, and in naturalizing it reduces the individuals who are the
bearers of roles to the roles they bear.”25 To this end, the relation between “sex”
(understood commonly and uncritically as a biological or given state into which one is
born), and “gender” (frequently conceptualized as the social equivalent of sex, which is
meant to describe supposedly complementary patterns of behavior, as attributed to, or
expected of, individuals in differently sexed bodies), are presented as mutually
complementary parts of a whole person. This so-called sex/gender binary has become, in
feminist literature, part and parcel of a patriarchal distinction that treats nature, woman,
femininity, and immanence as inferior to culture, man, masculinity, and transcendence.
The implications for hierarchically-arranged gender classifications, their grounding in
specifically sexed bodies, and their associations with assumptions about capabilities has
been the impetus for the most vehement and voluminous feminist attacks of Hegel, many
of which, in failing to critique the dialectic immanently, have misread the force of his
thought and its positive import for the deconstruction of the sex/gender binary. It is not,
as Heidi M. Ravven argues, that “women were to be confined there [to the home]
eternally because of what Hegel maintained was their naturally truncated rational
capacity and therefore primitive ethical personality.”26 Rather, an immanent critique of
Hegel reveals precisely the opposite of such feminist criticisms, insofar as his reading of
Antigone rejects normative gender categories that prescribe, regulate, and police
individual action. Antigone, the power of the negative par excellence, is the “most
25
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resplendent figure to ever walk the earth” precisely because her defiance shatters both the
stability of the post-Kantian Greek ethical world, and the normative gender binary that it
entails. To this end, the “appearance” of the world shows itself to be phenomenologically
accurate. On the other hand, if we interpret gender vis-à-vis its appearance in the
imaginary, might it be read as something with concrete consequences, but—in and of
itself—something illusory and transitory? By challenging the limitations of her inherited
gender role, Antigone ruptures the cultural configuration of female duty, thereby
breaking the tie that binds her, and all women, to a specific destiny prescribed by
anatomy, and she implicitly discloses the fortitude of culture in formulating ideas of what
roles are allowed and precluded for specifically sexed bodies. Additionally, the
“feminine” principle, allegedly inherent in Antigone, no longer resembles what we saw in
the Asiatic world; yet, as spirit progresses beyond immediate ethical harmony, though in
the shapes of spirit to come, remnants of the past will remain in what is present. In this
sense, Ismene, Antigone’s sister, the more classically “feminine” of the two, preserves
the classical element of femininity and its emergence in a female sexed body.
Nevertheless, that Antigone, “rather than what Creon would see as the more “feminine”
Ismene, is Hegel's ideal here”27 suggests that, for Hegel, Antigone not only undoes the
immediacy of ethical community, but also, and moreover, destabilizes naturalized gender
roles, their correlation with specifically sexed bodies, and the prognosis about social roles
and abilities that follows from them: “What she uncovers is the individualism at the heart
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of the polis, its male chauvinism, its overemphasis on the particular or male principle, its
pretense that this is universal and natural.”28
How, then, should Hegel be situated within the contemporary “feminist” debates
concerning gender, sexual difference, and sexuality—and, in what ways, if any, can
Hegelian thought contribute to the movement of such positions? If we agree with
Bernstein that “Hegel comes to regard conscientious action as paradigmatic because he
comes to view transgressive action, action that opposes existing norms of action, as
paradigmatic of significant action generally,”29 then Hegel's Antigone, in contrast to what
many feminist critiques have argued, represents a paradigmatic feminist position.
As a figure out of joint, Antigone acts out of place, or rather, outside of woman's
place, for her time and culture. To be sure, Antigone exceeds the time of Greek
Sittlichkeit, as it is envisioned by Romantic holism, but the temporality she uncovers and
represents for us warrants a closer look: As a character of play, she lives in repetition, for
all that has happened in the play has in a sense already happened, and to this end,
Antigone lives what one commentator has called a “temporality of tragic belatedness.”30
Antigone shares with the time of nature and the “Oriental” world (and, as we have argued
elsewhere in this dissertation, both the mad and women vis-à-vis sexual reproduction)
circular temporality. Assuming her “role,” while also following her passion, Antigone
reshapes the face of the ethical world: Her action of burying Polynices is, for Hegel, her
attempt to transform nature, that is, to unveil what is spiritual in nature. Ironically though,
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by following her natural duty, done in the name of universality, Antigone enacts the
emergence of action as something self-made, something that is “mine.” Antigone’s
distinguishing feature emerges in her own unique principle of passion;31 unlike the
passion Hegel found in the Roman world, which is future-oriented, the shape of passion
is transformed in Antigone because she follows it, not out of a dissatisfaction with her
time, and for the sake of progress and futurity, but in order to conserve the way things
are. While she does not intend such, her passion to maintain the order of the community
inadvertently pushes it into a new and unknown time. To this end, Antigone, by virtue of
her passion, breaks with the circularity of natural time, as seen in the “Oriental world”
and moves into the linear time of the “Roman world.” Yet, by embracing at once her
“natural” duty and her passion, Antigone takes up and transforms both the prevalent
models of time seen thus far—linearity and circularity— and renders them no longer in
opposition, but in unison.
That Antigone is a fictive work and a fictional character implicitly brings to light
the role of representation (Vorstellung) for Hegel in the dialectic. While the character
Antigone may illustrate an underlying unity to the opposed models of time characterizing
the “Oriental” and Roman worlds, she fails to bring them to their highest level of
resolution—a task the remains for speculative thinking. Nevertheless, as a fictive
representation (Vorstellung), Antigone further suggests that, like the play, gender is also a
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product of a cultural imaginary that bears concrete consequences for the lives that are
organized and regulated by gender norms and expectations. However, when the mapping
of gender roles onto sexual difference fails—or, in the case of Antigone, works in ironic
ways—we are reminded that gender always requires a contexualization within a time and
place (within a historicity and a culture) the boundaries of which are ever-shifting.
Further, Hegel’s representation of the Greek ethical world offers an implicit
critique of nostalgic memory—and here, the importance of the analogy of the stages of
life resurfaces. Memory can blur the actuality of the past; it can transfigure our
experience of the past and our uncovering of it in the present. On the contrary,
phenomenological memory or recollection (Erinnerung), which is the linchpin of The
Phenomenology of Spirit and, indeed, Hegel’s approach to subjective spirit generally,
serves as a reminder that past “worlds” continue to live on in us today, such that we can
look upon the past in the present as something that conveys something about who we are.
Yet, by virtue of the fact that we are inheritors of history and of tradition, we have
already internalized tradition, insofar as it becomes internal, and seemingly inherent, to
the culture. This, indeed, is true for Antigone. Hegel’s dialectic reveals at once that, while
there has to be a recovery of what has been lost, the character of immediacy defining
Antigone’s world and its Germanic reception, has to be broken up and transformed. A
new form of ethicality, one that embraces negativity, over and above the oppositional
structure of the Greek world, must come about. But it also reveals that the individuals
constituting a community must also overcome their own one-sidedness—including that of
gender. Following Judith Butler’s claim, with which this chapter opened, we can return
with more concretion to the idea that gender is a historical category, and, as such, yields
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different expressions, receptions, and understandings, each of which changes in
accordance with time and place.
Conclusion
By tracking the gendered resonance in Hegel’s Philosophy of History, we have shown the
ways in which notions of masculinity and femininity in history have coincided with
models of time. The ways in which fluctuating gender categories map onto, or fail to
coincide with, sexed bodies offer irreducible insight into the formation and evolution of
gender via Hegel.
This chapter has sought to deepen Hegel’s account of different models of time
and their relation to history by illuminating the ways in which they provide the conditions
for the possibility of gender’s emergence. In doing so however, the chapter has taken,
without question and as a philosophical ground, the centrality of historicity as a universal
category of all human existence—as does Hegel himself. By questioning the neutrality of
historicity and the models of time that emerge therein, we have attempted to
systematically illustrate the dialectical movement of gender, within Hegel’s specific
presentation. That Hegel’s idea of history and his exposition of the stages of spirit in the
Phenomenology of Spirit are predicated on the idea that readers of his books are
Europeans with European history, Eurocentricism is built into the very framework of
these texts. Philosophy’s self-consciousness, as developed from end of the eighteenthcentury to today, is governed by this framework, and is re-inscribed in the United States
and in Europe, anytime anyone sets foot in any philosophy classroom. After Fanon, this
comes into even shaper focus, and begs the questions: Is the very notion of history and, in
turn, historicity a Western ideal, one which is reified again and again by the seeming
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neutrality of philosophical discourses? Can we ask about temporality and historicity—
and, as we have argued, gender—in universalizable ways across all difference? Doesn't
the philosophy of our time demand a more exacting account of the specificity of
historicities and their correlative times? If so, then what, essentially, is at stake in asking
about time and history, about temporality and historicity, without such specificity? In
what ways does continuing to think through such concepts contribute, not merely to
scholarship, but also to the amelioration of human engagement with one another in the
world—historically, presently, and futurally?
If we follow Hegel’s idea that history itself has a point of departure (the
“Oriental” world) and of closure (the Germanic world, or Europe), then the task falls to
us today to inquire into history’s next logical moment—post-history, post-historicity.
What this might mean for the concepts of history and historicity themselves is immense,
and involves, for our purpose of gender, posing the question: is there a post-historical
classification for gender? That is to say, if gender is fully historical, then can there be
something like post-gender classification? It seems that, in our time of “gender trouble,”
to invoke Butler, a time of post-gender, or at least a time in which the codes of gender are
thoroughly scrambled, is already upon us—a phenomenon to which the multiplicity of
genders and expressions thereof in our age attests. In this sense, gender itself does not
disappear, but is re-invented, re-made, and re-appropriated—in short, it is divorced from
fixity and rendered mobile and pliable, what Hegel would call fluid (flüssig)—in ways
that were unimaginable in Hegel’s time.
Nevertheless, simply pointing out the ways in which genders today have become
profusely malleable—as something made possible by post-history—elides the basic
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Hegelian imperative of thinking within a speculative framework. What then, might a
speculative history of gender look like?
If the force of Hegel’s overall thought involves the philosophical rigor required,
not merely to see the opposition, or more significantly, to think through the ways in
which it can be overcome or suspended— then following him, the speculative task that
falls to us today is to see gender as a form of identity in difference. To this end, Hegel
offers us a rich gamut of tools for critiquing and, ultimately, destabilizing the logic of
oppositional difference. Rethinking, reworking, and ultimately undoing the fixity of these
identities, in order to speculatively comprehend their ongoing change, seems to us to be
the quintessential feminist imperative for our time.
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Chapter 4: The Death of God, and the Birth of a New Time: From Religion to
Philosophy
Time is not what it is. It turns, and
by its very concept is susceptible to
revolution. – Malabou
All revolutions, in the sciences no
less than in world history, originate
solely from the fact that Spirit, in
order to understand and
comprehend itself with a view to
possessing itself, has changed its
categories, comprehending itself
more truly, more deeply, more
intimately, and more in unity with
itself. – Hegel (PN §246z)

“Religion,” Hegel states in his “Introduction to the Concept of Religion” in the Lectures
on the Philosophy of Religion, is “present and presupposed in everyone.”1 As thinking
itself, religion is just another word for the type of thought that points to the profundity of
spiritual life, always present in humans. As a “consciousness of the absolutely universal
object,” religion points most fundamentally to the question of who we as human beings
are.2 If the most salient aspects of religion involve obtaining to a complete awareness of
the self as a creature sharing a mediated relation with divinity, then one’s understanding
of themselves as temporal creatures must be implicated. Consistently conceiving of
religion in terms of the relation of the finite to the infinite, in the movement from
singularity to universality, its reversal, and following reconciliation, religion for Hegel is
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also a question of how humans understand themselves temporally. For this reason, Hegel
can claim that, “you can tell a people by the gods they keep” (PS §689).3
In his works dedicated to thinking through the concept of religion, Hegel does not
offer a history, but aspires to show the different ways in which religion has been separate
from philosophy in the movement of world spirit. But, as the content of philosophy, one
cannot simply have a branch of philosophy that deals with the divine—a philosophy of
religion, as it were—precisely because for Hegel, all philosophy deals with the divine:
this is philosophy’s one and only subject. Equally, if one brackets out God, and looks
only at the human ideas of God – what philosophy of religion became with Fauerbach—
then philosophy of religion can be done without having any views on God or religion
itself at all.
Scholarly debates abound regarding Hegel’s status as theist or atheist, and leave
in their wake not only an immense amount of literature, but also a deep ravine dividing
the tradition of Hegel scholars. Specifically regarding this debate, “left-wing Hegelians”
try to position Hegel as an atheist thinker, limiting the role of the divine in his thought by
focusing exclusively on the finite, human perspective, whilst “right-wing Hegelians” risk
overvaluing God, at times in the name of a religiously infected politic, or, on the
contrary, the surrendering of philosophical work and of action, premised on the idea that
after reading Hegel, nothing further is required, both of which find finite truth only in the
logical Concept. While this dissertation refrains from engaging in the intricacies of these
debates, we, by adopting what Fackenheim has called a “Hegelian middle,” affirm that
the divine and religion are in some sense, indispensable to Hegel’s overall thought, and
3
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indeed for subjective spirit’s movement towards self-knowledge.4 This stance delimits
that infinity must be realized in the finite realm, and made actual in the experiences of
every-day human life.5
Finding in matters of religion a general tendency to favor simplicity – which
parallels Kant’s rendering of God as unknowable, but convened through pious faith –
Hegel ultimately finds all religions to be lacking, insofar as they fail to maintain a
thoughtful, knowable, dynamic, and inclusive relation between humans and the divine.
To the extent that religion is about belief, the fulfillment of religion then lies in a kind of
speculative thinking, and for this reason, religion must be raised to the utmost level of
thinking – that is, of speculative philosophy. That Hegel regards various religions and
religious beliefs and practices in, at best, a problematic, goes without mention: from his
account of Judaism in his Jena theological writings, his depiction of early tribal religions
in the Phenomenology, and his rendering of Hinduism and Buddhism in the Lectures on
the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel has left a trail of unfavorable remarks, leading up his
celebratory attitude towards Christianity, the Revelatory Religion.
In concord with Birchall, we find that “Hegel emerges not as an atheist or as a
theist, but as a philosopher,”6 whose philosophical work is deeply absorbed in Christian
imagery, allegories, and indeed premises, a thought which transcends any attempt to
exclusively classify it as a secular or Christian philosophy. Thus, one must not conclude
that his insistence on spirit knowing itself in terms of “religion” mandates a participation
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in a sect or religious community. However, this is a fine line, because the notion of spirit
is discovered not just that of a human community, but also in some sense that of a divine
community. While Right-Hegelians will delimit Hegel’s notion of community to the
“Holy Spirit,” that is, the moment of reconciliation between God the father and God the
son, we maintain that while Christian concepts provide a framework for conceptualizing
the profundity of the unification that Hegel aims to describe, this does not preclude
secular readings or appropriations of his thought. Rather, achieving a ‘communion’ as it
were, requires a fundamental shift in the relation between the human and divine – and,
that the formation of a divine community is not exclusively tied to (a) institutionalized
religion(s), nor does it nullify secular accounts of community; instead it is cultivated in a
community constituted by a group of people who together, recognize divinity within all
humans.
Reading Hegel’s discussions of the relation between humans and the divine in
terms of the temporal sheds light upon the ways in which an experience of time itself is
woven into the fabric of the religion, and thus one’s understanding of the divine.
Traditionally, one can only know the divine as something that is either within the self, or
outside of the self—a view that mandates that God can only be known as an inner power,
or as something beyond human reach. Finding a new, third way for thinking of God,
Hegel will claim that neither is God within us, nor beyond us; instead, God is Dead.7
Hegel claims this on the grounds that, if existence entails death, as the transition from
nature to spirit in the Encyclopaedia rendered explicit, then for God to exist requires that
God too, like all other living beings, must die. Setting up God and death as absolute
7

See Anderson, Deland. “The Death of God and Hegel’s System of Philosophy.” Sophia,
vol. 35. no. 1 (March/April 1996): 35-61, 45.

153

necessities, Hegel opens a new terrain of logic— the speculative—which paves the path
for re-conceptualizing the relation between humans and the divine, and the temporal tag
that this relation entails.
Tracking this, the present chapter winds through Hegel's corpus – following his
recurring affirmation, 'God himself is dead,’ first by setting up Hegel’s early articulation
of what became for him an overarching problem in his Jena text, Faith and Knowledge,
transitioning secondly to the Phenomenology and the parallel, albeit condensed
exposition that one finds in the Encyclopedia of “Revealed Religion,” and concluding
finally with his late Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. The feeling expressed in the
phrase connotes the “infinite grief” that arises from the seemingly unbridgeable
separation of finite beings and an infinite God. The feeling of God's death resonates as
the condition of separation and abandonment characterizing modern subjectivity's
relation to a God that is outside of and inaccessible to humanity, a state in which humans
are only able to imagine a God 'beyond,' and despair for Hegel is the feeling of the
simultaneous desire for and failure to realize a unity with God. Simultaneously, the
utterance of the death of God foregrounds a need for the new, and prompts a heretofore
un-thought understanding of religion and philosophy. Picking up from Anderson, who
termed the proclamation of God’s death as an “…occasion of a revolution in philosophy
and culture,”8 the chapter gives an account of this famous phrase, arguing that it gives
expression to a death/birth, to a fundamental shift in the self, and the self’s relation to the
divine, disruption of the dichotomy of time— the finite and the infinite— which
historically maps onto the division between humans and the divine. The proclamation of
8
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the death of God, as will be argued, serves as the springboard for a radically novel
conception of time—that of the absolute present—which allows for the complete and
reciprocal recognition between human beings and God. The thorough spiritual
understanding that one achieves upon the emergence of this shift in the ways in which
time is conceptualized, comes on the scene first within the leitmotif of death, and later in
that of love, and love’s interplay with anguish (Schmerz). The metamorphosis here marks
in many ways not only the apex of Hegel’s philosophy, but is the axis upon which a
revolution of the self occurs.9

Temporality from Kant to Hegel in Glauben und Wissen10
When philosophy ceases to respond to the needs of its time, it and everything around it
dies. To this extent then, Hegel's early text, Faith and Knowledge (Glauben und Wissen),
is a book about death. Principally, the text undertakes an examination of three of Hegel's
philosophical contemporaries – Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte – each of whom Hegel views as
a philosopher of the Enlightenment and therefore a proponent of the death of philosophy,
theology, and their overlap. He finds his evidence for this in the way in which each of the
aforementioned thinkers treats the 'corpses' of faith, reason, and the relation between
human and the divine. While each recognizes an absolute truth, instead of embracing it,
they locate the absolute outside and therefore “beyond” reason. It is within the leitmotif
of death that Hegel attempts to definitively sever what he deems to be the smothering
tentacles of Enlightenment thought, and in doing such, lays the foundation for his novel

9
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vision of time and temporality. Yet, for the profoundly new to emerge, a radical
nullification – a death, as it were – must take place: here, the “death” is that of God.
Focusing on Hegel's reading of Kant, the objective here is to show how Hegel's
speculative model of temporality, absolute presence, emerges in this early text out of an
engagement with and transcendence of Kantian thought, through the pathway provided
by the phrase “God himself is dead.”11

Kantian Modern Subjectivity and Finitude
The positive contribution of Glauben und Wissen involves unraveling the classic
distinction between faith and knowledge, which appear as shorthand for the antithesis
between cognition (Kantians), and sensibility and faith (Jacobi, Schleimarker).12
Enlightenment endeavors to explain religious faith vis-à-vis reason, with the result that,
on Hegel’s reading, reason, religion, and the human being are all diminished. The rigor
and vitality that Enlightenment thought stripped away from reason and religion must be
restored – and the human being must be raised up from the commonplace to the
extraordinary. Glauben und Wissen gestures towards this movement by demonstrating the
identity of a revealed God and philosophical subjectivity— where Hegel finds
philosophical resources for this task in Kant's critical philosophy. Reason, as a
manifestation of the Absolute, emerges in manifold forms throughout the history of
philosophy, whereas speculative propositions are the way in which Reason speaks and
11
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has spoken itself. Hegel's project then, is to read history and the history of philosophy in
terms of the unity of the Idea, that is, to look for what is shared in them in order to see its
essential unity. The philosophical task is no longer only demarcating what is wrong with
a philosophy by means of negative argumentation, but locating Reason at work in it. This
method conditions Hegel's reading of Kant in Glauben und Wissen, insofar as he isolates
what he finds to be right in Kant's thought, while also unveiling its limitations.
Thus, the extent to which Hegel's overall work is indebted to Kant is not to be
underestimated, despite the forceful critique he wages against him in this text and
elsewhere. To this end, Kant marks for Hegel a cultural and philosophical boundary to
cross, a deficiency, which bears specific consequences for the modern articulation of
time, and especially for the modern subject's relation with temporality. What is
principally wrong with Enlightenment philosophy is the domination of the concept over
the finite: “the only identity of the finite and infinite that remains possible is a relative
identity, the domination of the concept over what appears as the real and the finite.”13
This general premise has emerged within the pages of the Critique of Pure Reason as a
restriction of knowledge to conditions of subjectivity and is presented in series of
dualisms, including the opposition of appearance and reality, theoretical and practical
reason – each of which Hegel sees as derivative from Kant's distinction between intuition
and concept –namely, opposing elements of all forms of knowledge, the former produced
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by sensibility, or the faculty of receiving impressions, and the latter by understanding, the
faculty of producing representations. Locating oppositional thinking symptomatically in
modern philosophical subjectivity, as initiated by Descartes and developed through the
modern era to Kant, Hegel centerpieces this as a platitude of philosophy in need of
reconsideration. Descartes took the 'I think' as a first principle, a position that Kant
radicalized by raising the 'I' to the level of pure concept in the synthetic unity of
apperception in the 'I think'. Of the two forms of subjectivity that Kant offers in the B
deduction, Hegel describes precisely this, Kant's “I” or “I think” as “complete emptiness”
(FK 96/ GW 333). The reason for this begins by recalling Kant's position on time from
the “Transcendental Aesthetic,” that space and time are the conditions for the possibility
of experience and are necessary for the “subjective constitution of our manner of
sensibility” (CPR 1933, B 44). Insofar as outer objects are unknown, we can only have
representation of our sensibility, which must occur somewhere and someplace – that is to
say, with temporal and spatial demarcation (CPR A 29). Sensible phenomena, then, are
momentary and appear in successive moments, in linear temporality, which signifies that
from the standpoint of Kantian finitude, one only has the now. Working exclusively
within the bounds of finite knowledge, Kant “declares this finite cognition to be all that is
possible” (FK 68/ GW 303). His confinement of the limits of reason fuels Hegel's critical
evaluation and dismissal of this aspect of his thought, which offers merely a philosophy
of “absolute finitude and subjectivity” – one whose aim is not “the cognition of the
Absolute, but the cognition of this subjectivity” (FK 68/ GW 303). Kant maintains that
knowledge reflects the nature of the human subject, not the object of knowledge itself,
and for this point, Hegel calls Kant's idealism subjective. “According to Kant,” Hegel
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writes, “the super-sensuous is incapable of being known by reason; the highest Idea does
not at the same time have reality” (FK 56/ GW 288).
As a metaphysical idea, God or the Absolute is not knowable in the empirical
world, but points to a transcendent realm; that is, God is not presented in a determined
way, as influenced by space and time. Therefore, in Kant's system, the divine can only be
known as “a beyond”—or a distant God— one that is outside of the bounds of reason and
of modern subjectivity. Human beings cannot positively know God, for God is knowable
only as something that cannot be known. As Kant demonstrated in his critique of the
“ontological proof of the existence of God,” the divine can be thought of, but not proven
to exist, which on Hegel’s reading left Kantian philosophy and the thought of those who
followed it lacking an essential, necessary being. The results of Kant's position emerges,
as previously indicated, within reason itself: Enlightenment thinking, claims Hegel, can
only admit positive knowledge of the finite and empirical, and to this end, reason has
been reduced to intellect; there is no reason proper in Enlightenment thinking, rather
Understanding. Human connection with the divine then, “must take refuge in faith,” (FK
56/ GW 288) that is, a belief or confidence in something that is outside of itself. This is
an attitude that expresses subjective certainty, but concedes to the impossibility of
objective or theoretical certainty. In Hegel's own words, “Reason, having in this way
become mere intellect, acknowledges its own nothingness by placing that which is better
than it in a faith outside and above itself, as a beyond [to be believed in]. This is what has
happened in the philosophies of Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte” (FK 56/ GW 288). The state of
Enlightenment thought, Kantian philosophy, and in turn, modern subjectivity, are
burdened by this prevalent opposition between faith and knowledge, both philosophically
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and theologically. Cast antithetically, both faith and knowledge remain limited, empty; as
long as there is a division between reason and faith, and the content of philosophy is
limited to subjective knowledge, this problem will persist.
Denying God a place in the world, Enlightenment thought casts God beyond the
limits of what is knowable, and thereby makes God abstract. Linking modern subjectivity
with Protestantism, Hegel characterizes the God knowable to this subjectivity as present
“ in the heart of the individual. His sighs and prayers he seek for the God whom he denies
himself in intuition, because of the risk that the intellect will cognize what is intuited as a
mere thing, reducing the sacred grove to a mere timber” (FK 57/ GW 289). Modern
subjectivity's knowledge of God is only in feeling, or alternatively, a faith in its
immediacy, one lacking the rigor of reason. It is, as Hegel illustratively states in the
Phenomenology, an “empty husk” (PS §792). The consequence of this gulf dividing
human and the divine that Kant's philosophy gives rise to, is a particularly characteristic
and equally damaging aspect of modern subjectivity, and bears monumental relevance for
subjectivity's temporality. Experiencing time as exclusively finite erupts affectively in the
modern philosophical subject as a feeling of estrangement, of grief – sentiments
encapsulated in the feeling that 'God himself is dead.' Identifying God as 'beyond' human
cognition situates God temporally in an unknown and unknowable future, towards which
finite humans long for in faith, and meanwhile, leaves them dissatisfied with the present
yearning for what they must merely believe is going to come. Enlightenment thought, in
its vapidity, has left behind it the 'corpse' of God himself, where Kant's model of the
modern philosophical subject, one that is articulated in isolation from a proper
understanding of its relation to God, reinforces this affective hangover. We can now see

160

with sharper clarity Hegel's claim that Kant's subjectivity is one of “complete emptiness”
(FK 96/ GW 333): in its striving for an unknowable God, subjectivity is displaced from
itself, from its own time, and thus finds itself to be hollow. The phrase 'God himself is
dead' poetically summarizes the “nihilism of transcendental philosophy,” (FK 61/ GW
294) where Kant's limitation of knowledge is what condemns him to stagnate in
subjectivity and skepticism, and keeps subjectivity locked in pain, isolated from true selfrealization.
Although Hegel esteems Kant's position in the Science of Logic when he claims
that “one of the most profound and true is the idea that the unity which constitutes the
essence of the concept is the synthetic unity of apperception, formulated as the unity of
the 'I think' or of self-consciousness,”14 and in many ways celebrates the philosophical
initiatives of Descartes and Kant elsewhere, they, in their commitment to the autonomy
of the subject, refrained from seeing unfolding over time of the recognition of the original
unity of thinking and being.15 Yet, “Kantian philosophy has the merit of being idealism
because it does show that neither the concept in isolation nor the intuition in isolation is
anything at all; that intuition by itself is blind, and the concept by itself is empty” (FK 68/
GW; CPR A 51, B75). While Kant recognizes that neither side of an equation makes
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sense without the other, and gestures towards this reconciliation, he nevertheless fails to
render explicit in Hegel's eyes, the validity of this claim in the relation between human
and the divine, the finite and infinity – which is essentially to say, the unity from which
the dualisms in his work originally arose. As an achievement, Absolute idealism must
necessarily go beyond Kant, insofar as the principles of knowledge must grasp the Truth,
not just the phenomenal; or, as Hegel famously states in the Phenomenology, philosophy
must no longer be the love of wisdom, but wisdom itself.

Hegel's “Triune” God: Subject Becoming Substance, or the Identity of Thinking
and Being
Recalling that the aim of philosophy according to Hegel is to demonstrate the process of
the identity of form and content, to render explicit the identity subject and object, the
“perfect unity of thought and being,” (PN § 409) we can see the importance of historical
thinking for Hegel: Parmenides first formulated the identity of thinking and being as a
philosophical premise, and Plato's dialogue Parmenides, to which Hegel alludes
throughout the Jena writings and refers to explicitly in the Preface to the Phenomenology,
offers a dialectical demonstration of the power of negativity. Perhaps the most centrally
influential philosopher for Hegel, Spinoza recognizes an immediate identity between
being and thinking – causa sui. To this end, Hegel's indebtedness to Spinoza is
undeniable, even thought his endorsement of his philosophy, not unlike Kant, is not
without reserve. Even though Spinoza's concept of causa sui fulfills Hegel's condition for
Absolute thought insofar as it posits an identity between being and thinking, it, as a
substance deficient of the vitality necessary for dialectical movement, ultimately “lacks
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the principle of the personality;”16 Substance must be know not only as a specific thing
with determinacy, but also as an essence with a rich inner life. As Macherey summarizes,
...it thus constitutes a substance which cannot become subject, which fails in this
active reflection of self which would permit it to undertake its own liberation
through its own process. If he did not grasp or was not able to develop the concept
of the causa sui, it is because this concept, as he defined it, contained nothing
other than an abstract and indifferent identity of self to self, in which the Self is
nothing other than that which is already in its beginning, without the possibility of
real passage toward self, of an immanent movement which would not be that of
its pure and simple disappearance. The point of view of substance expresses the
absolute in its own manner: without the life that animates it and that causes it to
exist. This is an arrested and dead spirit, which is nothing but that self in an
original restriction, which condemns it from the beginning.17
Alluding to Spinoza (and most likely Schelling) in the Phenomenology, Hegel explains
further: “Everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance,
but equally as Subject” (PS §17). Spinoza's primary shortcoming, as Hegel explicates in
the Encyclopedia, is that he fails to see that “God is in truth assuredly the necessity or, as
one might say as well, the absolute Thing, but also at the same time the absolute Person,
and on this point we must agree, that the philosophy of Spinoza falls short of the real
concept of God, which forms the content of religious consciousness in Christianity;”18 or
again in the lesser Logic: “The absolute Substance of Spinoza certainly falls short of
Absolute Spirit, and it is a right and proper requirement that God should be defined as
Absolute Spirit.”19 While Kant's philosophy culminates in the “complete emptiness of
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subjectivity,” (FK 96/ GW 333) the objective Substance in Spinoza's is proportionately
vacuous; equally, God's transcendence in Kant and Enlightenment thinking, and his
immanence in Spinoza's (and perhaps Schelling) are both susceptible to the same
critique: they fail to fully encapsulate the co-articulated generation through a process of
mediation and mutual recognition; or, in a word, of Hegel's Absolute.
Nevertheless, the model for Hegel's rendering of a qualified type of immanent
God can be traced to his creative reading Spinoza. While he faults Spinoza for grasping
the Absolute only as objective substance, Hegel still finds in his thought an essential
speculative idea, and appropriates a transformed concept of causa sui into a dialectical
process: “The living Substance is being which is in truth Subject, or, what is the same, is
in truth actual only so far as it is the movement positing itself, or is the mediation of the
self-othering with itself” (PS §18). In his revision of Spinoza's concept of Substance,
Hegel offers the content of philosophy, which is just to say, a definition of the Substance
that shall become Subject.
While Hegel wants to find within Kant the identity of thinking and being—the
absolute identity—he must concede that this insight cannot be maintained, resulting in an
antithesis, which gives rise to a “beyond,” placing the thing-in-itself outside of
philosophy. To this end, Kantian philosophy is not culmination of philosophy, but rather
its death: it marks the end of philosophy precisely because it is locked within a subjective
framework. The death of God re-unifies being and thinking, which Kantian thought
served to divide, insofar as God can again be thought, but only as dead.
In Glauben und Wissen, Hegel finds the uncultivated seeds of a new form of
idealism in Kant's “Transcendental Deduction,” that is the philosophical form for an
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originary unity of Substance and Subject. He claims that we must place our merit in
Kant's,
…having put the Idea of authentic a priority in the form of transcendental
imagination; and also in his having put the beginning of the Idea of Reason in the
intellect itself. For he regarded thinking, or the form, not as something subjective,
but as something in itself; not as something formless, not as empty apperception,
but as intellect, as true form, namely as triplicity. The germ of speculation lies in
this triplicity alone (FK 79-80/ GW 316).
Identifying triplicity in Kant, Hegel delineates the philosophical form of a manifested
Absolute— the Trinitarian God— a quintessential concept underscoring Hegel's larger
body of philosophical work. The doctrine of the trinity relies on Aristotelian concept of
substance, where as substance is a pseudonym for subject.20 Following Aristotle's
definition, and supplementing it with his revised version of Spinoza's substance, Hegel
will claim that the becoming Substance of Subject and Subject of Substance takes place
in a double movement: human self-consciousness must raise itself to the standpoint of the
trinitarian God, and the spiritual God must translate into the sensual in the Incarnation.
Since Absolute understanding does not, or cannot begin as absolute as does Spinoza's, but
rather it must be generated, Hegel will claim that the unity of Substance and Subject
occurs over time, through a dialectical movement and mediation. Yet, just as the bud will
only develop to a blossom in time, under the right conditions, so too will the recognition
of Substance as Subject and Subject as Substance latent in Kant and Spinoza's philosophy
maturate: “The recognition of the identity of the Subject and God was introduced into the
World when the fullness of Time was come: the consciousness of this identity is the
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recognition of God in his true essence;”21 or again in Glauben und Wissen: “When the
time had come, the infinite longing that yearns beyond the body and world, reconciled
itself with existence” (FK 58/ GW 291). To properly understand what this time is and the
significance it might have for finite subjectivity and infinite divinity, our analysis must
return to where we began: Kant's “Transcendental Deduction” and Hegel's coupling of it
with the phrase “God himself is dead.”

Kantian Imagination and the Birth of a New Time
Hegel's overarching philosophical position is motivated by the imperative to not simply
reject dualisms, but rather to overcome them in Absolute Knowing, that is, by
demonstrating how the appearance of opposition arises from absolute unity. Calling an
end to binary division by seeing the original unity in difference, Hegel paves the path for
a new identification of thinking and being as Absolute Idealism, whereby human thought
reflects the nature of reality. In Glauben und Wissen, this line is developed through a
critical interpretation of the prominent philosophies of the time – most notably for us,
Kant – through the backdrop of the phrase “God himself is dead.” The implication of
Hegel's invocation of the phrase 'God himself is Dead' only resonates fully if it is taken in
context: The phrase originates as a 17th century Lutheran hymn, as Hegel later makes
explicit in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion vol. III: “'God himself is dead,' it
says in a Lutheran hymn, expressing an awareness that the human, the finite, the fragile,
the weak, the negative are themselves a moment of the divine, that they are within God
himself, that finitude, negativity, otherness are not outside of God and do not, as
21
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otherness, hinder unity with God” (LPR 326 1827 Lectures). Taken in context, the Death
of Christ is articulated with reference to Good Friday – that is, with the incarnation of
God. Just beyond the historical death of God at Golgotha is his resurrection;
correlatively, the desolate mourning of modern subjectivity will also give way to a new
birth – Speculative Good Friday – the expression of the idea in the event, the universal in
the particular. Since the needs of the time have surpassed Enlightenment thought, its
feeling, and its temporal orientation, the validity of the modern model of subjectivity and
the temporal components that it encapsulates expire. This transformation demands a
severe break with the old, as an uncompromising refiguring of time, the temporal, and
subjectivity's place therein.
Offering a testimony for understanding the needs of the time, the new philosophy
and new religion that Hegel sees emerging out of the residual feeling of God's death, out
of the death of the Enlightenment, must embrace a novel way of thinking and being – that
is, it must envelop the full thrust of the speculative. The beginnings of this take place in
the transition from the theological to the philosophical meaning of the phrase 'God
himself is dead.' Hegel finds philosophical content in the phrase precisely because the
separation of faith and knowledge has become not only a theological doctrine, but also a
philosophical initiative within Enlightenment thinking. The philosophical content finds
realization by elevating the heretofore feeling of death to the level of thought, a
movement which is expressed in temporal terms as an elevation and a complication of the
way in which time is understood and indeed lived. Concretely, this means understanding
the death of God, first, as the event of the crucifixion, and secondly, as the idea in the
event; to this end, it provides the gateway for developing a new model of subjectivity.
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Understood twofold, the death of God is on the one hand, a moment of the absolute Idea,
namely the Crucifixion of Christ, but on the other, is also the idea we take from the event
(PM §564, §569). Emphasizing the latter, the death of God here refers not to the
historical event, but rather the death of an absolute God that lies beyond, the God of the
Enlightenment. Calling for the death of a representational God is in the same breath
announcing the speculative incarnation of God and the death of modern subjectivity;
Hegel at once closes the curtains on finitude, and rises to welcome the birth of a new
time—that of speculative identity of human and the divine.
The death of finitude or the birth of a new time, in which God manifests himself
anew in human temporal mode, must be made philosophically explicit, and Hegel
identifies the conceptual form for this, paradoxically, in Kant. Detecting in his work the
aforementioned philosophical scaffolding of his own overarching project of seeing unity
across difference, particularly for human and the divine, the finite and infinity, Hegel
argues that Kantian philosophy, however inadvertently, offers a template for the
realization of this premise. To bring this claim into focus, Hegel, in philosophical
adaptation with Kant's transcendental imagination, locates in the figure Christ the
“schematizing power of divine subjectivity,” (FoH 125) and identifies Kant's
transcendental imagination as intuitive understanding, or divine understanding. Indeed,
this is the precise point that Kant himself aims to destroy, and moreover, it marks the
starkest point of departure separating Hegel from the now famous Heideggerian
interpretation of the Kantian imagination, as was discussed in Chapter One. Reading Kant
speculatively, the imagination becomes for Hegel that which synthesizes opposition –
subject and object, finite and infinity, human and divine. For Kant, the imagination is the
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faculty responsible for forming concepts out of the 'manifold of intuition' and for
synthesizing intuitions with concepts to form objects. The productive or transcendental
imagination does not use empirical data, but serves as the link between the intellect and
sensibility. While Kant claims that the imagination synthesizes two different capacities
and allows for their cooperation, Hegel contends that what needs to be recognized is the
original unity of difference. He states:
We must not take the faculty of [productive] imagination as the middle term that
gets inserted between an existing absolute subject and an absolute existing world.
The productive imagination must rather be recognized as what is primary and
original.... This power of imagination is the original two-sided identity. The
identity becomes subject in general on one side, and object on the other; but
originally it is both (FK 73/ GW 308-9).
To this end, Kant's imagination, or a revitalized interpretation of it, serves as the
philosophical ground for temporalizing God. And using Kant's famous definition of the
imagination as “the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is not itself present”
(CPR B 151) a temporalized God is by Hegel's rendering, both present and not present,
both temporal and infinite. “Christ's life” as Malabou summarizes, “translates the union
of the sensuous and the supersensuous into a sensible form, here making homogenous
two instances which seem at first heterogenous” (FoH 122). Hegel in effect calls for a
double reading of time, one that is not stagnating in antithesis, but flourishing in unity.
Time must now be understood both as a sequence or series (temporal) and as moments of
the whole (eternal); any standpoint that fails to recognize the unity of this double aspect
of time will prove insufficient. With the death of God, philosophical subjectivity is
allowed a new temporal form—one in which God becomes human by sacrificing divinity.
Hegel highlights the crucifixion rather than incarnation to underscore his claim that God
does not die for human sin, but rather, dies to simply destroy the gulf dividing human and
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the divine. Christ's death allows for the descent of the Holy Ghost— where death is
transfigured into the universality of spirit in the community. Through this particular
death, humans can partake in God, and consequently, linear time, or the time in which
subjectivity is but a fleeting finite moment, is no longer truthful. When Hegel calls for the
death of God then, it is also the death of finitude and the death of the modern feeling of
estrangement. In this sense, the death of God is simultaneously the resurrection of
philosophy and the birth of a new model of time, for as Hegel claims, God died to save
philosophy from the Enlightenment's self-perception.
If the heretofore exposition of Hegel has emphasized the importance of death,
destruction and overcoming, why then, one might ask, is Glauben und Wissen a book
about life? The guiding themes of faith and reason that inspired and facilitated Hegel's
critiques of Kant, Enlightenment philosophy, and modern subjectivity have, for us today,
historical significance, with specific bearing to our understanding of intellectual (and
spiritual) history, but to be sure, have expired as life-full philosophical problems.
Nevertheless, the most forceful insight that Hegel brings to the fore in this text is the
unification of time and subjective revolution – a fusion Hegel initiated through an
engagement with the disputes of his time—which he himself terms a “philosophical
revolution” or “revolution of philosophy” (FK 189/GW 430). Through Hegel's
interrogation, a new possibility for time and subjectivity found articulation, and we, by
putting pressure on the ideas that Hegel's groundwork made possible, see that the pivotal
term effecting change is time—both in the sense of responding to the needs of the time,
and re-envisioning the way in which time is understood and subjectively lived. Glauben
und Wissen demonstrates what is possible when we step beyond the boundaries of our
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conditioned thought, what we think we know, or should know to be true, and imagine
another way – when we take a 'corpse' and breathe new life into it.

The Death of God in the Phenomenology of Spirit
Five years after the initial utterance of the death of God in the Critical Journal of
Philosophy’s article on faith and knowledge, Hegel returns to this phrase in his
Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), in the penultimate chapter of the book, “Religion,” in
the section entitled, “Revealed Religion.” Again, Hegel does not present a history of the
study of religion, nor does he offer a philosophy of religion. His project, to be sure, is to
trace out the phenomenological development of human consciousness as it interacts with
religious development. In other words, he is meant to reconcile social history with the
history of spirit. In this text, as well as his others dedicated to religion, Hegel insists that
one can see God in all religions, but the participants in these religions do not yet know
God as Spirit. The Phenomenology of Spirit presentation of religion gives forms of
religious consciousness one after another, and interrupts itself with interjection of the
“we”—that is, “we” the philosopher, who have attained to absolute knowing—who can
see a certain conceptual, logical necessity in the sequence of religion. The presentation is
not an historical sequence – we are doing the ordering –but we see a certain necessity in
their appearance in seeing the concept of religion working in them insofar as we can see
the divine working in them as spirit.
Despite contrasting interpretations, the claim that Hegel does not shift his
attention away from the human subject to focus solely on a divine Being seems to most
adequately capture his argument, for even with the introduction of a divine object or
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Absolute Being, Hegel maintains the same focus of his overarching project, namely, to
explore the evolution of the human spirit. This claim is buttressed by the fact that
religious experience is conceptualized as a higher level of human experience than the
preceding stages of experientialism. Consequently, we must read Religion as a working
out of two dialectics: the first is the internal development of a self-knowledge and
adequate expression of spirit, and the second is “the reflection of a certain world which
finds an ideal expression of itself in religion.”22 Implicitly, what Hegel is showing us is
that to be fully human is to be fully spiritual, and to be fully spiritual is to be the way the
Absolute Spirit is. A key problem remains however, insofar as spirit cannot be merely
represented, for “the self which is represented, is not the real self” (PS §684). Spirit must
be present. The question then becomes, how can the Divine Spirit be present in the selfconsciousness of human spirit? This would require reconciliation between the divine and
the human— which entails further a reconciliation of the finite and the infinite.

The Phenomenology of Spirit, Chapter VII: RELIGION
Although the chapter entitled “Religion” in the Phenomenology thematically keeps to the
project envisioned in the title – dialectically working through historical stances towards
absolute Spirit – the essential problem here, as Hyppolite states, is the “the relation
between finite consciousness, which portrays to itself the divine of infinite spirit, and this
infinite spirit itself.”23 Straight away, the motivating problematic is that of the temporal,
and its (mis)representations. Underscoring this, the dialectic commences with a history of
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sorts, whereby Hegel a reproduces the general movements of the Phenomenology.
Reminding us that this chapter is not religion’s first appearance, he recalls its presence in
Consciousness, Self-consciousness, Reason, and Spirit – where it appeared, albeit in
dwarfed versions. Religion was thus presupposed24 from consciousness’ point of view
and was understood as a vague awareness of the absolute Being. Nonetheless, although
natural consciousness has been aware of the absolute Being, the absolute Being has not
yet been aware of itself in the aforementioned forms of consciousness.
In the subsequent paragraphs, Hegel recounts the partial glimmers of
consciousness’ ultimate object that we have seen throughout the text thus far that have
led up to spirit’s knowledge of itself in religion. In Understanding, consciousness
grappled with a “suprasensible reality” that transcended immediate perception, but was
unable to see itself in this reality. In Self-consciousness, unhappy consciousness strove
for the unattainable “out there,” but failed to see the ways in which it precluded its own
grasp of itself as Absolute. This preclusion allowed for the movement to Reason, which
nonetheless missed the mark altogether because it contently found itself merely in itself,
where spirit is not found. In the ethical world, we saw the first approximate grasp at
what’s going on with spirit in the thickness of social life. Consciousness became aware of
religion as “belief” in the inevitability of “fate” (PS §674). This proved to be an
impersonal awareness in which individuals did not recognize themselves. Similarly,
religion in the Enlightenment proved to be vacuous precisely because the empty Absolute
was thought to exist “beyond.” For this reason, what Hegel referred to as the “empty
religion of understanding” also failed to see itself in the Absolute (PS §675). Lastly, in
24
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the religion of morality, the content of Absolute Being was recognized, but still remained
intertwined with the negativity of the Enlightenment. Therefore, all differentiation and all
actuality remained outside of itself. Because none of these were complete forms of
religion, we may conclude that even though religion has been present to some extent in
all of the stages, we are only now equipped to properly explore the ultimate object of
consciousness, the Absolute Being. We the readers are no longer observing the
movement of consciousness through different stages, for despite the fact that the
Phenomenology has begun a new chapter we have undergone no new movement at all.
Since religion has, in a way, been there all along, we are now prompted to “look into a
form of consciousness which has its own phenomenology, and this is and remains a
phenomenology of the human spirit, whose object is both universal and concrete.”25 The
dialectic of religion in contrast to the previous dialectics is positive: it is no longer the
same highway of despair whereby consciousness must rise from certainty to truth. Spirit
in religion still has to go through phenomenological experiences that end in failure, but
now, spirit has achieved self-knowledge and must seek out an expression that completely
reveals its essence.
Unlike the stages mentioned above, in religion spirit is self-consciousness. It
understands itself as a universal spirit that “contains within itself all essence and all
actuality” (PS §677). That is, consciousness realizes in religion that the conflict between
the world of reality and the world of spirit is non-existent because they are the same
world. The significance of spirit’s knowledge is concurrently the essence of Religion and
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the central insight to Absolute Knowledge.26 Nonetheless, religion does not nullify the
tension between the actual world and the world of spirit completely because in religion,
spirit masquerades in worldly costumes. Simply stated, religion is “the self-consciousness
of Absolute Spirit as portrayed by finite spirit.”27 Consequently, as we shall soon see,
spirit is Absolute insofar as it knows itself, but appears to itself in guises that
inadequately suit its essence.
How then does spirit come to find its most adequate expression? It begins as a
mere Notion that initially lacks the self-actuality that it eventually comes to acquire for
itself in the movement of its consciousness. Its partiality is that of a dark night of essence
“as contrasted with the daylight of explicit development” (PS §685). It contains within
itself the “creative secret of birth” which must be externalized and viewed through the
forms of daylight (PS §685). The process of externalization occurs in typical Hegelian
fashion: all of the previous stages leading up to this moment (Consciousness, Selfconsciousness, Reason, and Spirit) re-appear in the course of Religion as shapes through
which it comes to know itself in its most actualized, developed state (PS §680). The order
of arrangement in which the shapes have heretofore appeared now differs, such that the
shapes no longer appear remotely as a single series of advancements, but now manifest
emphatically as a whole (PS §681).
Glancing over the dialectic with a wide-angle lens, Hegel tells us that the reality
of spirit as the Concept (Begriff) of religion is, to begin with, simply and immediately
Natural Religion, whereby spirit is in the form of consciousness; in the following
dialectics, Hegel traces out two subsequent realities of religion, Religion of Art and
26
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Revealed Religion, a standpoint which also appears in the Encyclopedia, and is that with
which we will linger. In the former, spirit supersedes natural existence and comes to
know itself through creative activity: this is spirit in the form of self-consciousness. The
latter is the unity of the preceding moments, such that spirit sees itself as itself, though
only in the form of representation (Vorstellung). To reach its full potentiality, it must
ascend to self-conscious thought: this is spirit in the form of Reason.
The first series of attempts at reconciliation between human and the divine are
laid out in Natural Religion, the most immediate and rudimentary of all religions, where
Spirit simply reveals the divine through nature. In this form, the human spirit has no selfrecognizable participatory function in making the divine known. In “God as Light” —
Persia, or “Oriental” religion, we can easily see that light is meant to represent divine
Spirit, but it is an indeterminate spirit whose “only determinations are attributes” that
never concretely or consistently cohere (PS §687). In short, it has no subjectivity. In
“Plant and Animal” or the first Indian and tribal religions, spirit disintegrates into natural
forms that substitute for immediate spiritual certainty. Initially these forms take shape in
the pantheism of plant totems, which are calm, passive, impotent and contemplative, and
later take the form of the destructive animal. The spiritual life of animal religion is none
other than the struggle for recognition as independent, yet conflicting tribes, battle each
other in the animal forms that they have taken as their essence. Echoing of the masterslave dialectic, this battle necessarily gives rise to the next stage, that of “The artificer,”
or Egyptian religion. At this stage of Natural Religion, the approach to the divine alters,
such that spirit no longer merely projects the divine into forces of nature, but makes out
of natural materials the thing in which the gods dwell. By crafting divinity into artificial
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forms, the artisan further increases the level of subjectivity in spirit. The first products the
artisan produces (pyramids and obelisks) are those of Understanding. Hegel tells us that
the mathematical form supporting these representations lacks spirit, for the artisan
remains anonymous in the work. Lacking self-consciousness, spirit here is not made
manifest in the work and therefore the work is as good as dead (PS §692). When the
artisan develops her work into architecture, (the in-itself of spirit) and sculpture (the foritself of spirit) we move from abstract forms to forms that are filled with life. By
authenticating her creations with decorative plant and animal figures, the artisan
reproduces life in the product by making it more of her own. The product nonetheless
remains unequipped with the proper tools to express its inner meaning to the outer world.
The section on Natural Religion thus closes, leaving us in need of a fully actualized
recognition of expression, such that one can see expression and the objects in which it
manifests as essentially one.
Taking subsequently a new form in “Religion in the form of Art,” or of Greek
religion, spirit has progressed from the form of substance that characterized natural
religion, and now knows itself as subject, which at this stage finds expression in works of
art made within the community. As present in the community, this religions’ stage, which
“surges up…between natural religion and the Christian religion… is the selfconsciousness of spirit as finite humanity.”28 Here, spiritual content is presented
sensuously in artistic production, ranging image to the lyrical weaving of words. In “The
Abstract work of Art,” spirit finds expression initially in Greek architecture and
sculpture, and then in worship in the form of hymns. Language gives existence of spirit
28
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where the hymn that is sung gives existence to devotion— an act that raises oneself to
spirit, and ushers in a feeling of being possessed by spirit. “The Living Work of Art,”
spirit enjoys and immediate relationship with the divine, as the act of worship has made
possible. In “The Spiritual Work of Art” spirit emerges in the form of language – that of
Greek epic, tragedy, and comedy, whereby the divine is realized in the language of the
people: Homer, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Aristophanes. What Religion in the form of
Art shares temporally with Natural Religion turns on Hegel’s depiction of them as a form
of truth that is, for us, no-longer, in the sense that the truth obtained in these forms of
religion as they emerge within their own historical formation, is no-longer sustainable; at
the same time each is not-yet, anticipating a finish line marked by a form of
completion—which amounts to saying that they are not-yet Christianity— which is in
turn, not-yet Philosophy.
The third and final attempt at reconciliation in “Revelatory Religion” (Die
offenbare Religion)29 or Christianity, centerpieces the movement of Subject becoming
Substance and its reversal. The dialectic commences with, at once a celebration of the
achievement of “happy consciousness” as worked out in the Religion of Art—absolute
self-certainty—and its subsequent slippage back into unhappy consciousness. Hegel takes
the proposition Das Selbst ist das absolute Wesen (the self is the absolute essence) –
where essence here is the predicate— to describe the happiness achieved in the previous
dialectic, and as a framework for the unfolding discussion. Traditionally, meaningful
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statements include a subject and a predicate, which are thought to be different. Contrary
to formal logic, speculative logic maintains that predicative statements express the
identity of subject and substance. Finding an underlying identity in difference between
subject and predicate, Hegel will claim that the predicate is the substance of the subject.
Yet, in locating the divine exclusively within the self— the self is the absolute essence—
the comic self falls asunder, loses itself, and digresses to the stance of unhappy
consciousness: “It is the consciousness of the loss of all essential being in the certainty of
self…the grief which expresses itself in the hard saying that “God is dead” (PS §752).
This occasion of the phrase ‘God is dead’ points temporally to the over abundance of
finitude: when humans reduce the divine to themselves, infinity is also reduced to simply
the finite, and in this devaluation, fails to preserve the integrity of difference for the
infinite. In order to think of the finite and the infinite, human and the divine together,
without compromising the richness of either side of the equation, an alternative way of
conceiving their interaction must be posited.
Recalling the overall task of the Phenomenology of Spirit— to lead one up an
ascending ladder to where there is pure self-recognition in absolute otherness—
the dialectic of Revealed Religion advances Spirit to a stance whereby it reveals itself as
self-revelation; The dialectical unfolding of what Hegel will call God’s self-revelation
occurs in three spheres of representation, shown from the standpoint of God and of
humans: (PS §769): 1) the element of pure thought, 2) the movement of creation, and 3)
reconciliation in the life of the community. In the Encyclopedia, Hegel treats Absolute
Spirit in three stages, beginning with Art, concluding with Philosophy, and in-between
the two, treating religion exclusively in the form of Revealed Religion (Die geoffenbarte
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Religion). Remaining consistent with the Phenomenology, Spirit comes to its selfconsciousness, to the point where God is known as Spirit – the precondition for our
knowledge of spirit, which was presupposed all along. He begins by announcing three
propositions, which delimit the knowledge of God in thought: “God is only God insofar
as he knows himself: his self-knowledge is further, a self-consciousness in man and
man’s knowledge of God, which proceeds to man’s self-knowledge in God” (PM §564).
Describing next the form of this knowledge, representational form (Vorstellung) – as
instantiated in “Art”— emerges as the first and most immediate expression of the divine.
Here, as also in the two previous dialectics in the Phenomenology, Revelatory Religion
steadfastly remains in representational or picture-thinking (Vorstellung)—a partial image
of the truth of spirit, yet still not spirit actually.30 Representation works by dividing and
separating what is whole, formulating a “series of events according to finite reflective
categories,” (PM §565) and thus representation, as Malabou notes, “first appears as a
process which temporalizes the conceptual content” in linear temporal form (FoH 86).
God expresses himself in each of these moments, or what Hegel will call “spheres,” (PM
§566) beginning with God the Father, a conceptual identity of God in the “… ‘moment’
of Universality…pure thought, or the abstract medium of essence,” (PM §567)
transitioning to God’s abdication of his “aloof and inert” representation (or his
“alienation”) (PS §778) in begetting himself in the phenomenal world as his Son;
followed by the “infinite return and reconciliation with the eternal being…” (PM §566)
as manifest in the spirit of the community. These three moments, seen from both the
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standpoint of spirit and religious consciousness, constitute Revealed Religion in both
aforementioned texts. The divine must not be thought of as three persons, but as three
moments in the movement of the concept of God—that is to say, God’s movement must
be thought of speculatively.
In the first sphere of representation, the divine Being, as the element of pure
thought, remains in abstraction in the time of alienation, and from the standpoint of
religious consciousness, is apart from temporal and spatial dimensions. Bridging this
perceived gap, the Divine manifests as existence in the Son; spirit now is incarnated—
indeed shows itself as it is—for the first time in a determinate subject, in man. As
immediate revelation, religious consciousness can see, hear, and touch the divine who is
manifest in sensuous being, making him, in short, “an individual Self is not yet equally
the universal Self, the Self of everyone…In other words, not as yet the form of the
Notion” (PS §762). While the spatial and temporal problem that arose vis-à-vis the
Divine as beyond in pure thought is resolved, a second temporal ineptitude arises: “He is
the immediately present God; consequently, his ‘being’ passes over into ‘having been’
(PS §763). Religious consciousness can no longer sensuously intuit the divine, as he can
no longer be seen or heard. Since he was once present however, the life of the
community, in which the divine manifests as spirit, can recall this event as part of its past:
“This death is therefore its resurrection in Spirit” (PS §779).
Hegel’s divinization of human beings radicalizes the heretofore understanding of
Christianity by taking ideas that are already familiar in representation and instead,
understanding in terms of the movement of the Concept. Self-consciousness finds itself
not in its reflection upon itself—as in Descartes— but rather, in this truth that was
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heretofore presented externally, and is now internal, a movement effected by the selfelevation out of subjectivity and a finding oneself in the life of the community. Selfrecognition in absolute otherness facilitates the finding of the self in radically other terms,
whereby the divine is discovered within; this self-finding in this truth which is the truth
of the Holy Spirit, read speculatively, or as articulated in the “Preface” to the
Phenomenology, the recognition of the “universal individual” that each person implicitly
is.
One must not forget though that in the realm of Religion, the union of human and
divine is achieved only in form of representation (Vorstellung). In the ‘Beautiful Soul’ of
Chapter Six a similar union occurred insofar as its inwardness was both intuiting the
Divine and the Divine intuiting itself (PS §795). Yet, the ‘beautiful soul’ was left wanting
because it was a movement of internality that did not care to dirty its hands with
externality. The aim now must be centered on the self as universal, not the universal in its
obscurity. The culminating project is to bring the form and the content together. To affect
this movement, Religion must be transformed into philosophy by moving away from
abstract universality to concrete universality in a dialectical experience. For clues as to
how this might happen, we must recall the relations among chapters six, seven, and eight:
At end of Chapter Six, judging consciousness forgave acting consciousness and thereby
renounced itself. The result was their reciprocal recognition in the double affirmation, the
“yes-yes” that is actual spirit (PS §671). Spirit found fulfillment in forgiveness and
reconciliation, a fulfillment that parallels the reconciliation that will come about in
Absolute Knowing. Similarly, the result of Religion was also reconciliation with the
universality of spirit that arises out of anguish over the death of God, and because it
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suffered the agony of the loss of God, consciousness no longer recognized anything
outside of itself. “We see self-consciousness at its last turning point become inward to
itself and attain to a knowledge of its inwardness; we see it divest itself of its natural
existence and acquire pure negativity” (PS §797). In its renunciation, consciousness
emptied itself out. Unlike the conclusion of Chapter Six, here God is manifest in those
who know themselves as pure knowing (PS §787).
Within the community filled with the divine, for whom the divine is not beyond
human knowledge expires, yet nevertheless, while God is now knowable, a true and
complete reconciliation of the human and the divine still fails to transpire: since the
foundation for reconciliation in Revelatory Religion (and those who practice it) is based
on a historical event, as revealed in scriptures, of which, as Heidegger recounts, “one
“knows” about…only in believing,”31 God is revealed, but only as a distant historical
event, knowable only to those who have faith. One’s communion with God, as it were,
lies in an investment in the past. At the same time, Revelatory Religion’s driving force is
its directedness toward unification with God that lies in the future, to a time that is notyet. The overvaluation of both the past and the future leave the religious consciousness of
Revelatory Religion in temporal dissidence. Reconciliation between human and the
divine is achieved, but only, as these underlying temporal threads reveal, in
representational thinking:
…its satisfaction thus itself remains burdened with the antithesis of a beyond. Its
own reconciliation therefore enters its consciousness as something distant, as
something in the distant future, just as the reconciliation with the other Self
achieved appears as something in the distant past (PS 787).
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In Christianity’s attempt to present its beliefs in narrative and historical mode, the
revolution in time that Hegel calls for—which disrupts the dichotomies of
transcendence/immanence, and infinite/finite— is not fully achieved. To this end, “…the
universal divine Man, the community, has for its father its own doing and knowing, but
for its mother eternal love, which it only feels but does not behold in its consciousness as
an actual, immediate object. Its reconciliation; therefore, is in its heart, but its
consciousness is still divided against itself, and its actual world is still disrupted” (PS
§787). As it stands, “the community of tolerance and the church have not yet discovered
their common identity;”32 both must “let go” of the distinctions that divide them, and
merge with one another in order to see that the content Religion takes to be sacred is in
fact the self’s own acts. In releasing their one-sidedness and giving themselves over to
unity, the two aforementioned shapes of spirit can together formulate the Notion, or the
content of Religion that is an act of the self-knowing Self. This marriage will allow spirit
to rise to its quintessential level of development. While it is not-yet able to see itself in
terms of the life of the spirit—that is through recollection, we can look back and organize
this history. When this is achieved, the content of Religion receives the shape of the selfassured spirit of Chapter Six. What was formerly ‘beyond’ now transitions into the self,
and becomes the element in which we dwell; this element is what Hegel will call Science.
When the religious and the secular views of spirit and Religion confess and forgive one
another, spirit then reaches the last brick of its long and winding road. Its complete
content fuses with the form of self-knowing self, and its Concept is finally realized in
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Absolute Knowing: “It is Spirit knowing itself in the form of Spirit” (PS §798). Such a
step will mark the transition from a theological to a philosophical rendering of the death
of God, the task of translating the content of the Revelatory Religion into the form of
philosophy is. And with this, Hegel draws the chapter of Religion to a close.
This promise of what lay ahead marks the end of the road, as it were, for the
concept of religion, yet for us, its expression—as gestured towards in Hegel’s passing
comments on love—remains to be further developed.
The Temporality of Love: Hegel’s “Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion”
Despite the passing of twenty some years since the publication of the Phenomenology,
both Hegel’s language and his solutions to the question of the relation between the human
and the divine remain consistent in his Berlin lecture series on the Philosophy of
Religion. While thematic overlaps carry over from both Glauben und Wissen and The
Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel’s objective in the lectures shifts, insofar as he here offers
a philosophy of religion. The lecture series, which Hegel delivered three times over the
course of ten years33 parallels his previous accounts of religion as spirit’s movement
towards an ever increasing conceptual richness, accompanied by an ever fuller,
conceptual framework, which was previously governed by a resemblance to, and now is
explicitly named as, Christianity. In the course of these lectures, Hegel robustly
articulates his version of this concept of religion, and in doing such, fleshes out what was
left in skeletal form in the Phenomenology and Encyclopedia forms of “Revelatory
Religion,” namely, the human and divine experiences of religion stripped of
determinacies, and elevated from a representational stance, to that of the conceptual: this
33
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finds expression in the experience of what Hegel calls absolute love. While the
organization and many details of the Lecture Manuscript, 1824, 1827, and 1831 versions
of the lectures vary in interesting an important ways, the main thrust of Hegel’s thought
remains consistent: the highest point of religion is “spirit: to know love [to know] oneself
in love” (LPR 785, Lecture Manuscript). The puzzle pieces contributing to this selfunderstanding – infinite love, infinite anguish (Schmerz),34 death (including the death of
God), resurrection, and the reconciliation of human and the divine, incorporating their
temporal divide—come together in an extensively expanded and amended speculative
presentation of the version of Revelatory Religion that we have already seen. As in the
Phenomenology, Hegel highlights three forms in which spirit posits itself in the
Consummate Religion: first, in the eternal being in the form of universality; second as
appearance or particularization in the form of being towards others; and third in the
return from appearance to self-presence in absolute singularity (LPR 186 1824 Lecture).
Developing these forms in the 1824 lectures first in terms of locales – divine history as
outside the world, in the world, and as the inner place, or as heaven within itself on earth
(LPR 187 1824 Lecture)— he next centerpieces them in terms of time:
The first element is God outside of time, God as the eternal idea in the element of
pure thought of eternity, but eternity only in the sense in which it is set against
time. This time that is in and for itself explicates itself by unfolding into past,
present, and future. The second element is the divine history as appearance, but as
a past time; it is [there], for appearance means something that is, that has being,
but it has a mode of being that has been reduced to a mere show. As appearance,
it is and immediately determinate being, which is simultaneously negated; this is
the past—exactly what is called history, which proves itself to be mere
appearance by the fact that it is only history. The third element is the present, but
34
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only the limited present, not the eternal present as such, but the present that
distinguishes past and future from itself. This is the element of heart and mind, of
immediate subjectivity—the spiritual “now” as it is in this single individual. But
this present also has to be the third element; the community raises itself to heaven
as well. So it is a present that raises itself, it is essentially reconciled brought to
consummation through the negation of its immediacy, consumed in
universality…(LPR 187-8 1824 Lecture).
In this lecture, Hegel puts explicit pressure on and offers an extended discussion of the
temporal aspect of the reconciliation of human and divinity—including a revised
transformation of the statement “God is dead.” Accumulatively, the statement here
achieves the objectives of both Glauben und Wissen and the Phenomenology, insofar as it
signifies a critique of Kantian and Enlightenment thought that casts God as an
unknowable beyond, the birth of a new time in which the divide between infinity and the
finite is overcome, the sorrowful feeling of Unhappy Consciousness, the historical death
of Christ, and now, collecting the heretofore moments throughout his thought, articulates
them in one breath—a breath that is the foundation for knowing the self in and as love.
Revisiting love in his mature works, Hegel in a sense, returns to the origins of his
early theological writings—when loved served as the bridge uniting reason and
revelation, Greek folk religion and Kant’s ethical doctrine. Intuiting oneself an other—as
love presupposes—offers a rich model for self-recognition in absolute otherness that
Hegel utilizes both in his description of friendship and erotic (what he will call familial)
love, but also to describe the apex of human and divine reconciliation. This process
occurs over the course of the three volume lecture series, which illustrates how “the
kingdom of God—or spirit—is to move from the universal to determinacy, to pass over
into actuality” (LPR 123 Lecture Manuscript). Even though spirit is always present in
each stage, it must pass through its own moments in order to demonstrate its own result, a
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process that, as Hegel states, is the same as articulating love: “Insofar as love is present,
its utterance and all the activities to which it gives rise, whereby it is simultaneously
brought forth and supported, merely confirm it. What is brought forth is already
there…”(LPR 195 1824 Lectures). While the divine is always there in and indeed as
finite subjectivity, finite subjectivity is not immediately aware of this (LPR 199-201 1824
Lecture). Hegel thus begins here, within the finite realm and the correlative sensuous
affective experiences of finite subjectivity, in particular the experiences of love and
anguish. The experience of love and anguish recur in the realm of spirit in religion, which
is always present but un-actualized, albeit in a wider and richer way. Both religion and
love, or as we shall argue in what follows, the religion of love, overcome all opposition,
and for Hegel, the two seem to coalesce insofar as love is always already infinite, but the
immediate experience of it, as something only shared between finite beings achieve a
higher expression. Indeed, when one is in love, an objective content makes a claim on
you and elevates you to another world. Everyday life becomes exceptional: the sun shines
brighter, birds sing more melodically, passions emote with heightened intensity, and the
world generally appears as an open door of possibility; song lyrics, daydreams, and the
otherwise banal quotidian occurrences all serve as reminders of love. Since “love
[consists] in giving up one’s personality, all that is one’s own, etc… It is a self-conscious
activity, the supreme surrender [of oneself] in the other” (LPR 125 Lecture
Manuscript).35
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Yet, such rapture has the inverse possibility for love's passion can fade away with
the sands of time, can be cut short by death or an unforeseeable circumstance, or it can be
given to another. For finite spirit then, anguish haunts love, for to fall in love is to
become attached to another being, and to be attached to another is to be vulnerable to the
loss of love, to the loss of that which is loved, or to the loss of oneself in the experience
of loving. For this reason, the pain of love is often associated with separation and
subjectivity, a pain that manifests as the anguish that comes from the separation of two
individuals when love takes place in a context that is inadequate to its fulfillment: when
one’s love with another is broken, when it changes, when it dies, or when it is met with
unequal intensity, one faces agony by virtue of the loss or devaluation of love. What is
more, when one loves another, she gives part of herself to her beloved, but in doing such,
she also runs the risk of losing herself. This possibility for love is present even in the
most banal, everyday language: She has lost herself in her love for another. When a loved
one dies, an emotional void or emptiness remains in her wake, for what is lost is not only
the loved one, but the sense of self obtained in their shared love. To this extent, death and
the loss it implies leaves one anguishing over the other, and unrecognizable to her own
self. Love and anguish then, are opposite ends of the same piece of string. In temporal
terms, death, the absolute annulment of finite subjectivity, shows that “…the pinnacle of
finitude is not actual life in its temporal course, but rather death, the anguish of death”
(LPR 125 Lecture Manuscript).
Such experiences showcase Hegel’s general polemic for natural humanity, or
finite spirit: finding itself in a form that does not suit its content, its life, which is filled
with contradiction, is ever vulnerable to falling asunder. To remain attached exclusively
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to the finite world then is to remain chained to particularity, and thus to suffering: “This
is the infinite anguish, the suffering of the world” (LPR 210 1824 Lectures). Insofar as
subjectivity remains wedded to a limited finite perspective—including that of its own
identity and particularity—it will suffer. This Hegel claims, is because “human beings are
inwardly conscious that in their innermost being they are a contradiction, and have
therefore an infinite anguish concerning themselves. Anguish is present only where there
is opposition to what ought to be, an affirmative” (LPR 305 1827 Lectures).
When raised to the level of speculative thinking, the relation between love and
anguish as unfolded from a finite perspective inverses, achieves positivity, to the end that,
love presupposes and indeed springs forth from anguish. The element of infinity serves as
that with which Hegel will distinguish particular love from its universality—whereby the
historical biblical story of the life and death of Jesus Christ provides the model from
which Hegel develops what he calls infinite love, or a “speculative” model of love.36
Recalling that speculative logic posits the identity of subject and substance in predicative
statements, we can again return to the phrase “God is dead,” or as Hegel states here,
“God has died, God himself is dead,” to trace the maturation of Hegel’s concept of love,
and to locate its generation from infinite anguish (LPR 125 Lecture Manuscript).37 Hegel
here identifies the idea of God’s death as a “monstrous, fearful picture (Vorstellung)…but
at the same time…the highest love” (LPR 125 Lecture Manuscript). Reading the phrase
speculatively, we recall straight away that all speculative propositions contain their
36
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reversal: Relinquishing individuality and identity in death, God overcomes death.
Although death is the negative, God’s death reveals its implicit positivity: death “…is
what reconciles. Death is love itself; in it absolute love is envisaged” (LPR 220 1824
Lecture). Love therefore provides the speculative intuition unifying what has heretofore
been indefinitely separable: God, who exists infinitely, and death, which is absolute
negativity, or the limit of finitude. Born out of death and in the overcoming of death,
infinite love is spirit: “love as [originating] in infinite anguish is precisely the concept of
spirit itself” (LPR 140, Lecture Manuscript). When Hegel claims that God is love, he
dismisses notions of God as unknowable or beyond, and instead avails divinity to all. The
capacity to love is implicit in every human and is, as Alice Ormiston remarks, “a
knowledge that resides within all of us, and to which [Hegel] believes we can all come
back, even in the midst of our alienation from it, will continue to provide for the modern
subject the seed that can flower into a fully rational human community, a community that
integrates all aspects of the self in a genuine and complete freedom.”38 One’s relation to
the divine is characterized by being outside of oneself and in the other— a speculative
unification of the one and the many, a unity in difference, or in short, a definition of love.
The task for finite subjectivity involves following this trajectory toward achieving
the affirmative, a process that entails actively striving, laboring—what Hegel will call
throughout his work, “tarrying with the negative.” In this engagement, one does not shy
away from the negativity, but embraces it, unearths its power and thereby transforms it
into something positive. The historical death of God gives for the first time a concrete
example of this tarrying and overcoming as “the negation of negation.” Like God, finite
38
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subjectivity must “die” that is, it must let go of its individuality “[give] up all external
distinctions in this infinite value, distinctions of mastery, power, position even of sex
(Geschlecht) and wealth” (LPR 138, Lecture Manuscript).39 Acquiescing all
distinctiveness, all traces of natural will, all differentiation in infinite love contains a
“revolutionary element to the extent that it gives the world another shape,” (LPR 187
Lecture Manuscript) one in which individuals recognize that love “[constitutes] the very
center of their being” (LPR 118 Lecture Manuscript) When Hegel discusses the
becoming substance of subject, he is pointing out in other terms “the unity of divine and
human nature…that humanity implicitly bears within itself the divine idea…as its own
substantial nature…: this infinite possibility is subjectivity” (LPR 109 Lecture
Manuscript). In the act of self-surrender subjectivity loses itself, but ultimately what is
lost is not loss at all.
The revolutionary element of which Hegel speaks that transforms the figuration of
one’s world is precisely the seizing of one’s own infinite possibility – a possibility that
comes to light when “humanity knows the universal and [knows] itself to be determined
for the universal, i.e., elevated above all locality, nationality, condition, life-situation,
etc.” (LPR 109 Lecture Manuscript). “By dying,” as Malabou reiterates, “Christ reveals
to the Western world a new revelation between spirit and finitude, in which death is the
limitation, the end of a linear series of moments linked one to the other” (FoH 120).
Knowing the self as a mediated harmony of finitude and infinity, one “enter[s] into the
relationship of spirit, of love—[this is] to be this relationship of spirit, of love...” (LPR
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293 1827 Lecture). Recognizing that one’s own self-substance itself is love opens the
door unto “eternal truth and eternal virtue, the region where all the riddles of thought, all
contradictions, and all sorrows of the heart should show themselves to be
resolved…”40All questions and concerns, problems and paradoxes, whether ethical,
epistemological, or psychological, lose their gravity, and become derivative. That is, they
emerge and point back to one, ultimate thought, that of infinite love.41 Thus, when one
sees that “God is the sacred center which animates and inspires all things,” the pain and
urgency of the concerns that constitute one’s particular life and its problems diminishes.42
Surrendering all ties to subjectivity in infinite love also revolutionizes one’s
relation to temporality. With the recognition that all thought is one thought of God, one
no longer remains entrapped with the ties of every day life, its concerns, and anxieties.
Leaving these in its wake, an experiential space of love opens and “radiates into the
temporal present”.43 This, as we argue, is the experience of eternity temporalizing itself,
what Hegel characterizes as an “intuition and feeling” in which “we are not concerned
with ourselves, our vanity, our pride of knowledge or conduct…”44 With this knowledge,
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“spirit frees itself of all finitude;”45 opening oneself to the freedom that is love. It releases
one from experiencing finitude as a limit, and thus, the experience of time, turns around
and revolves, and can be rethought as the overcoming of finite as a constraint, by
recognizing eternity in finitude. This revolution in temporality opens one’s eyes to the
vision that when the problems of particular, finite life are broken down and surmounted
by the one thought that is love, one forgets the angst of finite temporality, and lets it pass
away into eternal harmony. Hegel characterizes this as a dissolution or evaporation of
“finite aims, limited interests, toil, sorrow, unpleasantness, earthly, and finite cares.”46
“All of it,” he states, “wafts away into a kind of past.”47As the urgency of the experience
of finite time evaporates, an alternative way of experiencing time comes to the fore, one
that is divorced from “finite purposes, [disgust at] petty interests, the pain of this life,
[even if in isolated moments that are themselves unhappy] the troubles, burdens, and
cares.”48 This alternate way of experiencing time is the
Sabbath of life—in which all the unpleasantness and misery of the everyday
world—waft away into devotion’s present feeling or in devotion’s hope. All of it
wafts away into a kind of past. Psyche drinks from this river of forgetfulness, and
45
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in its doing so earthly cares and worries waft away and the whole realm of
temporality passes away into eternal harmony.49
However, that the finite drifts away into the past, loses its hold, and can be forgotten,
does not annul its occurrence. Rather, the experience has been surpassed by one with
more sophistication and thus, the past is no longer essential to spirit, for it has entered
into a new realm. Underscoring this point, Hegel describes the realm of eternity in
everyday temporal terms—“as the Sunday of their lives”50 or “the Sabbath of life.”51 This
description points to Hegel’s attempt to frustrate a classical structure of opposition— in
this instance, of finite and infinite, of temporal and eternal. Finite time is not simply
replaced with eternity, but rather, Hegel posits eternity temporalizing itself. Yet, the coexistence of the two experiences requires a different way of thinking, being, and
experiencing—this for Hegel is the role of the speculative that accompanies the richest
experience of God, namely infinite love.
Conclusion:
The extent to which Hegel has been influenced by Christianity, not only in his works
dedicated to religion proper, but indeed throughout his entire corpus, makes his thought
prone to suspicion for some readers. Yet, if it is true, as Hegel claims—and as we pointed
out in the inaugural moments of this chapter—that religion is present and presupposed in
all of us, we may ask, what stones remain unturned in his thought when reconceptualizing “religion,” departing from it as an institution, its history of blood-shed
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waged in the name of one sect or another, taking leave from the identities that tie one to a
type of practice, or rite of passage, and rather envision “religion” as a temporal
undertaking, indeed an experience, characterized by resolution, reconciliation, exaltation–
in a word, love?
In the reading of religion heretofore presented, we have argued that religion for
Hegel, when distilled to its essential ingredients, entails the knowledge of the temporal
co-incidence of finitude and infinity from both human and the divine standpoints, and at
its apex, discloses this knowledge through Absolute love. Unlike institutionalized
religion, love offers a fluid condition for belonging, one that remains open and available
to all, despite lines of descent or belief. Living the time of love, a time in which one’s
focal point for self-understanding shifts from singularity to plurality, to unity in
difference, unveils this about ourselves and about those whom we live amongst.
Yet, taking into consideration the multifarious post-Hegelian crimes to
humanity—the zenith of which lives on today in the lived memories of concentration
camp survivors—we must necessarily ask: does Hegel’s concept of love still contain the
fortitude for us, as it once had for him?
If we understand love as simply a sensuous feeling one has in response to an
other, then the rigor of Hegel’s vision of Absolute love necessarily deflates, for its
Absolute manifestation emerges only over time, and as a result of one’s own dedicated
effort. That is to say, cultivating love as a way of experiencing time seems to require
patience, dedication, and above all, hard work, a work that it seems, is up to us. If we
embrace Hegel’s claim that love is always already there with us, then the task of opening
ourselves to it falls to each of us, in our actions and interactions, each second, every day.
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Chapter 5: Absolute Presence: What it means to Know Absolutely
If we take eternity to mean not infinite
temporal duration but timelessness, then
eternal life belongs to those who live in the
present. Wittgenstein, Tractatus

Jean Hyppolite closes the chapter dedicated to reading Religion in his monumental book,
Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit with the following series of
questions:
Aren’t all the difficulties of the Hegelian system brought together in this last relation
between the finite and the infinite, the specific and the universal, in the form of time
and time and eternity? The Phenomenology presents the temporal conditions of this
absolute knowledge of the self. But how can we conceive this absolute knowledge?
What community succeeds the imperfect religious community? History presents us
only with nations which live and die; in this life and death spirit again finds that it is
“that which is equal to itself in its being-other” and takes refuge in the knowledge of
itself which becomes its eternal self-knowledge, philosophy. But is philosophy merely
a knowledge, or is it at the same time an act?1
The questions Hyppolite poses to Hegelian philosophy have stretched across national
boundaries, generations, and indeed divisions within philosophy itself. His final question,
“But is philosophy merely a knowledge, or is it at the same time an act?” falls
particularly hard on the mind of any philosophical thinker interested not only in
accumulating knowledge, but in putting that knowledge to work in self-conscious acts.
In response to Hyppolite, we first aim to show what philosophical absolute
knowledge knows vis-à-vis achieving self-knowledge; this entails explaining now
philosophically what was cast last chapter in terms of religion—namely the reconciliation
of finitude and infinity in Hegel’s speculative model of time, absolute presence. Reading
“Absolute Knowing” in light of Heidegger’s critique of Hegel, we maintain that the time
in its most developed experiential form entails a robust recognition of the past, present,
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and future and as such, is much closer to the notion of temporality that Heideggerian
ontology necessitates. Our interpretation of Heidegger reading Hegel offers a rejoinder to
Hyppolite’s intervention, arguing that Absolute Knowledge, which entails the cultivation
of absolute presence, is precisely what allows for human subjectivity to conscientiously
work on the self– that is to say, engage in the ongoing labor that is self-knowledge.

Absolute Knowing: Spirit’s Time contra Heidegger
Perhaps the single most important thinker of time in the 20th century, Martin Heidegger,
has become known as an essential analyst of the “metaphysics of presence” and
accordingly wages criticisms against the way in which the temporal present has been
employed in the history of metaphysics. The metaphysics of presence, he argues, is
conditioned by determining the past and the future in relation to the present in what he
calls the ordinary or 'vulgar' understanding of time, and by uniting the meaning of being
with presence. Such thought, he contends, has remained unquestioned and indeed unproblematized in the history of metaphysical philosophy at least from Aristotle to Hegel.
To be sure, Heidegger finds Hegel to be particularly illustrative of this tradition, and by
his reading, Hegel's concept of time is the quintessential expression of 'vulgar time,'—
the position that he seeks to distance himself from. While Heidegger advances a reading
of Hegel that undeniably, until very recently, has been the cornerstone of all subsequent
discussion concerning Hegel and time in the Continental philosophical tradition, it
nevertheless fails to rigorously think through the negativity of time, and in doing such,
does not account for the dialectic of time in Hegel's thought. Making such an omission,
Heidegger risks leveling the complexity of Hegel's rendering of time, even as he

198

criticizes it on the same grounds. Nevertheless, his reading of Hegel up until Catherine
Malabou’s book The Future of Hegel, has served as the prominent understanding of time
in his thought, to the end that much of contemporary philosophy has found time itself to
be the grounds for a collective “divorce” from Hegel (FoH 1). In spite of Heidegger’s
negative reading of Hegel, his thought overall has inalterably changed the ways in which
questions of time are framed in contemporary scholarship. For this reason, we engage
firstly with Heidegger, in order to show how a return to Hegel after Heidegger’s polemic
complicates, enriches, and brings further clarification to the question of time in Hegel’s
though.
The originating point for Heidegger’s ontology emerges from his reading of Kant:
Finding a ground for his new interpretation of Kant in the difference between the A and B
editions of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger in his so-called “Kant Book” looks
to Kant’s revision of the text, and puts pressure specifically on the diminished importance
of the imagination in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason.2 This shift,
according to Heidegger, attests to what Kant himself knew, but did not wish to
acknowledge—namely, that the imagination, even in its irrational determinations, resides
at the core of subjectivity. He writes,
Kant's laying of the ground for metaphysics asks about the grounds for the intrinsic
possibility of the essential unity of ontological knowledge. The ground upon which
it comes is the transcendental power of imagination. As opposed to the arrangement
of two basic sources for the mind (sensibility and understanding), the
transcendental power of imagination obtrudes as an intermediate faculty. The more
original interpretation of this previously laid ground, however, unveils this
intermediate faculty not just as original, unifying center, but rather it unveils this
center as the root of both stems.3
2
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Kant’s amended Second Edition, one that subdues the role of the imagination, bears
witness to this reading, insofar as, by Heidegger’s interpretation, emphasizing it could
compromise the essentiality of rationality that Kant had heretofore instituted. Precisely
this retreat invigorates the significance of Kant's philosophy for Heidegger. Finding an
ontological project in Kant, Heidegger grounds his new ontology in temporality, for
which the transcendental imagination serves as “originary time.”4 Finding Kant’s
amendments to silently acknowledge that reason alone could not be the only condition for
the possibility of knowledge, Heidegger claims that time—also and moreover— in fact, is
the fundamental notion in Kant's Critique. Following this line of argumentation, then the
Kantian project finally leads not just to a determination of what man is, but more
concretely, to human finitude. Precisely because humans are finite beings, we are the
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locus of the philosophical issue. In this sense, the question of finitude, in conjunction
with humanity, moves from margin to center.5
In his magnum opus, Being and Time, Heidegger's central task is to raise anew the
forgotten or covered over question of the meaning of being. To begin to ask such a
question, Heidegger must first ask about the entities for whom being is an issue—namely,
Dasein.6 Heidegger develops this in the second half of Being and Time, when he posits an
ontology of existence, and begins from within Dasein's concrete situation or “being-inthe-world” (In-der-Welt-sein). He claims that whatever one does is a negotiation or a
projection into the future, which is determined by one’s ‘thrownness,’ (Werfen ) that is,
the facts of social, cultural and personal history that make certain existential possibilities
open, and others closed. Most significantly for Heidegger, the meaning or underlying
significance of the being of Dasein is temporality. Temporality unites in a tripartite
structure (care), insofar as Dasein is: 1.) ahead of itself (future); 2.) already being in
(past); 3.) being in a world as being alongside entities encountered in the world (present).
One who exists as being-in-the-world must exist as ecstatic temporality, as transcending
itself in this threefold unity of ecstasies. This means that Dasein is open to the past, is
something futural, but that has been, and is making present. While temporality is the
ontological foundation of Dasein’s being as care, every mode of care is either authentic
or inauthentic. Heidegger rejects as inauthentic the notion that time is a sequence or a
series of nows that emerge from the future, offer themselves in the present, and disappear
into the past. This model assumes that time is a collection of self-contained units into
5
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which humans are dispersed, and moreover, it fails to explain how one single self can
persist unscathed through time. Instead, one is living in a moment that is grounded in
previous moments and in turn grounds the moments to come. Dasein is thrown out of the
past, into the present as it projects the future—it is openness to time, or, alternatively
stated, one does not live in time, but most fundamentally is temporality. Heidegger terms
his understanding of time ek-stakic (ecstatisch)—literally, a stepping outside of oneself,
derived from the “Greek ekstasis, meaning 'shaking, rocking', and then 'moving', 'away'...
and also a heightened emotional state.”7 Returning to Hegel from this Heideggerian
synthesis of time in the term “ecstatic,” we aim to, through it, confront various modes of
temporality coinciding with subjective experience, that we have traversed throughout the
course this dissertation, in an effort to enrich the impoverished account of time that
Heidegger finds in Hegel.
Arguing that time for Hegel dialectically matures beyond that which Heidegger
highlights the Encyclopaedia vol. II, “The Philosophy Nature,” we will turn to time’s
richest philosophical turning point, in “Absolute Knowing” in the Phenomenology of
Spirit, with the aim of offering a different philosophical interpretation of time than what
Heidegger sees. While fleshing out some of the details in Hegel's conception of time that
Heidegger overlooks and thus misreads, we will illuminate the primary commonalities
and points of convergence between the two philosophers concerning time in order to
show that for Hegel, the richest experience of time as absolute presence can only be
achieved once subjective spirit recognizes itself as a fully temporal being – emerging out
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of its past, projecting into its future, and making itself present. To this end, his
understanding of the temporal is can be read as an early anticipation of Heidegger’s
ecstatic temporality.
It is in the light of Heidegger's re-thinking of time that he structures his critical
engagement with Hegel, just as the curtains of Being and Time draw to a close in
paragraph 82. Here, Heidegger attends to Hegel's systematic account of time in the
“Philosophy of Nature” in his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Heidegger
sees Hegel's concept of time as ordinary and thereby lacking rigor insofar as he finds it
to: 1.) equate being with presence; 2.) be exemplary of 'vulgar time'; 3.) make the present
the primary axis of time, thereby covering over the primacy of the future and the past.
However, time for Hegel is not univocal, but dialectical, and a dialectical method renders
a double meaning, or two ways of seeing things. By extension, a dialectic of time
necessitates a double reading of time, which amounts to seeing, as Malabou notes, that
“Hegel works (in) on two 'times' at once” (FoH 13). The task then, is to see with Hegel
the two ways in which spirit experiences and knows time. To do justice to the question of
time in Hegel then, one must follow the procession of the dialectic, and for time, this
means seeing it in its infancy in the “Philosophy of Nature,” and in its maturity,
particularly in the final pages of the Phenomenology of Spirit. The task of the remainder
of this analysis is to highlight and to explicate the development of the concept of time
between these two texts, and in doing such, bring them into dialogue with Heidegger.
Heidegger's notion of 'vulgar time'—as we have alluded to— is a rendering of
time that he traces back to Aristotle, Physics Book IV, which amounts to 'the ordinary
understanding of time' in which the passing of time occurs in a string instants or nows.
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The point of reference for every facet of time is the present—the past is no-longer
present, and the future is not-yet present. Heidegger sees this in contrast to his own
ecstatic horizontal temporality, one that “temporalizes itself as a future which makes
present in the process of having been.”8 In some ways, Heidegger's assessment of Hegel
is correct, and indeed, insofar as nature and the experiences of the natural world are
spirit's starting point, its least mode of sophistication, Hegel would partly concur. But
Heidegger's consideration stops short here, and in doing such, it fails from the start to
comprehended the rigor of Hegelian time, even in its most basic guise in nature. In
claiming that Hegel's understanding of time is a “paraphrase” of the Aristotelian exoteric
of time, Heidegger seems to find essentially no distinction between the two accounts.
However, the key difference between Aristotle and Hegel's versions of the 'now' is that
while for Aristotle, the 'now' gives way to the following moment and in doing such
ceases to be, for Hegel, as Houlgate point out in his essay, “Hegel on Time,” “the 'now' or
the present is self-negating or self-sublating.”9 This means that each present is an active
act of self-negation, which differentiates itself from itself. Therefore, at the heart of
Hegel's conception of the now or the present is not a repetition of indistinct moments
passing into each other, as the standard rendition of ordinary or 'vulgar' time would have
it, but is difference itself. For this reason, Hegel can claim, “It is precisely the existence
of this perpetual self-transcendence which constitutes time” (PN §257Z). In a word, time
is self-development. Accordingly, the present does not simply demarcate a limit between
past and future, as Aristotle maintains, but is in and of itself the power, which by
8
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negating itself, instigates difference in each instant. The significance of Heidegger's
negligence of this point amounts to a leveling off of the motive power that impels spirit
incessant movement and restless development.
In the Phenomenology, a similar problematic occurs within spirit itself: as
negativity, spirit is temporal, but does not grasp itself fully as such. Instead, it intuits time
as something external: Time is “the external, intuited pure self that is not grasped by the
self” (PS §801). Understood externally, spirit's cognition of time is as the simple
expression of time in “Philosophy of Nature.” Here, Hegel describes it as “...the same
principle as the I=I of pure self-consciousness, but as time, this principle, or the simple
Notion, is still completely external and abstract as mere intuited becoming; it is pure
being-in-self, as a plain self-production” (PN §258 Remark). Since spirit does not yet
understand that time in its fullness is in truth its own self, it identifies time and in turn
history closely to the way in which Heidegger deems it as 'vulgar' – as something
external, calculable, vanishing, and other. Spirit, at this moment in the Phenomenology is
immersed in the philosophical problematic that Being and Time thematizes, and in this
regard, Hegel would agree with Heidegger's assessment that such a model of time is
unsatisfactory; but Heidegger overlooks the perpetual development of spirit— and thus,
fails to see that this is not where spirit remains.
As the chapter progresses, the language with which the temporal is expressed
changes, and accompanying this change, the significance of the past, future, and present
as spirit comes to know itself in its richest, most sophisticated form. As in the
“Philosophy of Nature,” space takes the form of time implicates the past, present, and
future axes of time, and again here the movement recurs with spirit. The Science that
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Absolute Knowing gives rise to consists of a recollection of the historical, where the
becoming of spirit is an externalization, a becoming of itself in time. He begins to
demonstrate this by characterizing the becoming of consciousness as a “gallery of images
each of which [is] endowed with all the riches of Spirit… (Galerie von Bildern)” (PS
§808). Recollecting this gallery reproduces the ecstasy and the fury of consciousness’
long journey on the highway of despair. To know its substance is not to know something
outside itself, and so it is therefore a turn into itself in a moment in which spirit
“abandons its outer existence and gives its existential shape over to recollection (Gestalt
der Erinnerung)” (PS §808). In the time of nature, the present is intimately related to the
past insofar as time is space that destroys itself. This same movement will reappear on a
higher level, that is as “Absolute Knowing” in the Phenomenology. What has been gained
in chapter seven entitled “Religion,” is the insight that even though they are dead and
seemingly lost, the past worlds and the Gods, the people, art, thought and culture that
constitute these worlds nevertheless live on for spirit (and indeed for us) in a veiled
recollection (Erinnerung) (PS §753). Internalizing in memory what has been lost, spirit
takes possession of what already belongs to it, and makes these possessions subject.
Spirit now knows that it is equipped with the ability to look upon the past in the present,
to see it as something that conveys something meaningful about who it is, about who we
are. The past then becomes more than an endless succession of meaningless disparity— it
is something that belongs to us, something we recognize ourselves in. This occurs with
more concretion, as we will see in a few short paragraphs, by taking up past worlds and
by making them a part of the history of Science. Internalizing the memories of the shapes
of its existence, it makes subject substance. This illustrates, as we saw in Religion, that
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memory has an organic quality, insofar as it is capable of being internalized, integrated,
incorporated into the fabric of our being. This of course means that memories are a part
of us, not just vapors in the head, as it were, but constituting factors of our substance. At
any given moment, one carries within the burdens and delights of a merry-go-round of
past worlds, of patterns of consciousness; yet this is often forgotten or overlooked, and
thus past experiences that are handed down to spirit as “acquired property” appear to
spirit externally (PS §28). Spirit “recalls them to the inward eye, but has no lasting
interest” in them (PS §28). It thus internalizes cognition without focusing its sustained
attention, or dwelling on them. The trace of these experiences is in its substance, so in
watching the rapturous show of moving shapes, the lights and color capture its attention,
but spirit has no desire to remain stationary within them (PS §28). To this extent,
Erinnerung works for Hegel by placing us, by locating us within a time and a culture. It
does this paradoxically by momentarily displacing us, dislocating us, and our sense of
who we are. In this regard, we are a past which is no longer, for we have transcended that
moment, that space, that experience, and yet it remains with us as us. One can hear
Heideggerian echoes in Hegel, for like Dasein, spirit is its past; it comes to itself only
insofar as it is historical, something that has been. Both Dasein and spirit are their past,
and thereby make decisions and act in view of the coherency and integrity of an enduring
person with a past and a future.
The foundation for a developed notion of futurity was laid in the “Philosophy of
Nature,” where time as negativity is always pushing forward into the future to become
something else. Similarly, while Heidegger's Dasein is projecting futurally from a past,
and making present, Hegel's spirit in the Phenomenology is striving, and moving forward
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futurally, overcoming what has been, while simultaneously preserving these moments.
Like Dasein, spirit's futural orientation is motivated by affectation; for Heidegger,
Dasein's resoluteness for the future happens in and with anxiety for its being-towardsdeath; for Hegel, spirit's futural projection is motivated by spirit's dissatisfaction with the
'world' it inhabits. The pressing issue, however, and indeed the one that provokes most
strongly Heidegger's contention with Hegel, concerns the possibility of a future after
spirit has reached Absolute Knowing. To this end, Heidegger reads Hegel as bringing
closure to time (and history), thus foreclosing the possibility of the future, that is, of
Dasein's most fundamental temporal ecstasy—where the primordial or originary
temporality “temporalizes itself primarily out of the future.”10 While a complete
argument for the future in Hegel must be set aside from our present aim, an abbreviated
and truncated initial reply to the question of the future in Hegel11 can be found in the
textual evidence of the future, of what is to come, as he articulates it in “Absolute
Knowing”—where for Hegel, like Heidegger, death and futurity are intimately linked.
For Heidegger, authentically projecting ahead in being-towards-death throws Dasein
back to itself and urges it to contemplate its facticity, and to this end, the projection of
death enlivens and intensifies Dasein's engagement with its own most possibilities. For
spirit, death is not only a limit, insofar as it is a demarcation of finitude and transience;
but by transforming this boundary, as we have argued Hegel does through the death of
God, it also opens up a new beginning; death is an ending that thrusts spirit forward into a
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new birth, a new world, a new way of being. This new beginning is “now reborn of
spirit's knowledge—[it] is the new existence, a new world and a new shape of spirit” (PS
§808). Precisely because that which is negated (aufheben) in death is also always
preserved, the experience of its outside world is also maintained in its internal existence.
In a sense, it is the end of the world, but in another, it is just the beginning: It is “the
bursting forth of the blossom” in which the bud has disappeared, but the trace of it
remains (PS §2).12 The past that lingers as Erinnerung is not lifeless, but rather, a death
that gives way to a new birth, to the future.
Despite the inroads that can be found bridging partially the distance between
Hegel and Heidegger, the deepest ravine separating them comes at the concluding
moments of the Phenomenology, when spirit transforms its heretofore experience of
representation (Vorstellung) into conceptual thinking—philosophy—or, what Hegel calls
Absolute Knowing; a complete knowing that resolves itself from its relations, and relates
only to itself. When spirit grasps itself as what it is truly, Hegel claims it annuls time (PS
§801). Perhaps these few lines of text are the most contentiously debated, ones that have
given rise to endless controversy regarding precisely how to read Hegel on time.
Revisiting the lines, Hegel writes:
Time is the Notion itself that is there and which presents itself to consciousness as
empty intuition; for this reason, Spirit necessarily appears in Time, and it appears
in Time just so long as it has not grasped its pure Notion, i.e. has not annulled
(tilgt) Time. It is the outer, intuited pure Self which is not grasped by the Self, the
merely intuited Notion; when this latter grasps itself, it sets aside (aufheben) its
Time-form, comprehends this intuiting, and is a comprehended and
comprehending intuiting (PS §801).
12
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In claiming that spirit annuls time, does Hegel intend to call an end to time altogether?
By Heidegger's interpretation, the Aufhebung of time marks a clear and decisive break
with the temporal, and ushers in a state of steadfast and unchanging present as spirit's
constitution. Reading the text more carefully though, this seems to be implausible—and
the importance of understanding time in two ways is further underscored. Grasping itself
as itself, spirit sublates its time-form, but as always, the work of Aufhebung is not mere
annihilation. Rather, the Aufhebung of time marks an ending of one type of understanding
of time—that is, time as it is understood in the everyday sense of one moment endlessly
passing into the next. This model of time is in which “the subject sees itself as a passing
moment,” (FoH 128) and does not recognize its own temporal multiplicity.13 Reading
Hegel in this light brings his thought decisively closer to that of Heidegger; spirit no
longer recognizes 'vulgar' time, the infinite series of passing nows, as truthful, but intuits
itself in its utmost being as something temporal—yet not merely a perishing entity. This
understanding facilitates the two ways in which Hegel will claim the preservation of
spirits can be regarded: one side “appearing in the form of contingency, is History”; the
other side is a philosophically rooted system of organization and comprehension, “the
Science of Knowing in the sphere of appearance” (PS §808). The shapes that spirit took
throughout the text turn into, appear for us, as passing moments – and to this end, the
early dialectic of space and time from the Philosophy of Nature recurs, but now at a
higher level. Here, like Heidegger, Hegel draws a distinction in history: it is the historical
succession of the shapes of spirit exists in contingency, and, when grasped conceptually,
it is organized as shapes of spirit in Science (PS §808). In terms of time, the first is the
13
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time of contingency, which is 'annulled,' and the second is its own history and its selfproduction, which is preserved in spirit.
The most fundamental difference between Heidegger and Hegel's conceptions of
time and history is that the former adheres to radical facticity, and the latter to the time of
“eternity.”14 It is with this concept that our analysis turns to the last point of contention to
be considered: the marriage of being and presence. That Hegel unifies being and presence
is clear, and thus, upon first glance, Heidegger's criticism of such a linking in Hegel is
warranted. Looking in closer detail though, Hegel's notion of presence as articulated here,
and thereby his unification of being and presence is not entirely that of which Heidegger
accuses him. Recall that in the “Philosophy of Nature,” the concept of time dialectically
develops out of Hegel's consideration of space; as the negativity of space, time emerges
out of space and thus is not simply given, but is generated. This means that for Hegel,
time is not merely there, but must be dialectically derived, whereby arguing for this point
is the task of Paragraphs 246-258. Precisely this point, as Houlgate argues, is missed by
both Heidegger and Derrida, who each claim in their respective ways that Hegel takes
time for granted by from the outset by automatically equating being with presence.15 In
14
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the Phenomenology, the same gesture recurs, albeit on a higher level. The co-implication
of being and presence in “Absolute Knowing” is not simply given, but is spirit's
accomplishment: “Spirit has won the pure element of its existence, the Notion” (PS §804,
emphasis mine). Such an achievement enables spirit to conceptually organize the
moments of history, for now it relates to itself as it is—as intuited time in Absolute Spirit.
Even though the basic underlying gesture of the Phenomenology is precisely selfovercoming through spirit's restless movement, an activity that conditions each of the
transitions in the text, Heidegger’s myopia whilst considering Hegel and time prevents
him for seeing this. Albeit in different ways then, underlying and constituting both
Dasein and spirit are time(s) and temporality, history and historicity. To see this
continuity though requires that time and history in Hegel are tracked and interpreted,
through and with its movements, in its own dialectical generation.
Having reopened Hegel’s explicit philosophical account of time via Heidegger, we
can now revisit Hyppolite’s question: “…in this life and death spirit again finds that it is
“that which is equal to itself in its being-other” and takes refuge in the knowledge of
itself which becomes its eternal self-knowledge, philosophy. But is philosophy merely a
knowledge, or is it at the same time an act?”
While Heidegger’s project stresses the essentiality of recovering the forgotten and
thereby covered over origins of fundamental temporality as “originary time,” Hegel will

Hoy, The Time of our Lives, 77). This, for Derrida, is the 'trace' – the absence of presence and the
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otherwise, but ultimately he uphold the vulgar understanding of time. Derrida, Jacques. “Ousia
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argue for a return, but only after one has traversed, struggled through, and ultimately
overcome the temporal limitations which support its own self understanding. This means:
in madness, contextualizing oneself in a time shared with others; ascending one’s own
bodily disclosed experience of time, and its sexual specificity; challenging the silent yet
pervasive inherited structures of history, of culture, that condition expectations about
power and ability; breaking from institutions—including those that facilitate our most
intimate of personal belief— all in the name of cultivating a space and a time, in which
one can recognize herself, as inseparably a part of others, with the temporal fluidity to
build future plans, that emerge out of a specific past, and condition present circumstances
in which one lives. The labor, the act involved in this process is precisely that which
allows spirit to return with a higher level of understanding to its own starting line; only
by struggling with itself, in a long and varied path, can spirit rejoin to itself, with the
satisfaction of knowing that what it recovers is not simply given, but the product of its
own effort. This accomplishment, we maintain, now in philosophical terms is speculative
time—the absolute present. Describing the collection of temporal axis constituting the
absolute present, Hegel states,
Whatever is true exists eternally in and for itself – not yesterday or tomorrow, but
entirely in the present, ‘now’ in the sense of an absolute present. Within the Idea,
even that which appears to be past is never lost. The Idea is of the present, and the
spirit is immortal; there is no past or future time at which it did not exist or would
not exist; it is not over and done with nor does it yet not exist—on the contrary, it
exists absolutely now. This in fact means that the present world and the present
form and self-consciousness of the spirit contain within them all the stages which
appear to have occurred earlier in history” (LPH 150).
As is clear, absolute presence is not the negation of finitude, but the attitude one obtains
to in their temporal openness—an openness that allows fluidity, whilst committing to the
rigor required of speculative thinking. And, as we already know, once one arrives at the
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speculative, everything appears differently, and therefore, personally and philosophically,
the importance of grasping the speculative moment is not to be missed. It is precisely that
which allows for a new opening, a novel way of interpreting and seeing, both in
philosophical terms, and in the interpersonal. In Ferrarin’s words, “if our reading of past
philosophies is a living engagement, and if in the past we look for one idea in some
particular aspect, then the history of philosophy cannot be historical scholarship. It must
be speculative; and the past for the speculative philosopher is the living present.”16
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Conclusion: Seeing Difference Differently
Everyone thinks of changing the
world, but no one thinks of
changing himself. – Leo Tolstoy
If we are going to change the
world, we need to change hearts
and minds. – J.M. Bernstein

The lesson learned in the culminating moments of spirit’s journey throughout the
Phenomenology in “Absolute Knowing” point precisely to the precarity of being human:
refusing to dirty one’s hands, as it were, by retreating to the spiritual bliss that one might
find in religion and religious experience simply will not suffice. To become thoroughly
human means to be in one’s own self a manifestation of spirit, whilst actively engaging in
a world— tattered with social, political, and spiritual inequality, violence, destruction,
and greed—with the knowledge that others, too, are themselves involved in such.
Rendering this visible, this dissertation has argued that the human subject for Hegel is
fully temporal, and by seizing the specificity of the different temporal modes in which
spirit resides, a space unclaimed as of yet by readers of Hegel, particularly those with
feminist ambitions, opens for re-thinking and re-constructing the ways in which
differences can be conceived and perceived. By accentuating the most controversial
elements in Hegel’s philosophy, those that have served as reasons for dismissing Hegel’s
thought for countless critics, elements which are, to be sure, also profusely personal—
madness, sexual difference, love, racial and gender difference, religion, historicity and
temporality—we have argued that through recourse to the temporal aspects latent in each
of these, one can find perspectives in Hegel’s thought itself that not only challenge the
fortitude of the critiques heretofore waged against him, but also and moreover, provide
productive platforms for advancing new perspectives on these standpoints.
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Interrogating the time of madness brings to the fore the virtually untapped depth
and breadth of temporal expression in Hegel. Madness disrupts time, and by displacing
the regulatory temporal ordering, it problematizes the every-day conception of time as
past, present, future. It is precisely this interruption that places a philosophical demand
upon us, one that asks us to reflect upon even the most pedestrian moments of human life.
To this end then, to ask about madness is to ask about how time is felt, and how time is
lived. In and through such questions, a space for the unexpected breaks open, reminding
us of what has been long covered over, or never before thought. One such line in Hegel is
that reason can emerge in various guises, not all of which are cool, calculating, and
formalistic, as is habitually thought, and routinely attributed to Hegel the man. In fact, if
we follow Hegel, madness is, in its own way, an expression of reason, albeit one in
disguise. And yet, an element of madness, as the analysis of laughter suggested, is always
potentially within each of us, and can erupt uncontrollably at the most inconvenient of
times. Such moments can usher in seconds, minutes if we are lucky, of sheer pleasure,
reminding even the most serious of us the joy of unguarded, raw human emotion – the
inverse of which can destroy us, send the strong and the weak equally scrambling to pick
up the pieces of a life, of a self, inextricably woven with others, and as such,
unimaginably fragile.
Turning engaged attention to a sexual life, inquiring into the moments that
constitute a shared love, or, “multiple loving forms,” we illustrate the potential for a
return to the question of love and sex in Hegel on the basis of time. Recognizing that our
bodily life discloses in its givenness specific experiences of time, we maintain, and
against the grain of much feminist literature, that the seeds for a phenomenology of the

216

reproductive body in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature can be unearthed, and brought to
fruition, by putting pressure on a co-articulation of reproduction, production, and time.
Turning to Hegel’s particular understanding of world history, we have argued that
gender emerges within, and indeed changes throughout, a shared history and culture. This
becomes particularly evident when reading the experiential models of time that
underscore spirit’s movement through history: circular, linear, and their representational
and speculative resolution, for which Antigone served as the catalyst of the former, and
we the philosopher, for the latter. Nevertheless, the fortitude of history and gendered
histories can be challenged through Fanon; returning to Hegel’s black Africa through
him, the deeply problematic aspects of Hegel’s rendering of history become glaringly
obvious; and when read in unison with gender, the question arises as to whether gender
itself might be a residual product, whose origins trace back to colonization.
Looking at the ways in which one experiences a relation with the divine in
religion, we learn that, for Hegel, spirit is not something “out there” or “beyond,” and if
we fail to recognize this, our conceptions of the self as human subject will fail precisely
because they are partial, and do not understand the sense in which we belong to, and
indeed in our substance, are a part of a larger community. Through the “Death of God,”
however, this gap between the human and the divine can be in part mended, and a new
model of time, and in turn subjectivity can emerge—one that, through a reconciliation of
the antinomies of, human and the divine, finite and the infinite, humans are able to see in
themselves, and in others, a universal community. The time of love that unfolds in this
common vision is a time equally of rigor and of resolution—it is the achievement of
absolute presence.
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Yet, what might such a temporal expression mean in philosophical terms?
Translating the content of religion into philosophy through an engagement with
Heidegger, we have argued that absolute presence presupposes that which Heidegger
found wanting in Hegel: a fluid self-understanding of the self as a fully temporal being.
This understanding, to be sure, is an accomplishment for spirit, one in which it can
recognize itself in the product of its own sustained labor.
Isolating these moments in Hegel’s thought, we have demonstrated the
seriousness of thinking through time in Hegel. Having spanned a range of temporal
modalities in Hegel, we can now return to our point of departure, and to Hegel’s initial
moments in the “Introduction” to the Philosophy of Spirit to ask again into the meaning
of speculative presence in spirit’s aim of self-knowledge, and the bearing this has on
subjective difference.
In some sense, who one is in relation to the world is intimately bound up with one’s
advance projections, which determine how things in the world appear. To this end,
one’s engagements with the world are enveloped in her projections into it, which means
concretely, that there is a strong correlation between who she is and what she sees. Hegel
describes this as seeing self-recognition in absolute otherness, where, as we have argued,
a rich model for self-recognition in absolute otherness can be found in absolute love, or
the standpoint that names the view from absolute presence. This vision is what allows us
to live Hegel’s speculative philosophy, that is, to recognize subjective differences as
irreducible in their import, but at the same time, to see an underlying unity in what has
heretofore served to divide us.
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Turing to time to cultivate what is not specifically thematized by Hegel himself,
but is still present in his thought we see the importance, perhaps even the essentiality of
Hegel for our time. Counter-intuitively, we can find radical resources in and amidst his
thought, sharpening the tools with which a critique of subjective differences can be
waged, opening up the possibility to see the world and those within it with new eyes, and
thereby breathing new life into the social and political possibilities immanent in the deep
well of Hegel's philosophy of time and temporality.
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